Daily Report

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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

Soviet Official Signs Protocol Normalizing Ties 1
USSR's Kvitsinskiy, Delegation Arrive 28 Jul *[ATA]* 1
'Joint Statement' Normalizing Ties *[ATA]* 1
30 Jul Protocol Stresses Developing Relations *[ATA]* 1
Malile Receives Kvitsinskiy *[Tirana Radio]* 1
Tirana AWP Committee Discusses Job Creation *[ZERI I POPULLIT 25 Jul]* 1

BULGARIA

Zhivkov's Public Defense Appeal to Parliament *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Zhivkov Letter Read to National Assembly *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Kyuranov Withdrawn as BSP Presidential Candidate *[Sofia Radio]* 4
Parties View Presidential Election Round Five *[BTA]* 5
Parliamentary Commissions Established 30 Jul *[BTA]* 5
'City of Truth' Explains Protest at Assembly *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Radical Change Clubs Declaration on Civic Unrest *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Kolarov's Remains Removed From Mausoleum Wall *[DUMA 25 Jul]* 6
Ashes To Be Buried in Son's Grave *[DUMA 26 Jul]* 7
Ration Cards Introduced in Stara Zagora *[Sofia Radio]* 7
SFRY Ambassador Summoned on Entry Refusal *[BTA]* 7
Yugoslav Ambassador Rejects Letter *[BTA]* 7
Soviet Oil Supply Cut Not Meant as Sanction *[BTA]* 8
Minister Belchev Provides Data on Foreign Debts *[BTA]* 8
DUMA Reports on Foreign Debt Details *[23 Jul]* 8
Romanian Call for Reactor Shutdown 'Groundless' *[Sofia Radio]* 9

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Havel Refuses Resignation of Press Spokesman *[Prague Radio]* 11
U.S. Congressmen Letter on Cuban Representation *[LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE 28 Jul]* 11
Foreign Ministry Note Rejects Cuban Accusation *[Bratislava Radio]* 11
Slimak on U.S. Visit, NATO, Warsaw Pact *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 27 Jul]* 11
Delegation Leaves for Pentagonal Meeting *[CTK]* 12
Further on Meeting in Venice *[cross-reference]* 12
Visa Obligations With Switzerland Abolished *[Prague Radio]* 12
Trnka on Ministerial Recall Demand by Civic Forum *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 27 Jul]* 12
Extraparliamentary Assembly Established 30 Jul *[CTK]* 13
Democratic Forum: CPCZ Not Left Wing *[RUDE PRAVO 26 Jul]* 13
Nuclear Power Plant Safety Said Improved *[CTK]* 13

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Soviet Memo on Internment Camps Presented *[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 27 Jul]* 14
Foreign Ministry on CSCE's 15th Anniversary *[ADN]* 15
De Maiziere To Stimulate Trade, Agriculture *[NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 28-29 Jul]* 16
Diestel Against Professional Ban on Former Stasi *[ADN]* 16
Honecker Declared 'Not Fit' for Prison *[ADN]* 16
Former Prisoners Demand Compensation *[Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG 29 Jul]* 16
East Berlin Radio To Become 'Radio Aktuell' *[ADN]* 17
* New Berlin Constitution Text Published *[BERLINER ZEITUNG 18 Jul]* 17

HUNGARY

Preliminary Results on 'Invalid' Referendum *[Budapest TV]* 29
Further Data *[MTI]* 29
Spokesman Briefs Newsmen on Media Law, Issues *[MTI]* 29
Parliamentary Session on Media Bill Resumes *[MTI]* 29
Antall Speaks on Freedom of Press *[MTI]* 30
Law Adopted on Media Appointments *[MTI]* 31
Horvath Addresses Parliament on Self-Government *[Budapest Radio]* 31
Constitutional Court Elects New President *[MTI]* 31
President's Interview *[Budapest Radio]* 32
Official Discusses Military Academy Exchanges *[Budapest Radio]* 32
New Military Attorney General Appointed *[MTI]* 32
Defense Official Queried on Upcoming Changes *[Budapest Radio]* 32
Interior Minister Interviewed on Policies 33
Argues for Phone, Mail Intercepts *[Budapest Radio]* 33
Comments on Procedures, Soviet Influence *[Vienna KURIER 30 Jul]* 34
Plan To Replace Agriculture Minister Denied *[MTI]* 34
Industry-Trade Minstry Holds News Conference *[MTI]* 34
Competition Office To Replace Price Office *[MTI]* 35
Smallholders Head Speaks to Anticommunist League *[MTI]* 35
President Goncz Opens Gypsy Solidarity Day *[Budapest TV]* 35
Latest USSR Troop Withdrawal Figures Listed *[MTI]* 36
Bank Official on FRG Credit, Trade Surplus *[MTI]* 36
FRG Company Buys NEPSZABADSAG Shares *[Budapest Radio]* 36
Official Reviews GATT Uruguay Round Talks *[MTI]* 36
IMF Consents to Second Credit Withdrawal *[MTI]* 37

POLAND

Skubiszewski Discusses Warsaw Pact Reforms *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 26 Jul]* 38
FRG Officials, OPZZ Officials Hold Talks *[PAP]* 38
Economists Discuss Polish-FRG Relations *[PAP]* 39
Officials React to Reports on Terrorism Links *[PAP]* 39
Poland Seeks Interrogation of Katyn Perpetrator *[PAP]* 39
Government Protests Lvov Travel Restrictions *[PAP]* 39
Sejm Fails To Adopt UN Children's Amendment *[PAP]* 40
Mazowiecki Receives Soviet Ambassador 30 Jul *[PAP]* 40
Pakistanis Attempt To Cross Into GDR *[PAP]* 40
International Youth Congress Adopts Charter *[PAP]* 40
Russian Trade Unionists Visit Warsaw *[PAP]* 40
Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk Outlines Policy *[PAP]* 40
Vetting of Security Service Employees Continues *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 28-29 Jul]* 41
Supreme Chamber of Control Reforms Viewed *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25 Jul]* 41
Economic Indicators for Jul Reported *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Jul]* 43
Independent Credit Banks Foundation Established *[PAP]* 44
Council of Ministers Approves Development Policy *[PAP]* 44
Commentary on Poland, Need for 3-Party System *[Surdykowski in RZECZPOSPOLITA 26 Jul]* 44
Powers of Parliament, Presidency Viewed *[Winiorek in ZYCIE WARSZAWY 25 Jul]* 45
Cabinet Outlines Police Firearm Use Guidelines *[Warsaw Radio]* 46
Democratic Action Founding Congress Held *[PAP]* 47
Democratic Action's Frasyniuk on Program *[TYGODNIK GDANSKI 29 Jul]* 48
Solidarity, Center Accord Officials on ROAD *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 28-29 Jul]* 50
Center, Democratic Action Prospects Assessed *[Jakubowski in TYGODNIK GDANSKI 29 Jul]* 50
Alliance of Solidarity Factory Cells Planned *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 26 Jul]* 51
Citizens Committee Creates Political Commission *[Warsaw Radio]* 52
New Spokesman for Walesa Appointed *[PAP]* 52
Social Democrats Discuss Progress of Pluralism *[PAP]* 52
Polish Socialist Party Congress in Sep-Oct *[Warsaw Radio]* 52
Federation of Greens Holds Second Congress *[PAP]* 52
Lower House Adjourns Until Sep *[PAP]* 52

ROMANIA

* Aims of National-Liberal Party *[LIBERALUL 29 Jun]* 54
* Brucan on NSF Actions To Control Unrest *[ROMANIA LIBERA 17 Jul]* 55
Munteanu's Father Wants U.S. Embassy Protection *[DREPTATEA 18 Jul]* 57
Cluj Demonstrators Request Munteanu's Release *[ROMPRES]* 57
Prosecutor General To Review Munteanu's Case *[ROMPRES]* 58
Deputies Pass Bills, Ban Property Sale *[ROMPRES]* 58
Mediation Commission Proceedings *[ROMPRES]* 58
Conservation, Wages, Commercial Bills *[ROMPRES]* 59
Diplomatic Ties With NATO Planned *[ROMPRES]* 59
Daily Reports Doina Cornea Criticism Abroad *[ROMANIA LIBERA 19 Jul]* 59
Premier Roman Arrives in Madrid for Talks *[ROMPRES]* 59
Health Minister Receives PRC Ambassador *[ROMPRES]* 59
Iliescu Receives Ivory Coast, Egyptian Envoys *[ROMPRES]* 60

YUGOSLAVIA

Markovic: All Republics Want To Stay in SFRY *[BORBA 26 Jul]* 61
Presidency Denounces RELINDJA Commentary *[TANJUG]* 66
TANJUG Views Reaction to Markovic Party 66
First Collective Bargaining Contract Signed *[TANJUG]* 67
Slovenia's Kucan Warns Against 'Party Interests' *[DELO 23 Jul]* 67
Bosnia Reserve Officers Support Markovic Party *[TANJUG]* 68
Bosnian-Hercegovina Assembly To Have One Chamber *[Belgrade Radio]* 68
Foca Prisoners Protest Amnesty Provisions *[TANJUG]* 68
Serbian Assembly on Election of Key Officials *[Belgrade Radio]* 68
Serbian Socialists Adopt Draft Constitution *[TANJUG]* 69
Serbian Militia Alleged Repressions in Kosovo *[RILINDJA 24 Jul]* 69
Kosovo Serbs Buy Weapons, Ammunition *[RILINDJA 25 Jul]* 70
DSK Warns Against Arming Serbs, Montenegrins *[TANJUG]* 70
Five Political Parties Registered in Montenegro *[TANJUG]* 71
Montenegrin Communists Announce Congress *[Belgrade Radio]* 71
Parties in Serbia To Register Beginning 29 Jul *[POLITIKA 24 Jul]* 71
Socialist Party of Serbia Registered *[TANJUG]* 71
Croatian Serbs' Declaration of Autonomy *[POLITIKA 26 Jul]* 72
Croatia's Tudjman on Croatian-Serbian Relations *[TANJUG]* 72
Macedonian Muslims Protest 'Nationalist' Parties *[TANJUG]* 73
Democratic Action Party Demands Muslim Autonomy *[TANJUG]* 73
Slovene Leader Peterle Visits Italy *[TANJUG]* 73
Meets With Pope, Andreotti *[TANJUG]* 74
Summarizes Visit *[Ljubljana Radio]* 74
Foreign Ministry Reacts to Bulgarian Statement *[TANJUG]* 75
Serbian Republic, Russian Federation Hold Talks *[TANJUG]* 75

Soviet Official Signs Protocol Normalizing Ties

USSR's Kvitsinskiy, Delegation Arrive 28 Jul

AU3007112190 Tirana ATA in English 0925 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Tirana, July 30 (ATA)—A delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Y.A. Kvitsinskiy, arrived in Tirana on July 28. It will conduct negotiations on the normalization of relations between Albania and the Soviet Union.

Present to welcome it at the airport were Prof. Sofokli Lazri, Sokrat Plaka, deputy foreign minister, and other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

'Joint Statement' Normalizing Ties

AU3007174590 Tirana ATA in English 1703 GMT 30 Jul 90

["Albanian-Soviet Joint Statement"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, July 30 (ATA)—The People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, proceeding from the common desire to develop friendly relations and cooperation on the basis of observing sovereignty, full equality, and the noninterference in the home affairs of one another, agreed to normalize their bilateral relations and resume as soon as possible the activity of the embassies in the capitals of the two states.

30 Jul Protocol Stresses Developing Relations

AU3007174690 Tirana ATA in English 1705 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Tirana, July 30 (ATA)—The protocol "On the Normalization of Relations Between the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" was signed at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on July 30.

The protocol was signed for the Albanian party by Sokrat Plaka, deputy foreign minister of the PSR of Albania and for the Soviet party by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Yuliy A. Kvitsinskiy.

The signing ceremony was also attended by Prof. Sofokli Lazri, who represented the Albanian party at the negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries as well as senior officials of the foreign ministries of the two countries.

The protocol stresses that both parties are for a vast development of mutual relations in the political, economic, scientific, technical, cultural fields and in other domains relying on the principles of full equality and in the spirit of friendship and cooperation of mutual interest.

Malile Receives Kvitsinskiy

AU3007183290 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1800 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Reis Malile, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, today [30 July] received Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskiy delivered a friendly message sent by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Foreign Minister Reis Malile. Among other things, the message stresses that the normalization of relations between the USSR and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania marks the beginning of a new period of valuable and fruitful cooperation between our countries. After stressing the feelings of sympathy and friendship that exist between our two peoples, it expresses the wish that joint efforts will lead to a high level of dynamism in Soviet-Albanian cooperation in all fields. I am sure, he adds, that reciprocal Soviet-Albanian understanding will (?be good for) Europe.

F eign Minister Malile expressed his thanks for the message and said that he shared the views of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze regarding relations between our countries. He stressed that the Albanian Government considers the normalization of relations to be an important event which paves the way for friendly bilateral cooperation. He also spoke briefly about the process of the further democratization of life in our country and the main guidelines of the Albanian Government's foreign policy.

Views on achieving relations between our two countries and on questions of today's international situation were also exchanged at the meeting, which passed in a friendly atmosphere.

Tirana AWP Committee Discusses Job Creation

AU3007210390 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 25 Jul 90 pp 1-2

[Bashkim Koci report: "A Swift Response To Solve Specific Problems—From the Tirana District Party Committee Plenum"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Based on analyses and the preparedness of Communists and working people, a Tirana District Party Committee plenum was recently held to take action on issues that are in the interests of the people. The plenum will discuss how to cope with the great amounts of work required in fields which directly affect people's living standards, such as unemployment [forcat e lira], the construction of 3,200 apartments, and so forth. The plenum considered these not merely to be tasks for state and economic bodies, but primarily for party organs and basic organizations.

Let us talk more concretely. Soon (before the end of August), all those without jobs in Tirana will be employed. Of course this will not be easy. There is a

considerable number of people who must be employed, not just in order to receive a wage, as they say, but to contribute to economic progress and higher production. This was considered to be an essential and very important duty. Meanwhile, some comrades at the plenum were rightly worried that some difficulties would be overcome solely by administrative order—"Do it because the plenum said so"—rather than drawing on the study and experience that many of the capital's economic enterprises posess. Experience is available, and demands that the administration, engineering, and technical staff proceed with imagination in creating new jobs and in organizing and reorganizing in the most economically beneficial ways. The plenum mentioned the practical example of the comrades at the shoe factory. What is being done in this factory, and how are the problems of increasing the labor force and using labor effectively being viewed? If 350 workers have been employed in the last two years, 200 more have been employed in recent days. Two new sections have been opened, and workers have been employed throughout the factory. The aim is to give specialized work to highly qualified workers, while young workers are employed to deal with simpler tasks. [passage omitted]

Zhivkov's Public Defense Appeal to Parliament

AU3007183690 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] BTA Varna Bureau received a declaration from Angel Tsonev, chairman of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party Central Committee, who was appointed Todor Zhivkov's public defense counsel by the committee plenum on 15 July 1990 in Varna. The declaration is addressed to the Grand National Assembly deputies. Considering that we have been talking quite a bit about Todor Zhivkov recently, and that we will hear even more from him in the future, I would like to brief you on the aforementioned declaration, which reads:

The time in which we live urgently requires that we revise and reassess Comrade Todor Zhivkov's activities as state leader. In this connection we are confronted with a well-concocted and persistent campaign to subject the leader of the Communist Party, who played a leading role in our state, to public trial. This intention, inspired by violence, represents a severe assault on the workers and communist movement. The public defense counsel has incontestable evidence proving the innocence of the former head of state, the declaration states.

We are convinced that we shall be victorious in this trial.

The public counselor urges the National Assembly deputies to stop the trial against Todor Zhivkov.

We do not have enough time to cite the declaration to the National Assembly deputies in its entirety, but we shall just quote the following sentence which tries to persuade the deputies: Todor Zhivkov is a clever statesman and he has something to say to you, the National Assembly deputies, and to us who are involved in political affairs. This was a declaration of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party Central Committee.

Zhivkov Letter Read to National Assembly

AU3007180690 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1559 GMT 30 Jul 90

["Open letter" from Todor Zhivkov to the Grand National Assembly, read by Ivan Glushkov, deputy chairman of the National Assembly Presidum—live]

[Text] Esteemed National Assembly deputies, certain circumstances are forcing me to address this letter to you. I carefully listened on the radio to the procedures concerning my appearance at the Grand National Assembly. I will say frankly that I am amazed at certain things: In the first place, more than two hours were devoted to procedural questions on my future appearance at the 27 July session, and again over two hours were devoted to the same subject on Friday, 29 July. Perhaps as much time will be devoted to it at the session on Monday, 30 July.

At the same time, however, only 15 minutes will be generously—in quotes— granted to me for a statement on vitally important issues concerning the country's past and present. In the second place, it was a question of inviting me to speak to the Grand National Assembly and not of an obligation to be conducted—in quotes—and to answer—in quotes. Let us put aside the legal aspect of the matter, but humanitarian or ethical considerations should oblige you at least to treat me not as a criminal, but as a citizen of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Third: The proposal of the parliamentary group recommended that I should be asked at least some basic questions in advance. As you understand, I could not possibly be expected to answer in a correct and competent manner without relying on certain figures, analyses, and facts which are not currently available to me, considering my long isolation. The request that I be asked ad hoc questions could only enable me to answer with general evaluations and prevent me from providing competent replies.

Fourth: It was my wish that the meeting be directly broadcast by radio and television. I would like to speak before all people because I feel mainly responsible to them. Fifth: Do you realize what situation would emerge in the country as a result of my appearance and who do you think should assume the responsibility for a possible escalation of tension resulting from my public appearance and statement? Or will the blame be put again on me as it happened so far? I cannot and will not assume this responsibility.

These circumstances make me think that some people would like to use me as an instrument for achieving their own goals and personal interests. I declare that I will not let myself be turned into a plaything in the hands of any political group whatsoever. At the same time, I would like to ask the esteemed National Assembly deputies whether the Grand National Assembly realizes the situation in which the former head of state has been placed? This absurd situation persisted for months in contradiction with all domestic and international laws. For several months the prosecution organs have given in to political pressure and are trying to draw up indictments which immediately collapse when they are confronted with undeniable facts. In other words, a man is arrested before facts and evidence for his indictment are established. Doesn't this remind you of events belonging to the remote past?

The decision of the National Assembly points out that it will not deal with the problems of my penal accountability. As a matter of fact, it is precisely my political activity as a state and party leader which is subject to trial, and attempts are being made to define such activities as criminal. I understand that in a political system in which powers are divided, rights and responsibilities cannot be taken away. However, you know, esteemed National Assembly deputies, that the legal action was not taken by the Prosecutor's Office, it was taken under the pressure of a commission attached to the former National Assembly. The methods of this commission were dubious and irregular. The commission collected and processed —in quotes—rumors and sensational

news. It would be correct for the Grand National Assembly today to provide guarantees for the prosecution, so that it may do its job really in conformity with the law, instead of bending to pressure from the outside.

As far as I know, in the most recent international history only one head of state was prosecuted and sentenced. This was Emperor Bokassa in Africa, who was accused of conspiracies, murders, and atrocities. So, I should be the next?

As to my personal responsibility, I can say with a clear conscience and after a thorough assessment of my life: As a party and state leader of this country for 33 years, I am ready to assume the greatest political responsibility for everything that was achieved. Whether the positive achievements prevail over the negative ones, whether you all lived through those years in darkness and hopelessness, whether mothers bore children during those years, whether we suffered disasters, or lived in fear, whether the Bulgarian people had goals and ideals—all this is not up to me to evaluate.

Only the Bulgarian people and history can answer such questions. I am sure that they will be severe judges. However, I am convinced that they will be just, that they will categorically reject political nihilism and vulgar condemnation. Everything I did was inspired by my conviction that it was to Bulgaria's benefit. I may have committed mistakes, but I am not responsible for crimes against my people, and I am ready to assume political responsibility for my shortcomings.

For this reason, esteemed National Assembly deputies, I regard my appearance in parliament as a particularly responsible act toward the Bulgarian people and the National Assembly deputies. Therefore, in refraining from a meeting with you at this point because of the current situation that has emerged, for which I am not responsible, I declare and repeat my wish for an extensive and frank interview. I am willing to answer all questions, either during my trial, if it should take place, or on any other occasion if it should be suspended. In that case I will again insist on meeting the National Assembly deputies, or I will seek another public opportunity of meeting the people. 29 July 1990, Respectfully, Todor Zhivkov.

Kyuranov Withdrawn as BSP Presidential Candidate

AU3007135490

[Editorial Report] Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian from 1200-1230 GMT on 30 July carries a live relay of the continuing session of the Seventh Grand National Assembly in Sofia.

The session is opened by Grand National Assembly Chairman Nikolay Todorov, who also chairs today's meeting. Among his announcements, Todorov states that "after consultations with the Grand National Assembly parliamentary factions, unanimous agreement has been reached to transmit live over television the appearance, speech, and answers of Todor Zhivkov before the Grand National Assembly." He adds that "we will discuss this issue later on." Todorov also announces the presence on the platform of "a group of Swedish parliamentary deputies," and then opens the continuation of the debate on electing a new national president.

Aleksandur Lilov, leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), makes a 13-minute speech concerning the presidential election. "In my capacity as chairman of the BSP parliamentary group," says Lilov, "I am authorized to make an important political declaration to the Grand National Assembly in connection with the difficulties that have arisen in electing a president for our republic." Lilov notes that the people have seen how, after seven days and four secret votes, parliament has been unable to elect a president. Without dramatizing the situation, says Lilov, the delay in electing a president "has already turned into a worrying presidential crisis," and "is undoubtedly destabilizing the situation in the country," which may lead "to unforeseeable consequences."

Lilov voices the BSP parliamentary group's "concern over the symptomatic difficulties that have arisen and our worries over the delay in electing a president of the republic." He says that the "polarization in the presidential election debate" so far reflects "the polarization that has existed recently in our society and that is even increasing." According to Lilov, "The issue is not who gives way and who gains the upper hand—this way is a blind ally, in our view" and "to travel along it is politically dangerous." "The issue," says Lilov, "is to find a correct and productive basis for discussing and resolving the presidential issue." Lilov reiterates the BSP belief in the need to reach a national consensus for a peaceful transition from totalitarianism to democracy. He states that "a written or unwritten agreement is needed between the main political forces for overcoming the existing polarization and sharp confrontation in our society." He says that "we, the BSP, do not want a monopoly of the whole of power and are not striving for this," but regrets that it has been impossible to reach agreement with the opposition on "a reasonable division of state power." He calls on his fellow members to rally around the "supraparty goals" of solving the country's problems, in order that parliament's proceedings become "much more productive and successful" than the wrangling and displays of party passions in the debates so far. He speaks about the lack of trust, uncertainty, and confrontation evident in society at present.

"In view of all the above," says Lilov, "in the name of the BSP parliamentary group, I withdraw the candidacy of Professor Chavdar Kyuranov for the post of president of the republic." "We do this with regret, but out of a high sense of national responsibility," says Lilov, although Kyuranov would have made "a worthy, capable, and authoritative president." He says that the BSP wants "a president who will guarantee civil peace, stability, and unification of the whole of society in bringing the country out of the crisis."

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), follows with a five-minute speech in which he also refers to the "growing social and political tensions," "between the capital and the provinces, between the large towns and the villages, between the intelligentsia and the other social strata between the youth and older people, and between ethnic groups." He refers to the "escalation of pressure outside parliament upon the Grand National Assembly," often "coming from opposing directions and different parts of the country." "This tension," says Zhelev, "is at the moment increasingly concentrating around the presidential election," and therefore the SDS believes that the president must be elected as soon as possible.

Zhelev then stresses that the SDS respects Kyuranov and Vulkov as worthy candidates, but proposes Dr. Petur Dertliev as "the most suitable candidate in the present political situation." He tries to allay fears within the SDS that by Dertliev's election the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party will gain much greater influence and power, "producing a imbalance to the left of the center." Zhelev says the SDS believes that "there exist effective means to counteract this."

He is followed by Elena Kircheva, who makes a one-minute speech renewing the candidacy of Viktor Vulkov, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BZNS) chairman, whose election, she says, "will eliminate the dangers of a strengthening of the forces to the left or to the right." The meeting goes into a recess following the speeches.

Parties View Presidential Election Round Five

AU3007181090 Sofia BTA in English
1645 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—After the fifth round of voting, in which the M.P.'s had to choose between Dr. Petur Dertliev of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and Mr. Viktor Vulkov of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS), Bulgaria still has no president. Mr. Vulkov collected 257 votes, only three votes short of the required two-thirds majority he needs to be elected.

"I still believe that all parties should be represented in the government, and its form is open to discussion," Mr. Viktor Vulkov told a crowd of reporters who assumed he was the new president, in the break during which the M.P.'s cast their votes. Asked whether his party will form a coalition with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] if he becomes president, Mr. Vulkov answered that the BZNS will go into a coalition with the BSP provided that other parties join, too.

Mr. Aleksandur Lilov, the BSP leader, said he had voted for Mr. Vulkov. He had predicted during the break that the socialists will support Mr. Vulkov. He was proved right. Mr. Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, also thinks that Mr. Vulkov will be the new president.

"Viktor Vulkov has got a chance," said Mr. Milan Drenchev, the leader of the SDS-affiliated Nikola Petkov BZNS.

While the voting was in progress, opposition M.P.'s in the lobbies were busy counting the Nikola Petkov BZNS M.P.'s because, judging by the previous rounds, some of them have voted for Mr. Viktor Vulkov.

Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev of the SDS believed that in the fifth round, the Socialists would vote with their conscience. He said he would not be disappointed if Mr. Viktor Vulkov wins. He sees in him a "worthy and authoritative person who is capable to hold consultations on the formation of a government." Asked about the type of government he meant and whether a coalition was possible, Mr. Ludzhev said it was too early to say.

The voting had merely begun when Mr. Mikhail Nedelchev, the SDS spokesman, guessed right that it would not produce a winner "because the BSP has not instructed their M.P.'s and their votes will be distributed between Dr. Petur Dertliev and Mr. Viktor Vulkov."

"I won't be surprised by the result of the fifth round, whatever it may be," Dr. Petur Dertliev said before he learnt that he had polled 130 votes, 127 less than the rival candidate Mr. Viktor Vulkov.

"Politics is impossible without compromise," said Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov during the voting. He does not resent the withdrawal of his nomination by his party and said he expected it all along. Mr. Aleksandur Tomov of the BSP said the withdrawal of Prof. Kyuranov's nomination was not an agreed gesture. In his view, that was part of the grand compromise which the BSP is seeking. In this way it demonstrates that it is a party which does not want a monopoly of power, Mr. Tomov emphasized.

After the unproductive fifth round, the parliamentary factions retired for deliberations. After that the parliamentary factions of the BZNS and of the SDS again asked for a break.

Parliamentary Commissions Established 30 Jul

AU3007205990 Sofia BTA in English
1954 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—The drafting and the promulgation of a new constitution is one of the principal tasks of the Grand National Assembly, which elected today a 53-member parliamentary committee to work out the draft of the new basic law. The panel is chaired by Mr Ginyo Ganev M.P. of the Fatherland Union, deputy chairman of parliament. Its three deputy chairmen belong to the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, respectively. The members of the committee comprises, apart from the leaders of the major political forces, leaders of SDS-affiliated political parties, the leader of the Movement For Rights and Freedoms and M.P.'s representing different other political

forces. The Grand National Assembly approved the composition of some other parliamentary committees.

'City of Truth' Explains Protest at Assembly

AU2807161290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] The council leadership of the City of Truth in Sofia gave our representative the following explanation of the incident which occurred last night in front of the parliament building:

After the concert by Lili Ivanova in the central Sofia square last night, some of the audience, who were displeased with the proposal that the parliamentary hearing of Todor Zhivkov not be broadcast live on radio and television, spontaneously set off toward the National Assembly Building. Foreseeing possible consequences, the leadership of the City of the Truth attempted to organize the participants into a silent procession, so that their action should not get out of control. However, a large group of people, not belonging to the City of Truth, appeared from the direction of Aleksandur Nevski Square, refused to accept the guard provided and, jumping over the barriers, reached the doors of Parliament.

In the situation that developed, with the assistance of the militia and the guards of the City of Truth, cordons were formed with the aim of limiting the actions of these people. According to the leadership of the City of Truth, after the meeting with Stoyan Ganev [spokesman of the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces], most of the citizens present in the square dispersed; the persons who catcalled the members of parliament were not inhabitants of the City of Truth.

The leadership of the City of Truth expresses its regret over the resignation of Minister Semerdzhiev and considers that his conduct was completely honorable as an officer and a citizen of the country. It has been announced that a working Sunday will be held tomorrow in the City of Truth, in order to reseed the green spaces around the Archaeological Museum and to clean up the area in accordance with public health requirements. The council of the City of Truth appeals to the citizens of Sofia to help by providing suitable tools and grass seed.

Radical Change Clubs Declaration on Civic Unrest

AU2907190590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] The National Conference of the Clubs for Radical Change of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] continues in Sofia today. The conference adopted the following declaration directed toward the national political forces and to Bulgarian citizens:

Democracy, which has barely emerged in our country, is in danger. The citizens of Bulgaria have great expectations of the Grand National Assembly solving the country's crucial problems. However, from the very beginning of the Assembly's work, the danger has emerged that the parliamentary mechanisms may be blocked by uncontrollable ultimatums. The fanaticism in the street is growing and threatens to deteriorate into extremist actions and civic chaos. Is it possible that the command-bureaucratic diktat of the recent past might be replaced by escalating, aggressive actions of a new minority which claims to have a monopoly over the truth? Is it not strange that numerous people are again afraid of expressing their opinions and that a new form of intolerance against people who think differently is emerging?

We call on the members and on the leadership of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. We are confident that many of you do not support the rude and dictatorial tone, and all the actions that exceed the limits of normal civic protest. Nevertheless, there are people among you who encourage the attacks against parliament and democracy, and we, on both sides, know that even just demands, when they are expressed in the form of violence, can only undermine democracy. Many of those who are now relying on street aggression against parliament do not realize that they might soon become the victims of such aggression. Provocation on one side is about to evoke a response from the opposite side involving unpredictable results likely to destroy our common home.

We do not wish the legally elected parliament to lose the people's confidence, thus depriving our country of the opportunity of peaceful transition to democratic organization. It would be normal for the Grand National Assembly to review the petitions submitted by the deputies, and the declarations of their constituents. However, it is abnormal for National Assembly deputies themselves to inspire the undermining of the just emerging parliamentariasm. Our path to democracy is much too difficult and long for us to permit ourselves to proceed along it with feelings of hatred. Let us not remain a forgotten geographical spot on the map of the Balkans, involved in civic violence and unrest. Let us be worthy of our claim to be a civilized state, a part of Europe.

Kolarov's Remains Removed From Mausoleum Wall

AU2807200590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] Yesterday morning [24 July], between 0900 and 1200, the mortal remains of Vasil Kolarov were removed and transferred from the wall of the Mausoleum in Sofia. The help of a special crane was needed to shift the massive marble slab.

The transfer of Vasil Kolarov's remains was carried out in accordance with a request submitted by his close family and relatives to the Executive Committee of Sofia City People's Council. We have been informed by the Board of the Central Sofia Cemetery that the remains will be interred in the grave of his father, Petur Kolarov.

Ashes To Be Buried in Son's Grave

AU2807200690 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 26 Jul 90 p 2

[Text] The urn containing the ashes of Vasil Kolarov will be placed in the grave of his son, Dr. Petur Vasilev Kolarov, and not in his father's grave, which is in Shumen.

Ration Cards Introduced in Stara Zagora

AU3107104990 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Ration cards [taloni] for the sale of foodstuffs and consumer goods, which are in short supply, will be introduced as of tomorrow in Stara Zagora, our local correspondent Nayden Rangelov reports. Citizens are requested to submit applications to the townships for obtaining the ration cards. Hundreds of people have been lining up since the early hours of this morning to submit their applications. Considering the extremely large staff of the Stara Zagora Municipal Council, this unnecessary waste of time could have been avoided if work had been better organized, our correspondent Nayden Rangelov comments.

SFRY Ambassador Summoned on Entry Refusal

AU3007124090 Sofia BTA in English 1142 GMT 30 Jul 90

["For Mutual Respect and Equality-Based Good-Neighbourly Relations"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—As it is well known, the Initiative Committee for the Celebration of the 87th Anniversary of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising, comprising representatives of the major political and public forces in Bulgaria, appointed a delegation which was to lay a wreath on the grave of Gotse Delchev in Skopje.

At the request of the Initiative Committee the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassador of Yugoslavia to Sofia about the visit of the delegation. Subsequently the Yugoslav side stated that the delegation was "unwelcome to Yugoslav territory."

In connection with the statement made by the Yugoslav side and the refusal of the Yugoslav border authorities to allow entry to the delegation, the ambassador of Yugoslavia has been invited to a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at which Mr. Stefan Staykov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, stated that the decision not to allow the wreath-laying ceremony was an unprecedented act which would by no means contribute to the promotion of the two countries' relations. The contents and the tone of the statement made by the Yugoslav federal secretary of foreign affairs were rejected as inadmissible in the relations of two sovereign independent states enjoying equal rights. The arbitrary qualification of the initiative launched by the above- mentioned public committee as "a provocation," as pressing territorial claims and disputing Yugoslavia's sovereignty and the arbitrary evaluation of the leader and the members of the delegation were defined as an attempt to mask the real cause for stopping the delegation—to prevent the laying of a Bulgarian wreath on Gotse Delchev's grave.

It was pointed out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been asked to inform the Yugoslav side about the intended visit of the Bulgarian delegation and not to apply for permission. Such a permission is not necessary as no visas are required for travels to either country and it is the two countries' regular practice to just inform each other about visits of their delegations. It was pointed out that Yugoslavia had signed the Vienna document and that her decision in this case runs counter to the all-European tendency to open the frontiers and allow free movement and association of people.

It was underlined that the statement of the Yugoslav side made it necessary to remind some elements of Bulgaria's position on the Macedonian problem laid down in the declaration of the Bulgarian National Assembly of March 6, 1990. Bulgaria is within her rights to express concern over the situation of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia and to require guarantees for its self-determination and expression of its national self-identity. The attempts to form and assert a nation within the SR [Socialist Republic] of Macedonia on an anti-Bulgarian basis and the related illegal claims to recognize a non-existent "Macedonian ethnic minority" in Bulgaria are doomed to failure. All actions taken in Yugoslavia in this direction cannot and shall not be treated in any other way but as an interference in Bulgaria's internal affairs, as an encroachment upon her national sovereignty and pressing on her territorial claims.

Once more Bulgaria's position of principle was confirmed that it would be to the interest of both countries to conduct an equality- based constructive dialogue, to create an atmosphere of mutual respect and equality-based good-neighbourly cooperation and to observe the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Bulgaria will work along these lines, relying on Yugoslavia's readiness and understanding as to the adoption of a similar approach.

Yugoslav Ambassador Rejects Letter

AU3007191290 Sofia BTA in English 1820 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—Ms Maya Vaptsarova, president of the Macedonia All-Bulgarian Union, and Mr Vladimir Manolov, member of the Grand National Assembly from the Petrich Constituency, requested to hand a letter to the ambassador of Yugoslavia but were turned down.

The letter asked the ambassador to intercede with the Yugoslav authorities to allow the laying of a wreath at the grave of Gotse Delchev on behalf of the Macedonia All-Bulgarian Union.

Soviet Oil Supply Cut Not Meant as Sanction

AU3007142790 Sofia BTA in English
1344 GMT 30 Jul 90

["Decreased Soviet Oil Supplies Are Not Political Sanction"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—There is no question of any political sanctions or Lithuanian syndrome, stated today the deputy chief of the Soviet mission in Sofia, Mr. Vladimir Ivanisov, commenting on the cutting down of the Soviet oil supplies to Bulgaria. We are in a difficult situation, the oil production has decreased, which affected the deliveries to many countries, Bulgaria included, Mr. Ivanisov underlined at a news conference held in the Soviet mission today.

Mr. Ivanisov expressed his concern over the anti-Soviet wave that has spread in Bulgaria of late. According to him the impression is that of going from one extreme to the other: from boundless praises to total rejection. "Now it seems that in Bulgaria they take exception to Soviet culture too, Soviet music is less and less frequently heard on radio," he said, and stressed that come what may, the Soviet Union will always have a special attitude towards Bulgaria. He considers that the relations between the two countries should be the same as between friends who are realists.

Asked about the Bulgarians who live in the territory of the Soviet Union, in Moldavia and the Ukraine, Mr. Ivanisov said that this problem has been artificially complicated. Their cultural ties with Bulgaria and the exchange of literature are welcome and as to the demands for autonomy, this problem could be settled within the framework of the legislation of the Soviet Union.

Minister Belchev Provides Data on Foreign Debts

AU3007210290 Sofia BTA in English
1948 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sofia, July 30 (BTA)—By June 30 Bulgaria owed a total of 10,384,600,000 dollars, Mr Belcho Belchev, minister of finance, told parliament, answering an M.P. question. This debt is made up of 9,512,900,000 dollars owed by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank and of 871,700,000 dollars owed by the other commercial banks. It includes the outstanding debt due for repayment, as well as the indebtedness on forthcoming imports and the open letters of credit.

Bulgaria's largest creditors are banks in the Federal Republic of Germany (1,821,900,000 dollars), followed by banks in Japan (1,394,500,000 dollars), Austria (1,144,800,000 dollars), Britain (1,096,600,000 dollars) and France (517,900,000 dollars).

A total of 398,300,000 doliars are owed to the Moscow-based International Investment Bank, and 141 million dollars are owed to the International Bank For Economic Cooperation in Moscow. The minister of finance said that Bulgaria does not have bilateral debts with the countries with which it settled its accounts in nonconvertible currency.

Mr Belcho Belchev listed the composition of the foreign debt as follows: 1,659,200,000 dollars in state-guaranteed investment credit, 3,801,200,000 dollars in collateral commodity credit of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, 3,654,500,000 dollars in long-term monetary credit, and 855,500,000 dollars in short-term credit. The principal totals 9,974,000,000 dollars, and the due interests total 414,200,000 dollars.

This year Bulgaria has to repay a total of 3,367,000,000 dollars of its foreign debt, and in 1991, a total of 1,795,300,000 dollars. In Mr Belchev's view, the amount of servicing in 1990 and 1991 is considerable and can be considered as a decisive reason for the freeze on payments.

The minister of finance explained that the moratorium on debt servicing, introduced in late March 1990, affected only the indebtedness of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, while the debt of the rest of the commercial banks reflected normal credit relations and settlements with foreign banks and their operation was not impeded by the suspension of payments.

Mr Belchev told the M.P.'s about the amounts owed to Bulgaria by other countries. The credits which Bulgaria granted and on which it receives regular or overdue payments totalled 2,216,500,000 dollars by June 30.

Bulgaria's largest debtors are Iraq (1,222,600,000 dollars), Libya (265,400,000 dollars), Nicaragua (172,000,000 dollars), Algeria and Nigeria (102,000,000 dollars each). Other developing countries owe smaller amounts.

DUMA Reports on Foreign Debt Details

AU2907160190 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian
23 Jul 90 pp 1,2

[Veselka Marinova article: "The Secret Safe With Information on the Foreign Debt Is Opened"]

[Text] Because of the current foreign debt, the country's economic situation is unfavorable and even critical; on 30 June, the foreign debt was $10.3846 billion. Nonetheless, according to its indebtedness, Bulgaria holds fourth place among the CEMA member countries, following the USSR, Hungary, and Poland. This classification is not quite accurate, however, because it does not take into account the resources of the countries, or the per capita debt. It should be added that the bank has enough funds at its disposal to cover personal foreign currency deposits.

At the end of 1970, the country's foreign debt amounted to only $1.1138 billion. During the following years the debt varied slightly in both directions (which is natural in foreign trade interrelations), and the country ended 1984 with a debt of $2.9229 billion. The reasons for this stable development of the economy over almost 15

years, and the almost problem-free mutual relations with creditors, may be sought in many directions. One thing though, was of substantial importance. The rise of cash receipts from the export of Bulgarian goods made it possible to make regular debt payments as they fell due, and to utilize the free foreign exchange resources without attracting foreign credits.

The year of 1984 should be remembered. It proved crucial for the country's later economic development, because it marked the last favorable period in our foreign trade relations with other countries. In 1985, Bulgaria already owed foreign creditors $4.1197 billion, and from then until the end of 1989 this indebtedness increased two and a half times. A few months later, on 29 March 1990, a situation was reached which put an end to the country's good reputation as a reliable payer of its debts. At the government's request, Bulgaria sought a postponement of payments on debt installments for 1990 and 1991.

For the first time in the last three decades, Bulgaria, which had not missed a single payment (regardless of many difficulties, hitches, and strains), was unable to repay its creditors on time. The situation is further complicated by the fact that this year the country has to repay 36 percent of the present debt.

It is interesting to take a look at how this debt of more than $10 billion is made up, because this will show who provided foreign currency when, and at what cost.

The credits for the country's economic development come from almost 200 foreign banks—the largest ones in almost all the developed countries. We owe the most to the FRG—namely $1.8 billion—followed by Japan, to which we owe $1.4 billion. Bulgaria's creditors in Austria and England have laid out a billion apiece, while Canada expects to get the least back—only $3.1 million. There is a simple explanation for this distribution of the debt by countries. For many years Bulgaria maintained close links with the German economy, so the FRG and Austria are the countries that granted credits on the most advantageous terms of interest. Our foreign exchange relations with Japan, against the background of a not particularly active goods exchange, are also no accident, because in recent years Japan has shown a pronounced and lasting interest in the countries of East Europe. The Japanese credits are used mainly for importing equipment and paying obligations to other creditors.

A further detail, not without importance, is which currencies are not jingling in the state's pocket. At present, 46 percent of the foreign debt is in dollars, 33 percent in Deutsche marks, 8 percent in Swiss francs, and 6 percent each in Austrian schillings and Japanese yen. The remaining 1 percent of the debt is distributed among many different currencies.

The internal reorganizations, ambitious investment programs (in 1984 the country started purchasing equipment for the Radomir combine and other big projects), and the lack of any return flow of foreign exchange from these projects whatsoever, make up one side of the foreign debt problem. The other side is that in 1988 and 1989 the exports of Bulgarian goods fell steadily, while at the same time debt installments fell due for settlement. The country entered a most vicious cycle: the less currency it had at its disposal, the more frequently it was forced to take short-term credits of one or two years duration.

Nonetheless, however gloomy and alarming the figures may seem today, the specialists of the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank still see a glimmer of sunshine: The economy has not yet reached a stage where it is necessary to take credits at any price. For the time being, the country is suffering only one penalty for its inability to pay—the interest rate has been raised 0.875 percent. One step has also been taken to alleviate the critical situation: We have applied to the World Bank for the payments for this year and next year to be postponed by 10 years, with no payments of capital or interest to be made during the first five (so-called gratis) years. However, this does not mean that Bulgaria intends by these postponements to freeze all foreign payments, for the economy cannot come to a stop.

During the downward plunge of the economy over all these years, the movement of foreign exchange within the economy has not been according to bankers' laws, but to the laws of the grocery store. Some 15 million leva was spent on reconstructing the streetcar line to Knyazhevo, as much as was spent a few years ago on developing agriculture. It was the rule, not the exception, for foreign currency not to be remitted to those who earned it, but to be reallocated to sectors whose foreign currency earning power was insignificant. In 1988 the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank issued the first serious and well-argued alarm concerning the critical situation by announcing that the state reserves had been drawn on.

At the end of last year, universal alarm and confusion dealt the final crushing blow to the foreign debt position. In December 1989, the country still had a small reserve of $1 billion at its disposal. However, instead of following the usual banking practice of warning creditors and freezing payments, the state treasury opened its coffers one last time. During three months there was an outflow of $1.5 billion (including new loans), in order to repay credits obtained. Thus, almost all the state's reserves melted away. One reserve actually still remains, but this does not inspire much hope, at least for the moment. Bulgaria not only has to pay out money, but is also supposed to receive it. The country is owed 2.3367 billion dollars, but the debtors are Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Syria, Mozambique, and Angola,... and they do not intend to pay.

Romanian Call for Reactor Shutdown 'Groundless'

AU2907184390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] An announcement disseminated by ROMPRES on the results of the meeting of a Bulgarian-Romanian

joint government commission on problems related to the work of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant expresses the demand of the Romanian side that all four reactors of the Kozloduy plant be temporarily put out of operation.

According to the Romanian side, the four first generation 440 megawatt power units that operate in Kozloduy should be put out of operation in order to investigate their reliability, while the remaining power units should be improved. The members of the Romanian commission are also reported to have urged that the building of two new 1,000 megawatt power units in Kozloduy should be discontinued, and that Bulgaria should altogether renounce the construction of similar power plants in the vicinity of the Romanian border.

In connection with the fact that the Bulgarian delegation described such demands as totally groundless, the Romanian delegation considers it necessary to invite the Soviet experts with whose assistance the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Station had been built to participate in the talks. The announcement further points out that it would be expedient to seek the opinion of international experts on the state of the Bulgarian nuclear power station.

Havel Refuses Resignation of Press Spokesman

LD3007130190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1200 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] CTK today published a statement by Michal Zantovsky, press spokesman of the president of the republic. Of late I have committed several serious errors, the statement says. My interview for the newspaper FINANCIAL TIMES was erroneously interpreted as an expression of differences between the president of the republic and the federal government. My comments at the lunch of the East-West press seminar, where I attempted to point to the general relationship between freedom and responsibility of newsmen, were perceived by a number of Western and Czechoslovak newsmen as an endeavour to restrict the freedom of the press.

At the seminar I spoke for myself and I spoke provocatively in order to trigger off a discussion, Michal Zantovsky goes on to say. I said, though with a great measure of exaggeration, that a journalist should be put in prison for revealing a state secret. As an example I quoted the publication of full lists of secret state security collaborators. However, in restrospect this pronouncement is at variance with my conscience and I cannot support it.

I am deeply convinced of the necessity of a free press as one of the best guarantees of democracy and I said this in my speech at the seminar, too. I am also convinced, Michal Zantovsky goes on to emphasize, of the need for the journalist's responsibility to his own conscience, public opinion and, if need be, to the laws of his own country.

I believe that there is information which should not be published; I do not believe, however, that in this country a journalist should ever again be imprisoned for publishing the truth—as murky or embarrassing as it may be for some. I cannot and I do not want to defend my erroneous statements. I believe that they were at least partly due to my exhaustion and momentary depression but this does not change their significance. Responsibility concerns every journalist, including a press spokesman. Thus I have asked the president of the republic to release me from my post, Michael Zantovsky concludes in his statement.

Vaclav Havel, president of the republic, has adopted the following stand on the statement by Michael Zantovsky, the press spokesman:

The way in which my spokesman Michael Zantovsky—openly, publicly, and honestly—has admitted that he committed certain mistakes, evokes admiration and respect. In my opinion those mistakes were not as great as he believes. I do know something about the background and context of his statements and about the extent to which they have been misinterpreted and to which the specific context was not understood.

I am convinced that Michael Zantovsky is the right man in the right place—a man who possibly makes mistakes ocassionally, as we all do. I cannot, however, imagine how I would carry out my post without his help. Thus, I have not complied with this request to be released from his post, Vaclav Havel, president of the republic, concludes the stand on the statement of his press spokesman Michael Zantovsky.

U.S. Congressmen Letter on Cuban Representation

AU3007160690 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 28 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "A Letter to the President"]

[Text] Washington—A group of 68 U.S. congressmen wrote a letter to President Havel on Thursday [26 July] in which they point out that Czechoslovakia is still representing Cuban interests in the United States. According to the opinion expressed by the 68 U.S. Congress members, who mostly represent the southern states in Congress, this diplomatic activity does not accord with current developments in Czechoslovakia. They regard representing Cuban interests in the United States as a tacit agreement with the policy of Castro's repressive regime.

Foreign Ministry Note Rejects Cuban Accusation

LD3007192990 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Vera Bartoskova received today Mario Rodriguez Martinez, ambassador of the Cuban Republic in Prague, and presented him with a note on the events at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana. The note rejects the Cuban accusation to the effect that the entire action was organized or caused by the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana. The note says that similar incidents can be prevented by adherence to obligations arising from the international agreements on human rights.

Slimak on U.S. Visit, NATO, Warsaw Pact

AU3007162090 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech, Slovak 27 Jul 90 pp 1,2

[Interview with Major General Anton Slimak, CSFR first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff, by Josef Vesely; place and date not given: "For the First Time Officially in the Pentagon"; first paragraph is HOSPODARSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] Major General Anton Slimak, CSFR first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff, returned home yesterday from the first official visit ever made by a senior Czechoslovak military representative to North America. His visit, understandably, was followed with great interest by journalists. The Czechoslovak military delegation established bilateral ties with the U.S. and Canadian Armies which, in the future, will be reflected in specific cooperation in military exercises and studies.

The highlight of the program, which also included visits to military bases, was the official reception by and talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in the Pentagon. An invitation was extended to Cheney on behalf of Army General Miroslav Vacek, CSFR defense minister, to visit our country. HOSPODARSKE NOVINY asked Anton Slimak to answer the following questions.

[Vesely] What were the results of the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl, talks which made the united Germany's full membership in NATO possible, as reflected in your conversations and meetings?

[Slimak] The talks between the Soviet president and the federal chancellor were taking place while we were on our visit. We accepted the meeting's conclusions with great satisfaction because we believe that the united Germany cannot exist outside the NATO framework. This is in harmony with the views expressed by our Army's leadership. Of course, this made the discussions with our U.S. partners easier. Both sides positively evaluated this event.

[Vesely] The recent NATO council session in London also introduced some completely new elements into this organization's relations with the Warsaw Pact. Was this apparent during your talks?

[Slimak] It was significant for us that this session took place in conjunction with the June meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in Moscow. Our delegation explained to our U.S. hosts Czechoslovakia's point of view on the future significance and function of the Warsaw Pact. In the context of this June meeting, we were able to state jointly that further prerequisites have been created on the NATO side for the development of the disarmament processes in Europe and for the elimination of artificial ideological barriers. During our talks with representatives from the Canadian Foreign Ministry, we stressed the need to get rid of the previous feeling of animosity in order that—as President Vaclav Havel has said—in the future the concept of East and West will have only a geographical meaning.

[Vesely] Could your talks, particularly the talks in the Pentagon, in some more significant way influence the process for formulating the CSFR's own military doctrine?

[Slimak] We already have this doctrine more or less worked out from a military and political point of view and it should be approved at the autumn session of the State Defense Council. From the military and technical point of view, it is necessary to complete a whole series of specific documents; the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are taking care of this at the moment. I think that at this stage it is unnecessary to revise or even finalize the work on this doctrine. On the contrary, the knowledge gained from our visit to the United States and Canada has convinced us of the fact that we have proceeded correctly because this doctrine, the way it is prepared today, corresponds to the requirements for guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of a free Czechoslovakia.

Delegation Leaves for Pentagonal Meeting

LD3107081190 Prague CTK in English 0629 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 31 (CTK)—Premier Marian Calfa, heading a Czechoslovak delegation, left today for a two-day visit to Italy during which he will attend a summit of the five-nation group known as the Pentagonal Initiative in Venice.

Members of the delegation are Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and Slovak Minister of Culture Ladislav Snopko.

The premiers and foreign ministers of the five countries - Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia - will discuss cooperation in the years 1990-1992.

Further on Meeting in Venice

WA3107121590

For reportage on the first summit of the Pentagonal Initiative group in Venice, Italy, including reports on the activities of the CSFR's Marian Calfa, Yugoslavia's Ante Markovic, and Hungary's Jozef Antall, please see the International Affairs section of the 31 July West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Visa Obligations With Switzerland Abolished

LD3107093490 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 0900 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Czechoslovakia and Switzerland have agreed to mutually abolish the visa obligation. The agreement will be valid beginning 15 August and will enable citizens of both states to travel to the other country without visas for a length of time not to exceed three months. The trips, however, must not be for the purpose of gainful employment. Czechoslovak citizens can also travel to Lichtenstein under the same conditions under which they can travel to Switzerland.

Trnka on Ministerial Recall Demand by Civic Forum

AU3007161490 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 27 Jul 90 p 2

[CTK and "(JM)"-signed report: "Is Slusovice a Thorn in the Side?"]

[Text] "The Civic Forum's parliamentary deputies categorically demanded my departure from this post," said Frantisek Trnka at yesterday's Czechoslovak Agrarian Party press briefing. Trnka has been recalled from his post as federal deputy economy minister after being appointed approximately three weeks ago. In his

opinion, there were two reasons for his recall: his "origins" at Slusovice which are apparently a thorn in the side of many deputies and the fact that he is chairman of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party.

Frantisek Trnka also expressed his fear that some of our leading representatives are unconvinced of the importance of agriculture until it finds itself in grave difficulties. He warned against a repetition of 1948 when farmers were manipulated against their will. "The Czechoslovak Agrarian Party is not advocating private farming specifically, but is advocating efficient farming on an entrepreneurial basis according to which all agricultural workers will be able to make a decent living. However, the farmers have to make their own democratic decisions," stressed Engineer Frantisek Trnka.

Extraparliamentary Assembly Established 30 Jul

LD3007205690 Prague CTK in English 1921 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 30 (CTK)—An extraparliamentary assembly was created here today in which all Czechoslovak parties and political movements which did not win the necessary 5-per cent limit in the June parliamentary elections can participate.

"A total of 17 per cent of voters are not represented in the legislative bodies, i.e. they are represented by deputies for whom they did not vote. But political parties which were defeated do not intend to give up the responsibility of their voters", Pavel Seifert of the Greens Party, which initiated the creation of the extraparliamentary assembly, told CTK.

These parties will have the possibility to voice in the assembly their opinions on the political development in the country. Its main aim will be the prevention of non-democratic methods, he added.

The extraparliamentary assembly will control and review the work of the parliament and national councils, issue stands on crisis phenomena in the state and prepare its own candidates for representing their parties in the next elections.

Democratic Forum: CPCZ Not Left Wing

AU3007142690 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 26 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Jiri Kofranek, chairman of the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum, by RUDE PRAVO correspondent Kamila Jaskova; place and date not given: "We Speak With Jiri Kofranek, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum"]

[Excerpt] [Jaskova] Do you consider the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] to be a left-wing party?

[Kofranek] We do not consider the present CPCZ to be the modern left-wing force it purports to be for two reasons: The first is the lack of democracy within the CPCZ because I believe that it does not suffice that, as opposed to in the past, its members are now allowed to say anything. It is a question of what kind of influence its members are able to exercise over the party's political line. Moreover, it is unfortunately the case that in parliament—save for some exceptions—officials and representatives of the apparatus are sitting rather than the experts who were entered on the lists of candidates, but in an incorrect order.

The second reason that we do not consider the CPCZ to be left wing is that, alongside the people who entered the party in the naive belief that through their membership they would be able to actively contribute to changing the totalitarian system, are those who are directly responsible for the past. The problem is sharply delimited. It is a question of the old and new, of the discredited and undiscredited members. Unfortunately the CPCZ is more concerned with itself than with an actual influence on the society. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Power Plant Safety Said Improved

LD3107091890 Prague CTK in English 0840 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Prague July 31 (CTK)—The "Kralovoposlke Strojirny" engineering works in Brno, south Moravia, has developed a new- generation heat exchanger for nuclear power stations, which—appart from increased efficiency and durability—also is safer.

"Kralovopolske Strojirny Brno" (KSB) will produce the new- generation heat exchangers for the first bloc of the nuclear power plant at "Temelin" (south Bohemia). Also, the exchangers now operating at the "Dukovany" (south Moravia) nuclear power plant will be replaced, as part of the plant's modernization.

"KSB" was prepared to supply also the "Mochovce" nuclear power station in west Slovakia (construction launched 1984) with its modernized heat exchangers, but this offer was rejected by both the Czechoslovak and "CMEA" authorities, which feared "increased cost".

GERMAN UNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *In order to provide information concerning German unification in one location for the benefit of our readers, materials on that topic from the FRG, GDR, and other media is now being published in the German Unification Attachment to the West Europe DAILY REPORT.*

Soviet Memo on Internment Camps Presented

AU3007125190 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 27 Jul 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "USSR Interior Ministry Memorandum on Special Camps in Former Soviet Occupation Zone"]

[Text] The following document is a memorandum of the USSR Interior Ministry on the special Soviet camps in the former Soviet occupation zone, which GDR Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel handed over to the press in a working translation from the Russian.

In the recent past, the GDR press has again and again dealt with the subject of special camps that existed in the early postwar years in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. In this connection, attention should be directed to a few decisions made by the allies of the anti-Hitlerite coalition concerning the punishment of prisoners of war.

In November 1943, upon the initiative of Winston Churchill, the "declaration on the responsibility of the Hitlerite Fascists for committed cruelties" was signed by the leading representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain. It emphasized that German officers, soldiers, and members of the NSDAP responsible for cruelties, murders, and executions in the countries they occupied would be sentenced and punished under the laws of the countries liberated from German occupation.

The protocol of the Berlin (Potsdam) Three-Power Conference, which was signed on 1 August 1945, states under Point 5 of the section on the political principles applying to the treatment of Germany: "War criminals and all those who were involved in the planning or implementation of Nazi measures that led to or resulted in cruelty or war crimes are to be arrested and handed over to the courts. Nazi party leaders, influential Nazi supporters, and the leaders of Nazi authorities and organizations that are dangerous for the occupation and its goals are to be interned."

In the course of the occupation of Germany by the main allies of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, various camps for persons suspected of having committed crimes and other delinquencies against the allied armies or the population were set up on its territory. Such camps existed in all occupation zones of Germany. In order to guarantee a single approach to assessing the deeds of the aforementioned persons, the Allied Control Council, which wielded supreme power in Germany, on 20 December 1945 passed Law No. 10 "On the punishment of persons who are guilty of war crimes, and crimes against peace and humanity." According to this law, each occupying power, in its zone, had the right to "detain any person suspected of having committed crimes," as well as to set up courts of law and establish their rules of procedure.

Immediately after the International Military Court of Law announced its verdict on the main war criminals and the description of the organizations of the NSDAP, Gestapo, SD [Security Service], SS, and SA [Storm Troopers] as criminal organizations, on 12 October 1946 the Control Council for Germany adopted Guideline No. 38 on the "Arrest and punishment, internment, control, and supervision of Germans who are potentially dangerous." The objective of this document, which was agreed upon and signed by the four powers, was "to establish a single course in the treatment of Germany, which included:

"a) the punishment of war criminals, Nazis, militarists and industrialists who inspired and supported the Nazi regime;
"b) the complete and final elimination of Nazism and militarism, by isolating the leading performers or supporters of these ideas, or by limiting the work of these persons;
"c) the internment of Germans who, without being guilty of certain crimes themselves, are dangerous for the objectives of the allies, as well as the control and supervision of other potentially dangerous persons."

Starting from the aforementioned principles and the documents agreed upon by the victorious powers, special camps were set up in the Soviet occupation zone as well as in the other occupation zones of Germany to which the aforementioned legal acts applied, and which existed for several years.

The establishment of camps was one of the links in the system of radical measures that were necessary for the elimination of Fascism and militarism to ensure that—in line with the Potsdam Agreement—Germany "will never again be able to threaten its neighbors or the preservation of peace in the world at large."

On the territory of the Soviet occupation zone a total of ten camps were set up at different times. They were given the numbers one to ten and were located in the cities of Muehlberg, Buchenwald, Berlin, Bautzen, Fuerstenwalde (Ketschendorf), Lieberose, Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg, Neubrandenburg, and Torgau. As the number of detainees decreased, the camps were dissolved or merged. Until 1948 three camps remained (Number 1 in Sachsenhausen-Oranienburg, Number 2 in Buchenwald, and Number 3 in Bautzen). The last camps were closed in March 1950.

In line with the aforementioned resolutions of the occupying powers, the people that were arrested and interned

were "considered to be dangerous to the objectives of the allies." This particularly included persons who were members of espionage and sabotage agencies, members of organizations and groups that committed diverse activities in the hinterland of the Red Army, people who ran illegal radio stations, established arms depots, had illegal printing shops, leading active NSDAP members, leaders of Fascist youth organizations on various levels, members of terrorist units, heads of various administrative bodies, editors and authors of anti-Soviet publications, and others.

The documents of the Soviet archives prove that between 1945-1950 122,671 Germans were interned in the aforementioned camps, of which 45,262 were released again. A total of 14,202 were handed over to the GDR Interior Ministry, and 12,770 persons were taken to the USSR. A total of 6,680 persons were transferred to prisoner of war camps, while 212 detainees managed to escape. According to existing documents, 42,889 persons died during the whole period as a consequence of diseases, in particular during the years 1945-1947. A total of 756 persons were sentenced to death by military courts. [all figures as published] Indications about their graves were not found in the archives.

On the whole, the essential information about the detainees corresponds with what was dispersed by the GDR mass media.

The available data prove that the prison conditions in the camps of the Soviet occupation zone were acceptable at that time, and that the detainees were treated according to the law.

The high mortality rate among the arrested Germans is partly the result of illness (mainly tuberculosis). The charges of purposeful mass annihilation of inmates, which were raised against the Soviet occupying power, were not confirmed by the documents of the archive. The number of Germans who were sentenced to death because of their crimes amounted to 0.6 percent of the total number of inmates in the special camps.

These losses are shocking, but they cannot be compared with the millions of Soviet citizens who died at the hands of Nazis without any trial or investigation.

Careful investigations were carried out concerning all persons that were interned in the camps, as a consequence of which many were again released. This is proved by the aforementioned figures. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that among those interned, there were also persons who were arrested only because of complaints against them, or because of a tragic combination of circumstances.

Obviously, there were also infringements on the established regulations concerning the treatment of prisoners, which were partly due to the incredible cruelties committed by the Fascists during the war. On the whole, all this is part of the general result of the war that was unleashed by Hitlerite Germany.

Many things remain unclear as far as the discovered graves are concerned, because in the Soviet occupation zone the camps for the interned were usually set up in former Fascist concentration camps. For example, it is well known that the camp near Neubrandenburg (Fuenfeichen), in whose proximity the first mortal remains of people were discovered, the Fascists detained mainly Soviet prisoners of war. It is to be assumed that the mass graves contain not only bodies of Germans. The mortal remains of prisoners of Fascist concentration camps might be there as well, including those of Soviet people.

The current efforts on the part of the USSR to solve international problems on a mutually acceptable and agreed upon basis, including questions regarding the unification of the two German states, have been determined by the USSR's desire to strengthen peace and good neighborly relations, and not to permit the past to repeat itself.

The copies of various documents from archives, which we put at your disposal, can give you some idea of the events of those days, and, as everyone can see, they provide an answer to the questions that were raised by the mass media.

Foreign Ministry on CSCE's 15th Anniversary

LD3107120590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1051 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Like never before, we can see the fundamental political changes in the pan-European process initiated by the signing of the Helsinki Conference Final Document on 1 August 1975, says a press statement by the GDR Foreign Ministry on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of that great political event. It was indisputable, it stresses, that even at times when East-West relations were under great strain, the CSCE process has proven to be a multinational forum for dialogue about the decisive questions of security, human rights, and cooperation in the fields of science and technology, economy, ecology, as well as culture and education.

"The CSCE agreements were an important foundation for the building of democratic social systems based on free elections and on the rule of law in the GDR and other countries in Central and East Europe," the declaration goes on to stress. In view of the dynamism of European development, the importance of the CSCE process as an instrument for the shaping of a united Europe is growing steadily. Of central importance for the future of Europe was the meeting in Paris on 19 November of the heads of state and government of the CSCE member states, which is to make decisions defining the part the CSCE could play in future European security and cooperation structures. It is important that the preconditions should be created there for all CSCE states to take part in future negotiations on conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The declaration goes on to say: "It is the GDR's foremost aim that the process of disarmament and military

confidence-building should be accompanied by steps towards the creation of new security structures in the framework of the CSCE. Together with the Polish republic and the CSFR, the GDR put forward a relevant proposal on 12 July 1990."

The GDR suggests that the Paris final document should lay down the task that a new CSCE charter, which takes into account the fundamental changes in Europe, should be elaborated before the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992. The further institutionalization of the CSCE process and the decision that future CSCE agreements should be legally binding are also of great importance here.

De Maiziere To Stimulate Trade, Agriculture

AU3007142490 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 28-29 Jul 90 p 1

[ADN report: "Prime Minister Wants To Promote Competition in Trade and Agriculture"]

[Text] In view of the current problems in the spheres of trade and agriculture, the GDR Government promotes all those measures that stimulate competition. This was stated by GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere at a meeting of high-ranking representatives of trade enterprises, the processing industry, and producers from the East and the West in Berlin on Friday [27 July]. The prime minister announced that more industrial space will be provided soon. For example, it is possible to sell buildings of the National People's Army that are no longer needed, he said. In addition, the government will try to increase the degree of legal certainty for investors, to improve the price system for agricultural products, and to make the granting of credits easier.

While the trade sector has mainly criticized the lack of industrial space, the GDR producers principally deplored the problem of old debts. These debts impede the granting of new credits. The farmers who were present complained about the exaggerated trade margins and the lack of equal opportunities compared with West German farmers.

Diestel Against Professional Ban on Former Stasi

LD3107090490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2341 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel has spoken out against banning former Stasi staff from professions. In an interview with DER MORGEN newspaper published today, he said that the Social Democratic Party's [SPD] demands that this be done—if they had really been made by the SPD, which he did not believe—were "nonsense." There are chefs, fishermen, forest wardens, and hunters at the Ministry for State Security. "There are people in this ministry whose relatives had to become employees, too. I am against any examination of people's conscience. For me, the standards are loyalty and ability to perform. We do not have the opportunity or the right to search people's minds, to try and find out what they think or what they thought ten years ago." He has always opposed the ban on extremists, ideological terror, and similar practices in the FRG, and he still does today.

As for the accusations that he was "severely obstructing" the disbanding of the Stasi, Diestel said that the current state of the process was laid out in a recent 500-page documentation. "We want to create the preconditions for the technical disbanding before German unity. Afterwards historians, philosophers, and lawyers—that is, all those dealing with social sciences—will have to work up this whole complex. Studying it thoroughly is important for the historic lesson to be drawn as a result."

Honecker Declared 'Not Fit' for Prison

LD3007181290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1703 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—The former GDR state and Socialist Unity Party of Germany leader, Erich Honecker, is not fit to be kept in prison, according to an internist's report. This concerns the convalescence phase after Honecker's kidney operation. However, the Health Ministry said today, there is "to be a renewed assessment of the level of fitness of those to be kept in prison." There are no neuropsychiatric or psychological objections in Honecker's case. His ability to stand trial and to be questioned are also self- evident.

All others from the former GDR political leadership now facing charges—Erich Mielke, Werner Krolikowski, Hermann Axen, Harry Tisch, Guenther Mittag, Willi Stoph, and Gerald Goetting—are declared fit to be questioned, to stand trial, and to be kept in prison, both on neuropsychiatric and psychological grounds, and also from the internist's point of view. [passage omitted]

Former Prisoners Demand Compensation

AU3107070290 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 29 Jul 90 p 5

[Martin Heidemanns and Andreas Wrede report: "150 Billion? GDR Prisoners Want Compensation for Imprisonment"]

[Excerpts] A reunited Germany is threatened with an avalanche of expenditures which so far have not turned up in any calculations: According to estimates of the GDR Peace and Human Rights Initiative, 300,000 people who were persecuted for political reasons during 40 years of SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] rule are entitled to compensation amounting to a total of 150 billion Deutsche marks. According to information obtained by BILD AM SONNTAG, the GDR Government is currently preparing a corresponding rehabilitation law. It is to be passed by the People's Chamber before unification. [passage omitted]

Will the day of unity become the day of payment?

Hans Buechler, Germany policy expert of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, told BILD AM SONNTAG: "The payment of compensation is a task that will cost money but that will have to be coped with nevertheless. After all, we cannot leave those who struggled for democracy in the GDR standing in the rain now."

The FRG Government is keeping quiet on this topic: BILD AM SONNTAG was told by the spokesmen of the Justice and Finance Ministries that the second State Treaty does not contain one single specific passage on this contentious issue. [passage omitted]

East Berlin Radio To Become 'Radio Aktuell'

LD3007150290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1412 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The Radio GDR 1 [East Berlin Domestic Service in German] station will broadcast under the name "radio Aktuell" as of 1 August. The station has been operating under the name "GDR 1—Radio Aktuell" since the spring of 1990.

The program organizers intend to offer, among other things, current information and round-the-clock popular music, travel, and tourism news, consumer tips, and market information. The station's finances are to be improved through advertizing.

* New Berlin Constitution Text Published

90GE0229A East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 18 Jul 90 pp 17-19

["Text" of law adopted by the Berlin Municipal Council on 11 July: "The Constitution of Berlin"]

[Text]

The Constitution of Berlin

According to the resolution of the Municipal Council Assembly of 22 April 1948, in the version of the Municipal Council Assembly of Berlin on 11 July 1990.

Preamble

With the will—to protect the liberty and rights of every individual,—to give a democratic structure to the community and economy,—to serve the spirit of social progress and peace,—to give a new order to national life for a transition period until unification of the two parts of Berlin, and the desire—that Berlin remain the capital of a united Germany, the men and women of Berlin, in that part of the city where free self-determination has been denied up to now, have given themselves this preliminary constitution through the Municipal Council Assembly.

Section I

Underlying Principles

Article 1

Until the unification of the city and Germany, Berlin has a status with Land authority.

Article 2

(1) Holder of public authority is the totality of Germans and foreigners residing in Berlin.
(2) Under this constitution, they exercise their will directly through election to the people's representation and through plebiscite, [and] indirectly through the people's representation.

Article 3

(1) Legislative power is vested solely in the city council assembly, and in the people through plebiscite. Executive power is in the hands of the government and its subordinate administration, judicial power in the hands of independent courts of law.
(2) The city council assembly, government, and administration discharge the responsibilities of Berlin as a community, association of local authorities, and city with Land authority.

Article 4

(1) Berlin is subdivided into city bezirks. The number and borders of the city bezirks can be changed only by law. For border changes of little importance, to which the respective city bezirks agree, something different can be regulated by law.
(2) This constitution is in effect for the territory of the city bezirks: Center, Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain, Treptow, Koepenick, Lichtenberg, Weissensee, Pankow, Marzahn, Hohenschoenhausen, and Hellersdorf with the borders existing at the time of the constitution's coming into force.

Article 5

Berlin has a flag, a coat of arms and a seal with the bear, the flag bearing the colors white and red.

Section II

Basic Rights and Definition of State Goals

Article 6

(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the highest duty of the state.
(2) All people are equal before the law. Any arbitrary act and any improper unequal treatment is prohibited. No one must be discriminated against or given preferential treatment because of his race, origin, nationality, language, sex, sexual preference, social position, or his religious, ideological, or political conviction.
(3) Women and men enjoy equal rights. The state is obligated to work toward equal status of women in career

and public life, in education and training, in the family and in the area of social security.
(4) It is the responsibility of the state and of every individual to promote and support the young, [and] older and handicapped persons.

Article 7

(1) Every person has the right to free development of his personality, as long as he is not infringing on the rights of others and does not violate the constitutional order.
(2) Human life is inviolable. Every person has the right to freedom from bodily harm and respect for his dignity in dying. The right to freedom from bodily harm can only be interfered with by law.
(3) No one must be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or debasing treatment or punishment, or to medical or scientific experiments without his voluntary and express permission.
(4) The right of self-determination for women, in particular the right to self-determined pregnancy and termination of pregnancy within an established time-limit, is guaranteed.

Article 8

(1) Every person is entitled to the protection of his personal data, to examine files and data banks as far as they concern him and do not touch upon the rights of third parties, [and] to information on stored data regarding his person. Personal-type data may only be collected, stored, processed, passed on, or used otherwise with the voluntary and express permission of the individual concerned within the framework of legally permissible purposes and in compliance with the principle of necessity. A claim for deletion or correction exists in cases of inadmissible or incorrectly stored data. Restrictions are permissible only in the predominant interest of the general public by law or on the basis of a law.
(2) Protection of personal data is to be safeguarded through technical and organizational measures.
(3) Details will be regulated by law.

Article 9

(1) Personal freedom is inviolable. Restrictions of freedom can be effected only to the extent that they are unavoidable and provided by law.
(2) Anyone whose freedom is being restricted must be informed immediately of the reasons for the restriction of his liberty, and his rights. Persons who are being deprived of their freedom must be brought before a judge immediately, or within 12 hours at the latest. The judge decides on the deprivation of liberty permitted by law in written form with reasons provided, or orders [the person's] release. The party concerned, at appropriate intervals, can demand a judicial examination of the continuance of the deprivation of liberty. A person enjoying the confidence of the party concerned must be notified immediately of the deprivation of liberty and before any judicial decision on its order or continuance; he must be given the chance to contact immediately legal counsel of his choice.
(3) Arrested persons must not be abused physically or mentally and must not be exposed to reprisals.

Article 10

(1) The home is inviolate. A search may be carried out only upon a judge's order based on law and in the form provided by law. In case of pursuit in flagrante delicto, a search can also be ordered and carried out by other authorities whose measures, however, require judicial confirmation within 48 hours.
(2) Entering the home without the resident's permission is permissible on the basis of a law only for the purpose of warding off a general danger or a danger to the body and life of individuals.
(3) The authority to enter, without the owner's permission, and to inspect premises used exclusively for work or business purposes in order to carry out official acts requires authorization by law or on the basis of a law.

Article 11

(1) The secrecy of mail, and postal and telecommunications secrecy are inviolate.
(2) Interventions are permissible only by law, after a judicial order.

Article 12

(1) Every person has the right to freely express and disseminate information and opinions in any form and to inform himself unimpededly from generally accessible or other, lawfully approachable sources. The validity of these rights in contractual employment or service relationships can be restricted only by law or on the basis of a law.
(2) Freedom of the press, radio and other mass media is guaranteed. The law must ensure through procedural regulations that the wide range of opinions existing in society can be expressed in the press, radio, and television.
(3) These rights are limited by general laws. These laws must not restrict freedom of opinion and information because of their intellectual content or intellectual effect. Legal restrictions to protect youth and honor are permissible. War propaganda and public statements of discrimination violating human dignity are prohibited.
(4) Radio and television stations, in coordination with neighboring radio stations, are to be established and maintained as autonomous public-law institutions or as joint institutions by state treaty. They have the task of contributing to public opinion formation through a broad range of programs. Participation by private organizers in forming public opinion is guaranteed. Licensing of private radio and television stations is regulated by a law.
(5) Lawful journalistic activity must not be impeded by the obligation to give evidence, seizure und search.
(6) Censorship is prohibited.

Article 13

(1) Science, research, and instruction are free. The state promotes universities and scientific institutions by allocating budget funds.
(2) The law can provide for information obligation and restrictions for research particularly dangerous for man and environment.
(3) Universities and scientific institutions cultivate science in research, teaching and training. Within the framework of the law, they have the right of self-administration in all academic matters. The students' rights of codetermination are to be guaranteed.
(4) Art is free. The state promotes cultural life and the conservation and transmission of the cultural heritage through allocation of budget funds.

Article 14

(1) Freedom of religion [and] conscience, and the freedom of professing one's religious and ideological beliefs are inviolable. Undisturbed exercise of one's religion is under the protection of the state. A need for religious services and spiritual ministry in public institutions must be met. There must be no coercion [imposed] on the freedom of choice or exercise of a religion or ideology.
(2) Parents are free to ensure the religious and ideological education of their children according to their own convictions.
(3) Churches and religious communities are separate from the state. The freedom of churches and religious communities is guaranteed. They regulate and administer their affairs independently within the legal framework applying to all.
(4) Churches and recognized religious communities are public-law corporations. They remain public-law corporations to the extent that they were such [before]. Upon application, other religious communities are to be granted equal rights if they offer the assurance of permanence through their constitution and number of members. Their spiritual and charitable work is guaranteed.
(5) State benefits to which churches and religious communities are entitled on the basis of existing legal titles can be replaced. Details are regulated by a law.
(6) Churches and religious communities which are public-law corporations may levy taxes on their members on the basis of state lists of taxpayers according to legal provisions.
(7) Details of the relations between Berlin and the churches and religious communities are to be regulated by treaty.

Article 15

(1) Property and the law of succession are guaranteed. Content and limits are determined by laws. Property is an obligation. Its use shall simultaneously serve the welfare of all.
(2) Expropriation is permissible only for the general welfare. It is to be implemented only by law or on the basis of a law which regulates extent and type of compensation. Compensation is to be determined on the basis of just consideration of the interests of the general public and the parties concerned.
(3) Every inhabitant of Berlin is entitled to appropriate housing. It is the task of the state to promote implementation of this claim. Eviction may be carried out only if replacement housing is available. Social housing construction, housing conservation, and rehabilitation are to be promoted by the state. Self-help establishments are to participate according to the provisions of the law. Housing construction must conform to the principles of urban ecology. The state is particularly obligated to promote housing appropriate for families, the elderly, and the handicapped.
(4) Municipal housing is to be developed in the forms of social economy, in particular in nonprofit municipal associations and cooperatives. Acquisition of personal ownership in housing and housing lots, and the formation of cooperative property are to be promoted. Time-limited measures of housing control to redress a lack of housing are permissible by law or on the basis of a law.
(5) If land increases in value due to its planned conversion into building land, the state is entitled to compensation for the increased value as provided by law.

Article 16

(1) Every person has the right to freely choose and exercise his profession. The exercise of one's profession can be regulated by law or on the basis of a law.
(2) The freedom to move and act, particularly the free choice of place of residence and of a training and work place, is guaranteed. These rights can be restricted only by law, and only to overcome public emergencies, to avoid special burdens on the public in securing an adequate livelihood, and to implement legal obligations.
(3) Politically persecuted persons enjoy the right of asylum.

Article 17

(1) Marriage and the family are to be protected and promoted by the state. Every mother is entitled to welfare and the special protection of the community. Other partnerships for life are entitled to protection against discrimination.
(2) Women and men are to be guaranteed freedom of choice between family and profession. The state promotes the possibility of paid work and vocational training for parents, particularly through regulating working hours and the establishment and maintenance of day-care centers, kindergardens, and school day nurseries in the interest of the welfare and protection of children.
(3) Legitimate and illegitimate children are equal before the law.
(4) Parents have the right and the duty to raise their children. Whoever raises children is entitled to appropriate state aids and societal consideration. Against the parents' will, children may be separated from their

family only on the basis of a law if the parents fail them, or the children are in danger of becoming neglected for other reasons.
(5) Children enjoy state protection against physical and emotional neglect and abuse. Child labor is prohibited.

Article 18

(1) Every person has, without application and permission, the right to assemble peacefully and without weapons.
(2) For marches or assemblies outdoors, this right can be restricted only for reasons of urgent requirements of public security and on the basis of a law.

Article 19

(1) Every person has the right to form associations, confederations and trade unions, to join them and be active according to the purposes of the associations. Associations are prohibited whose purposes or activity are directed against the constitutional order or against the idea of international understanding.
(2) Associations dedicated to public tasks and hereby influencing the formation of public opinion (citizens' movements) enjoy the special protection of the constitution as the upholders of free societal organization, criticism and control. According to the rules of procedure, citizens' movements have the right to presentation and objective treatment of their concerns in the appropriate committees of the city council in case of supra-bezirk matters, or in those of the city bezirk councils concerning bezirk matters. As long as the personality and privacy of third parties are not violated, and after considering opposing public interests, they are entitled to have access to information held by representatives of public administration and related to their concerns.
(3) The internal order of associations, confederations, and trade unions must comply with democratic principles, if they predominantly represent their members' interests in public or are engaged in implementing public tasks financed by the state, or are predominantly state-financed. The same applies to confederations and trade unions which are not exposed to any major competition in their field of activity; they must not refuse membership for nonobjective reasons. Participation, with equal rights, in the formation of will within the confederation or trade union, respectively, must be guaranteed.
(4) The right of codetermination in industry and administration is to be guaranteed by law.

Article 20

(1) Every person has the right to work or to be promoted.
(2) Public work and service duties are permissible only for special purposes established by law. They must be the same for all. Women must be obligated to perform a service only to overcome public emergencies. Every person has the right to refuse armed or combat duty without examination of his conscience. No disadvantages whatsoever must arise for him out of that.
(3) The right to work must be implemented primarily through a policy of full employment. In case of unemployment or threatened unemployment, every person has a right to publicly financed measures of work promotion, in particular to extended vocational training or retraining.
(4) Same work entitles to same wages.
(5) Apprentices, pregnant women, single parents, the sick, handicapped employees and older workers enjoy expanded protection from dismissal.
(6) The trade unions' right to strike is guaranteed.

Article 21

(1) Every person has the right to equal access to public educational and training institutions. Access to public schools is free of charge. Fees can be charged on a legal basis for institutions providing extended education. Pupils and students are entitled to educational promotion under the provisions of the law. Public schools provide free use of learning aids.
(2) Every young person has the right to school education. This right is safeguarded by a public school system which is to be established and maintained according to the provisions of this constitution and the laws. From the right to a school education result individual claims if they are determined by the preconditions and content of this constitution, by law or on the basis of a law.
(3) School education is to contribute to the personality development of the pupils in the community. The school fulfills this task by imparting knowledge, capabilities and value attitudes, thus trying to attain the educational goals and awakening the joy of learning. The constitution of Berlin constitutes the guideline and framework for this. The school's mission is to be carried out without any indoctrination of the pupils.
(4) The state must offer a differentiated school system, including schools for the handicapped and institutions for extended and further training for adult students. Openness and permeability of the educational courses and their free choice must be guaranteed, taking into account suitability and performance of the pupils.
(5) Notwithstanding the state's right of school supervision, pupils, parents and teachers have the right of codetermination in the school. The state's supervision of schools is to be exercised in such a manner that the pedagogic freedom necessary for the teachers' educational and instructive work and the autonomy of the school are not unnecessarily or unreasonably restricted.
(6) The right to establish schools under free sponsorship is to be guaranteed. Schools under free sponsorship can be chosen for school attendance if they satisfy minimum requirements to be established by law. The founding of such schools must not lead to segregation of pupils according to parents' income level. Schools under free sponsorship that operate on a nonprofit basis are entitled to receive public financial subsidy or forms of support of equal value. The subsidy in principle must not exceed the costs for a pupil at a comparable public school.
(7) Further details will be regulated by the school law.

Article 22

(1) The natural foundations of life, the landscape as well as monuments of art, history and nature enjoy public protection and are entrusted to the special care of the state and every individual. It is among their duties:

—to protect the soil, water, and air as natural foundations of life, to repair or balance damage already done,

—to use energy sparingly,

—to preserve and lastingly improve the performance capability of nature's cycle,

—to protect the forest and repair or balance damage already done,

—to save and preserve domestic animal and plant types.

(2) Every person whose rights and interests are affected by public planning of projects, particularly traffic routes and transport and communication facilities, energy plants, production installations, and large construction projects, has the right to participate in the procedures as provided by law. Associations of persons affected have the same right.
(3) No one must suffer injuries or unreasonable danger to his health through negative changes in the natural foundations of life. Every person can demand the disclosure of data on the state of environmental quality of his circle of life.
(4) The state is obligated to ensure free access for the public to forests, fields, lakes and rivers to the extent that no environmental damage is caused thereby and, if necessary, to open up access through restrictions of property rights. Article 15 (2), sentence 3 of the constitution applies to compensation.

Article 23

(1) Every person has the right to approach, individually or in groups, the city council, magistrate, city bezirk councils, and city bezirk offices with suggestions, criticisms, or complaints. They are entitled to a hearing and notice with justification within a reasonable period.
(2) A citizen representative and an authorized agent for data protection will be appointed for the protection of the rights of Berlin's men and women and support for the city council. The city council can appoint additional representatives for other fields. They are elected by a two-thirds majority of the members of the city council assembly. They can also be voted out of office with the same majority. A one-time reelection is permissible.
(3) The representatives are independent in the exercise of their office and subject only to the law. The government and administration are obligated to open their files to them upon request, grant them access to public institutions, provide them with all necessary information and grant administrative assistance.
(4) The representatives annually report in public to the city council. The city council and its committees can demand the presence of the representatives at any time.
(5) No one may be reprimanded or disadvantaged because of his statements and information given to the representatives.
(6) Further details on the representatives will be regulated by law.

Article 24

(1) The basic rights and goal definitions of this constitution are binding on the legislature, executive power, jurisdiction and, as far as provided, on third parties as immediately effective law.
(2) To the extent that basic rights can be restricted by law or on the basis of a law, the principle of reasonableness must be observed and the basic right be named, specifying the Article. Under no circumstances must the essential content of a basic right be infringed upon.

Section III

People's Representation

Article 25

(1) The city council assembly is the people's parliamentary representation elected by qualified voters.
(2) The opposition is a necessary component of parliamentary democracy. It confronts the government majority as an alternative and has the right to equal political chances.
(3) City aldermen are representatives of all men and women of Berlin, are not bound by orders and directives, and subject only to their consciences.
(4) According to the provisions of the order of business, city aldermen have the right to take the floor in the city council assembly and its committees, ask questions and introduce motions, and to vote in elections and on enactments.

Article 26

(1) City aldermen are elected for a term of four years in a general, equal, secret, and direct election according to the principles of proportional representation.
(2) Entitled to vote, and eligible to be elected, are all Germans who are 18 years of age on election day and have had their major place of residence in Berlin for at least three months.
(3) All other details, in particular concerning exclusion from the right to vote and eligibility to be elected, and incompatibility of professional functions with membership in the city council, will be regulated by the election law.

Article 27

(1) The freedom of parties to participate with equal right in forming the political will is guaranteed. The founding of parties is free. Their internal rules and formation of [political] will must meet democratic principles.
(2) All details will be regulated by a law.

Article 28

(1) The city council assembly elects from its midst the president and the other members of the presidium for the duration of the term.
(2) The president manages the business of the city council and represents the city council in all matters. He exercises regulatory authority and the domiciliary right on the premises of the city council assembly. Without his permission no search or seizure may take place on the premises of the city council.
(3) In agreement with the presidium, the president administers all economic matters of the city council and prepares the draft of the city council's budget. The president is the highest public authority for the employees of the city council.

Article 29

(1) The city council assembly gives itself rules of procedure.
(2) Under the rules of procedure, confederations of city aldermen have the status of a parliamentary caucus.
(3) The caucuses have a seat and voice in the presidium, the council of elders and the city council's committees. In distributing speaking time, the opposition must not be put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the majority and the magistrate.
(4) The ability to work must be guaranteed for the caucuses and individual city aldermen, even those not belonging to a caucus. This includes installation and technical equipment for offices, the financing of coworkers and material needs.

Article 30

(1) The city council assembly is summoned by the president.
(2) Upon request by one-fifth of its members, a caucus or the magistrate, the city council assembly must be summoned without delay.
(3) City council meetings are public.
(4) If one-fifth of the members of the city council, a caucus or the magistrate request it, the public can be excluded with a two-thirds majority of the members of the city council. The motion is to be discussed and voted on in closed session.

Article 31

(1) The city council has a quorum if more than half of its members are present.
(2) The city council makes decisions with a simple majority of votes, if the constitution does not prescribe a different proportion of votes. A tie in votes means rejection. A different majority [ratio] can be prescribed by law or the procedural rules for balloting to be carried out by the city council.

Article 32

(1) The city council elects committees from its own midst according to need.
(2) The caucuses must be represented in the committees according to the principles of proportional elections (d'Hondt procedure). The city council's rules of procedure apply to the committees.
(3) The committee on petitions decides on petitions addressed to the city council if the city council does not make the decision itself. The committee can also initiate action if it gains knowledge of important circumstances through some other means. The magistrate and all authorities subordinate to or controlled by it, as well as administrative units and courts of law, must provide information assistance and must submit files upon request by the committee. The committee can hear and swear in witnesses and experts. All other details will be regulated by law.

Article 33

(1) The city council assembly has the right, and upon motion by one-fourth of its members the duty, to appoint an investigative committee.
(2) Every person is obligated to comply with the demands of the investigative committee for the purpose of taking evidence. Courts and authorities must provide legal and administrative assistance; upon request, they must submit files and grant their employees permission to testify.
(3) Reports of the investigative committees are not subject to judicial review.
(4) Upon decision by the investigative committee, members of the magistrate and its authorized agents may be permitted to attend meetings of the investigative committee.
(5) All other details will be regulated by law.

Article 34

(1) The city council and its committees can demand the presence of the members of the magistrate.
(2) The magistrate is to be invited to attend the meetings of the city council assembly and its committees.
(3) The lord mayor or his deputy can take the floor before the agenda of the day is being entered into, irrespective of the subjects under discussion. Upon request, the members of the magistrate must be given at any time the right to speak to the items on the agenda.
(4) During the meetings, the members of the magistrate are subject to the regulatory power of the city council's president or the chairman of the committee.

Article 35

(1) No city alderman is to be held responsible, in court or administratively or anywhere else outside the city council, at any time because of his ballot or the exercise of his mandate.
(2) Every city alderman must refrain from statements and actions which violate the constitutional rights of third parties. Expulsion from the meeting can be sustained only by a two-thirds majority of the city aldermen present. Expulsion from a meeting must not lead to disqualification from voting.

(3) City aldermen have the right to refuse to testify about persons who have confided facts to them, or to whom they have confided facts, in their capacity as city aldermen, or the facts themselves. The right to refuse testimony does not lapse with the end of the mandate. To the extent of the right to refuse testimony, seizure is not permissible.
(4) A city alderman can be held responsible or be arrested for a punishable act only with the permission of the city council, unless he is arrested during commission of the deed or in the course of the following day.
(5) Permission by the city council assembly is also required for any other restriction on the personal freedom of a city alderman. Any criminal proceedings against a city alderman, arrest or any other restriction of his personal freedom are to be reversed upon demand by the city council assembly.

Article 36

(1) Reporting on the public meetings of the city council assembly and its committees, and documentation accessible to the public on the course and result of the meetings are guaranteed.
(2) No one must be called to account for truthful reports on the city council's public meetings and those of its committees.

Article 37

(1) Whosoever is running for elections is entitled to the leave needed to prepare his election campaign.
(2) No one must be impeded in taking up and exercising his mandate. Giving notice or dismissal for this reason is prohibited up to one year after his mandate has ended. All other details will be regulated by law.
(3) The mandate ends if eligibility to be elected is lost, or if the mandate is waived. Deprivation of the mandate is not permissible.

Article 38

(1) City aldermen receive remuneration to ensure their independence, and appropriate flat-rate cost reimbursement. Further details will be regulated by law.
(2) City aldermen are also entitled to free transportation on all public means of transportation which are owned by Berlin.
(3) The rights of city aldermen derived from their mandate cannot be transferred or renounced. Only up to half of the right to indemnification is transferable.

Article 39

(1) The city council is elected for four years, notwithstanding paragraph 5. The electoral term begins with the first assemblage of the city council. New elections take place after 46 months at the earliest, and 48 months after the beginning of the electoral term at the latest.
(2) The city council assembly can decide with a two-thirds majority of its members to end the electoral term prematurely.
(3) The electoral term can also be ended prematurely by a plebiscite. A plebiscite is to be held if one-fifth of all qualified voters have agreed to a referendum. The plebiscite becomes effective only if at least half of all qualified voters participate in it. All other details are to be regulated by law.
(4) In case of premature ending of the electoral term, new elections are to be held, at the latest, eight weeks after the city council resolution or the announcement of the results of the plebiscite.
(5) The electoral term ends with the assemblage of the newly elected city council. The city council assembly meets, at the latest, six weeks after the election under the chairmanship of the oldest city alderman.

Section IV

The Government

Article 40

(1) The magistrate is the executive organ of the government.
(2) The magistrate consists of the lord mayor, his deputy and a maximum of 16 city councillors.
(3) Members of the magistrate must not hold a paid office or any other job and must not be members of the management or supervisory board of an enterprise engaging in economic activity. The city council can permit exceptions. Members of the magistrate can be members of the city council.

Article 41

(1) The lord mayor is elected by a majority of the members of the city council assembly. If he is not elected on the first ballot, a second ballot will take place within one week. If he is not elected on the second ballot, he who receives the most votes in a third ballot is elected.
(2) The city councillors are elected by the city council assembly upon proposal by the lord mayor.
(3) If, on the basis of the lord mayor's proposal, no magistrate is formed within 21 days, the mandate to form a magistrate has lapsed and new elections must be scheduled.
(4) The members of the magistrate can resign their office at any time. Upon demand by the president of the city council, they have to continue to carry out their official duties until successors have assumed office.
(5) The office of the lord mayor ends in every case with the assumption of office by his successor; the office of the other members of the magistrate ends with the termination of the office of lord mayor.

Article 42

(1) The magistrate requires the confidence of the city council.
(2) The city council assembly can withdraw confidence from the magistrate and each of its members. A voice vote can take place, at the earliest, 48 hours after the announcement of a motion of no confidence by the city council assembly.

(3) The decision on a motion of no confidence requires the agreement of the majority of the members of the city council assembly. In case of adoption of a motion of no confidence, the affected members of the magistrate must resign immediately. Upon demand by the president of the city council, every member of the magistrate is obligated to carry on his official duties until assumption of office by a successor. The vote of no confidence loses its effectiveness if no new election is held within 21 days.

Article 43

(1) The lord mayor represents Berlin in external matters. He is chairman of the magistrate and conducts its meetings. In case of a tie vote, his vote is decisive.
(2) In agreement with the magistrate, the lord mayor determines the guidelines of government policy. They require approval by the city council.
(3) The lord mayor supervises observance of the guidelines; he has the right to demand information on all official business.
(4) The number of the magistrate's official fields of activity are decided by the city council assembly upon proposal by the lord mayor. The magistrate establishes its own rules of procedure.
(5) Each member of the magistrate manages his field of activity independently and on his own responsibility within the guidelines of government policy. The magistrate decides in cases of difference of opinion.

Article 44

(1) The magistrate is in direct charge of the central administration, including the administration of justice and the police.
(2) Upon proposal by the magistrate, the attorneys general and the chief of police are elected and dismissed by the city council assembly.

Section V

Legislation

Article 45

(1) Draft laws are introduced by the magistrate, from the body of the city council, or through a referendum.
(2) Every law must be discussed in the city council assembly in at least two readings. Between the first and second readings, as a rule a prior discussion is to be held in the appropriate committee.
(3) A third reading must take place upon demand by the president of the city council or by the magistrate.

Article 46

(1) Laws are passed by the city council assembly with a simple majority, unless the constitution stipulates otherwise.
(2) Laws must be issued immediately by the president of the city council and then be announced by the lord mayor within two weeks.
(3) Every law and every statutory order must determine the day of its coming into force. If such a regulation is missing, they become effective 14 days after the day they are announced.

Article 47

(1) The magistrate issues the statutory orders necessary for the implementation of a law, unless stipulated otherwise by law. They must be submitted without delay to the city council assembly for their information and can be changed or repealed by resolution of the city council assembly.
(2) The magistrate issues the administrative regulations necessary for the implementation of a law. Upon request, they must be submitted to the city council assembly.

Article 48 (eliminated)

Article 49

(1) A plebiscite must be held if one-tenth of all qualified voters demand a referendum on presentation of a draft law. Together with the referendum, a prepared draft law must be presented.
(2) The draft law on which the referendum is based must be submitted to the city council assembly by the magistrate, together with an explanation of its rationale.
(3) The plebiscite is not held if the city council assembly adopts the desired draft law in unchanged form.
(4) A law is passed by plebiscite if either half of the qualified voters participate in the plebiscite and the majority of the participants vote in favor of the law or, in case of lower voter turnout, if one-third of the qualified voters cast their ballot in favor of the law.
(5) The budget, laws on levies, and wage and salary regulations cannot be the subject of a referendum.
(6) All other details will be regulated by law.

Section VI

Administration

Article 50

(1) The administration is to be carried out in a democratic and social spirit according to the constitution and the laws.
(2) The city bezirks are to be given participation in the administration according to the principles of self-administration. The administrations must take into account the interests of the individual city localities in an appropriate fashion.

Article 51

(1) The magistrate establishes principles and guidelines for the administration and through the central administration deals with those affairs which, due to their overriding importance or special nature, require uniform implementation.

(2) The city bezirks deal with all other administrative matters. To that extent they are in charge of local implementation of the laws and ordinances according to the magistrate's general instructions. The magistrate is authorized to assign to the city bezirks some of tasks reserved for the central administration.
(3) The sectors of competence between the central administration and the administrations of city bezirks will be regulated by law.
(4) The magistrate exercises supervision over the administrations of the city bezirks. It has to ensure that the orderly process of administration is preserved and that no administrative measures contrary to the law are taken.

Article 52

(1) The administrations of the city bezirks have the right to express their views on the fundamental issues of administration and legislation.
(2) For this purpose, regular joint consultations are to take place at least once a month between the lord mayor and his deputy, and the mayors of city bezirks or the deputy mayors of city bezirks as representatives of the city bezirk office (council of mayors).
(3) Further details will be regulated by law.

Article 53

(1) A city bezirk assembly is elected in every city bezirk. It elects the members of the city bezirk office; Article 41 applies correspondingly.
(2) All other details, in particular the incompatibility of professional functions with membership in the city bezirk assembly, will be regulated by law.

Article 54

(1) The city bezirk assembly is elected at the same time as the city council in a general, equal, secret, and direct election by the qualified voters in the city bezirk.
(2) Eligible to vote and to be elected are all Germans who have had their principal place of residence in Berlin for at least three months, and all foreigners and stateless persons who have had their principal place of residence in Berlin for at least two years; all must have attained the age of 18 by election day.
(3) All details are to be regulated by law.

Article 55

The termination of the city council's electoral term also ends the electoral term of the city bezirk assemblies. If the first all-Berlin elections are held before expiration of the first electoral term of the city bezirk assemblies elected on 6 May 1990, it can be stipulated, in deviance from sentence 1 and Article 54, paragraph 1, that the city bezirk assemblies elected on 6 May 1990 are not elected again.

Article 56

The city bezirk assembly is the organ of self-administration of the bezirk; it exercises control over the city bezirk's administration and determines the annual financial requirement as a supporting document for the budget plan.

Article 57

(1) The city bezirk assembly establishes committees to assist in fulfilling its tasks.
(2) After more precise determination by law, in addition to members of the city bezirk assembly, citizen delegates can also be members of the committees. The citizen delegates are elected by the city bezirk assembly; they hold honorary positions.

Article 58

(1) The city bezirk office consists of the city bezirk mayor and a maximum of six bezirk city councillors, one of whom is at the same time elected deputy city bezirk mayor.
(2) The city bezirk office is the administrative authority of the city bezirk; it represents Berlin externally in city bezirk matters.

Article 59

(1) The organization of the city bezirk administration is to correspond to the organization of the central administration. Details will be regulated by law.
(2) The city bezirk mayor is subordinate to the official supervision of the lord mayor. The city bezirk mayor has official supervision over the members of the city bezirk office. In case of differences of opinion among members of the city bezirk office, the city bezirk office decides.

Article 60

The city bezirk assembly, with a two-thirds majority of its members, can dismiss a member of the city bezirk office before expiration of his term of office. Details will be regulated by law.

Article 61

(1) Every citizen according to his suitability, aptitude, and professional competence has equal access to any public office. Members of public service are servants of all of society, not of a party or citizens' movement.
(2) All recruitments, transfers, and dismissals in public service are carried out by the magistrate. For the city bezirks, this right is transferred to the city bezirk offices.
(3) The magistrate decides on transfers from one city bezirk to another, from the central administration to the administration of a city bezirk and vice versa, after hearing the city bezirk offices involved.

Section VII

Judicial Practice

Article 62

Judicial practice is to be executed in the spirit of this constitution and of social justice.

Article 63

(1) Judicial power is exercised by the courts, subject only to the law, in the name of the people.
(2) According to the provisions of legal regulations, men and women from all social strata are to be given participation in judicial practice.

Article 64

Judges are bound by law and justice.

Article 65

(1) An accused person can avail himself of the assistance of a defense attorney during any stage of the proceedings.
(2) An accused person is considered not guilty as long as he has not been sentenced by a court.

Article 66

No penal provision has retroactive force, unless it is more favorable for the delinquent than the penal provision in force at the time when the offense was committed.

Article 67

Special tribunals are inadmissible. No one may be deprived of his lawful judiciary due process.

Article 68

The right of pardon is exercised by the magistrate. In legally stipulated cases, it has to hear the committee for clemency petition matters, which is to be elected by the city council assembly.

Article 69

(1) Professional judges are appointed by the magistrate if their personality and past activity in judicial practice guarantees that they will execute their judicial office in the spirit of the constitution and social justice. The highest elected judges have the right of nomination for matters concerning their office.
(2) The presidents of the regional appeals courts are elected by the city council assembly with a majority of its members upon nomination by the magistrate, and appointed by the magistrate.

Article 70 (eliminated)

Article 71

(1) The administrative jurisdiction serves as protection against unlawful measures by the administration.
(2) The person affected can request the decision of administrative courts against ordinances and dispositions by the administrative authority. This applies in particular if a right to which he is entitled has been violated, or if he is burdened with a duty which is not incumbent upon him.

Article 72

(1) A constitutional court will be established with professional judges and laymen; they will be elected by the city council assembly.
(2) The constitutional court decides on:

1. Constitutional complaints which can be raised by any person with the claim of having had one of his rights, stemming from this constitution, violated by public authority;

2. The interpretation of this constitution on the occasion of disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties of the city council or magistrate or other involved parties who are endowed with their own rights through this constitution or the rules of procedure of the city council;

3. Differences of opinion or doubts on the formal or objective compatibility of Land law with this constitution upon request by the magistrate, a caucus, or one-fourth of the members of the city council assembly.
(3) All other details, including determination of additional competencies of the constitutional court, in particular regarding also election scrutiny, will be regulated by law.

Section VIII

Finances

Article 73

(1) All revenues and expenditures for every fiscal year must be assessed in the budget plan; the budget plan is determined by a law (budget law). Assessment and determination for a longer period of time may be permitted by a law, and in special exceptional cases, evidence of revenues and expenditures outside the budget plan may also be admitted.
(2) Special plans are to be prepared for city bezirks with their participation. An adjustment in the budget plan is to be carried out in such a way that the city bezirks are able to fulfill their tasks, and ensuring just social and evenhanded cultural care for the population. The financial requirements determined by the city bezirks are to be submitted to the city council assembly as a supporting document for the budget plan.
(3) Appropriate financial and supplementary funds are to be put at the disposal of the city bezirks.

Article 74

(1) The budget law forms the basis for the administration of all revenues and expenditures.
(2) Budget funds may be used only to the extent that it is necessary for the task to be financed, that the authority therefor exists, and that economical use for the welfare of the people is safeguarded.

Article 75

(1) The magistrate must not assess taxes or levies without a legal basis.
(2) Legal authorization, determined or determinable by amount, is required for taking up loans and standing surety, assuming guarantees or other warranties which can lead to expenditures in future fiscal years. Revenues from loans must not exceed the sum of expenditures for investments estimated in the budget plan; exceptions are permissible only to avert a disturbance of the overall economic balance. Details will be regulated by law.

Article 76

(1) Budget overruns may be committed only with the magistrate's approval in case of an unforeseen and irrefutable need.
(2) Ex post facto permission for budget overruns must be obtained from the city council assembly.
(3) If the city councillor in charge of financial management raises an objection to a budget overdraw, a decision by the city council assembly must be brought about.

Article 77

If the budget plan has not yet been passed at the beginning of the new fiscal year, the magistrate is authorized to pay absolutely necessary expenses to maintain existing institutions, fulfill lawful tasks and legal obligations, continue construction projects and maintain orderly activity of the administration.

Article 78

(1) Bills and motions on measures which result in a lowering of revenues or increase in expenditures vis-a-vis the budget plan must be discussed by the city council assembly in two readings, as a rule to be separated by 48 hours.
(2) The decisions must contain regulations on funds to cover [deficits].

Article 79

The members of the magistrate and the city bezirk offices as well as all other members of the Berlin administration who criminally violate the regulations of the constitution regarding the finance system are responsible for the damage incurred thereby. However, an obligation to compensate for damages does not exist if the action was taken to avert an unforseeable urgent danger and the infringement of the ordinances did not exceed the extent made necessary by the emergency.

Article 80

Organization, administration, business management and the accounting system of Berlin's economic enterprises which are not legal entities (municipal undertakings) will be regulated by law. The accounting system must be set up in such a manner that a clear insight into the current business management and results is possible.

Article 81

(1) The conversion of municipal undertakings and of individual plants of lasting value into legal entities requires a resolution by the city council assembly.
(2) The sale of land and the granting of heritable building rights by Berlin residents require the prior approval by the city council, if they are of significance to the city because of size and extent.
(3) As for the rest, the sale of objects of property will be regulated by law.

Article 82

The magistrate has to account to the city council assembly for revenues and expenditures as well as assets and debts of the budget management in the following fiscal year; the same applies to the city bezirk office, which accounts to the city bezirk assembly.

Article 83

(1) A preliminary Audit Office is to be established; it is an independent auditing authority subject only to the law in the implementation of its tasks. The Audit Office examines the efficiency and orderliness of Berlin's entire budget and economic management, including its enterprises as well as all budget and operational accounts of this sector to be submitted. It reports to the city council assembly and the magistrate, which can also order it to undertake special auditing tasks, on discovered irregularities in budget and operational management. The president of the city council is to be informed without delay in particularly grave cases, and the matter must be put on the agenda of the city council assembly or be handed on to the budget committee. No one must be discriminated against because of his activity in the Audit Office.
(2) Upon proposal by the magistrate, the director of the Audit Office is elected by the city council assembly with a majority of its members. The magistrate appoints two deputy directors. The director and two deputy directors decide on the distribution of business, the rules of procedure, and auditing guidelines.

Section IX

Transition and Final Regulations

Article 84

The authorities of Berlin are to exercise their powers until they have been replaced under the regulations of this constitution, [and] the holders of public office until assumption of office by their successors.

Article 85

Insofar as they do not contradict this constitution, the legal provisions of the GDR with continued effectiveness as Land jurisdiction, as well as the resolutions of the magistrate, the city council assembly, the councils of the city bezirks (city bezirk offices), and the city bezirk assemblies continue to remain in force until they are changed or repealed.

Article 86

The regulations of this constitution do not affect the legal provisions enacted for liberation from national socialism and militarism and elimination of its consequences.

Article 87

(1) The city council assembly can confer the function of the agent for data protection (Article 23, paragraph 2) to the Berlin data protection agent for the transition period until the city's unification.
(2) With the coming into force of this constitution, the laws and legal provisions listed in the annex are to be applied analogously to the other Berlin city bezirks not mentioned under Article 4, paragraph 2, in their respectively valid version, insofar as they do not contradict this constitution and the legal provisions of the GDR, and also with the proviso that the nomenclature of this constitution is to be applied respectively.
(3) In all issues essential for the life of the city, the city council assembly and magistrate coordinate with the House of Delegates and the Senate of Berlin. This also applies to all subordinate institutions which correspond to the authorized agents, the Audit Office as well as courts of law and judicial authorities.

Article 88

(1) Changes of the constitution require a two-thirds majority of the members of the city council assembly.
(2) The city council assembly, in coordination with the House of Delegates of Berlin, decrees a law on the preparation and implementation of elections for an all-Berlin people's representation.
(3) The elctoral term of the city council assembly terminates with the convocation of the newly elected all-Berlin people's representation.
(4) This constitution becomes invalid on the day that the newly elected all-Berlin people's representation determines the validity of an all-Berlin constitution for this part of the city, also. The all-Berlin constitution must:

1. Contain the mandate to develop, in the first electoral term of the newly elected all-Berlin people's representation, a final constitution of Berlin and to put it into force through plebiscite, based on the Berlin constitutions of 22 April 1948—in the version of 11 July 1990—and of 1 September 1950;

2. safeguard the legal status of the members of the city council assembly even after termination of membership according to Article 37 (2).

(5) Notwithstanding Section 4 (1), and subject to a transitional regulation of an all-Berlin constitution, the office of the lord mayor and the other members of the magistrate terminates with the assumption of office of the corresponding members of the newly elected all-Berlin government.

Article 89

The functional nomenclature in this constitution is to be used in its masculine or feminine form, respectively.

Article 90

This constitution comes into force at the time of its proclamation.

Annex to Article 87, Paragraph 2

1. Law on spheres of jurisdiction in the general Berlin administration (General Law of Spheres of Jurisdiction—AZG) of 2 October 1958 (GVBl. p. 947, 1020), last changed by law on 6 July 1989 (GVBl. p. 1289), with the ordinance on implementation of the General Law of Spheres of Jurisdiction -DVO-AZG—in the version of 21 January 1990 (GVBl. p 461) with the following provisions:

a) Provisions which obviously apply to the Western section of the city alone are dropped.

b) Legal provisions referred to, as long as they are not yet to be applied within the scope of this constitution, are replaced by applicable legal provisions of the GDR. If corresponding GDR legal provisions do not exist, the legal provisions referred to must be applied analogously.

2. Law on bezirk administration in the version of 17 July 1989 (GVBl. p. 1494) with the following provisions:

a) Article 4, paragraph 2 of this constitution replaces Article 1, paragraph 1 of the bezirk administrative law.

b) The number mentioned in Article 5, paragraph 1, sentence 1 of the bezirk administrative law is replaced—until the end of the electoral term—by the number of members of city bezirk assemblies elected on 6 May 1990. For Article 5, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the bezirk administrative law, Article 55, sentence 2 of this constitution must be noted.

c) Article 35, paragraph 2 of the bezirk administrative law is replaced by Article 53 of this constitution.

3. Law on municipal undertakings of Land Berlin (municipal undertakings law—EigG) in the version of 22 December 1988 (GVBl. p. 117) with the following provisions:

The municipal undertakings mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 2, are replaced by the municipal undertakings to be formed according to the resolution of the city council assembly of 13 June 1990 (Document 1/15/90), with the proviso of prior decentralization of the present institutions.

4. Land budget regulation (LHO) of 5 October 1978 (GVBl. p 1961), last changed by law on 21 May 1990 (GVBl. p 1085) with the provision that for Article 64, Article 81, paragraph 2 of this constitution must be noted.

5. Law on staff representation (PersVG) of 26 July 1974 (GVBl. p 1669), last changed by law on 2 April 1990 (GVBl. p. 721).

Preliminary Results on 'Invalid' Referendum

LD3007191590 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] We have been receiving unofficial data on the referendum held yesterday. The official preliminary results were issued by the National Electoral Committee this evening at a news briefing.

[Begin unidentified spokesman recording] The number of those eligible for voting is 7,815,759. The number of ballots cast at the referendum is 1,087,411— that is, 13.91 percent. The number of valid yes votes supporting a referendum is 926,355, that is 85.91 percent, and the number of no votes is 151,987— that is, 14.09 percent.

According to the evidence of the preliminary data, on 29 July 1990 the votes cast among the electorate did not reach the number the law requires. Therefore, the referendum is invalid. [end recording]

Further Data

LD3007202490 Budapest MTI in English 1838 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—The National Electoral Board published the preliminary results of the Sunday [29 July] referendum on Monday. According to the preliminary figures, 1,087,411 citizens, 13.91 per cent of the 7,815,759 eligible voters, turned out for the referendum. 1,078,342 votes (99.17 per cent) were valid and 9,069 (0.83 per cent) invalid. According to the preliminary figures, the the turnout was not sufficient for the referendum to be valid by law. 926,355 people (85.91 per cent) supported the election of the president of the Republic directly and 151,987 (14.09 per cent) by parliament.

The National Electoral Board announced that the preparations for the referendum had taken place according to the law. The votes were duly counted by the returning committees and summarized by the electoral work teams.

The board announced that the election results were declared nul and void in a Dravaszabolcs district where an ineligible voter also cast a ballot.

Until 6 p.m. on Monday, the National Electoral Board obtained no information about any legal procedure challenging the outcome of the referendum.

The final results are expected to be announced on August 1, Wednesday, in the evening.

Spokesman Briefs Newsmen on Media Law, Issues

LD2707204690 Budapest MTI in English 1424 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (MTI)—Although the government pledges to support the freedom of the press and the privatization of newspapers, it would like to see a legal guarantee that no large foreign concern could possess more than one national press organ at a time, government spokesman, Balazs Laszlo, said in his Friday briefing.

He said that on Thursday he informed Aidan White, the visiting secretary-general of the International Federation of Journalists, of these concerns as well as the government's stance on the appointment of national media leaders.

As reported on the 26th, the government hurried a bill through the house allowing for the presidents of Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television and the Hungarian news agency to be appointed by the president of the Republic on the prime minister's approval.

Justice Minister, Istvan Balsai, announced the government's intention to amend the laws governing businesses in order to promote the desired economic changes. It is proposed that up until 15 September 1990, company councils at all state-run enterprises should appraise the competence of their managers and, if needs be, replace them.

To implement the property reform measures, the government has decided to abolish the institution of transaction rights with immediate effect. The social institutions, that at present legally enjoy the use of state-owned property, will, until the relevant parliamentary law has been passed, continue to enjoy the use of these properties. Afterwards they will become owners, users or lessees of the property.

On the other hand, those eight structures of socialism that were symbiotically linked to the previous regime, namely the former state party and its successor, the former communist youth organizations, the Patriotic People's Front, the National Peace Council, the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society, the National Council of Hungarian Women, the Hungarian Defence Federation and the Federation of Anti-Fascists and Resistance-Fighters, will have to draw up a comprehensive inventory of their property, which is to be presented to parliament, who will then decide on the future of those individual bodies.

The government has finalised the programme for the pope's visit to Hungary from 16-20 August 1991, said Balazs Laszlo. Accordingly John Paul II will celebrate two open-air masses and visit a few other towns besides Budapest.

The spokesman also announced that from August 1 the consumer price of certain household energy sources would rise by 29.7 per cent on average.

Parliamentary Session on Media Bill Resumes

LD3007104590 Budapest MTI in English 1007 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—The plenary session of Hungarian parliament resumed on Monday. The bill on the order of appointing leaders of the national media (the Hungarian radio, the Hungarian television and MTI) was presented by Prime Minister Antall. The bill was requested to be debated with an urgency motion, in a separate note distributed among the MPs. The urgency

motion was carried by parliament with 289 votes in favour, no vote against and ten abstentions.

The cultural and constitutional committees are due to meet in session on Monday morning to adopt a position regarding the bill. This will open the way for it to be tabled at the plenary session of parliament, to be held in the afternoon.

The agenda of the parliamentary session was later passed with 291 votes in favour, one against and four abstentions. Accordingly, MPs will debate over the bill on the order of appointing leaders of the national media, and continue the general debate over the bills on the amendment of the constitution, on local governments and the election of local government officials and mayors.

Antall Speaks on Freedom of Press

LD3007162590 Budapest MTI in English 1515 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—The Hungarian National Assembly suspended its special session at 3.15 p.m. on Monday.

The leaders of the parliamentary groups spoke in terms of satisfaction about the redrafted bill on local government. Janos Ader (Federation of Young Democrats) proposed suspending the general debate on the topic, leaving sufficient time for the MP's to study the new drafts they received in the morning, since 180 MP's agreed with the proposal, the plenary session was suspended until the afternoon of August 2, Thursday.

Before the end of the session, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall once again demanded the floor. He objected that responsible organizations had invited foreign experts to examine whether the freedom of the press was really guaranteed in Hungary. (The prime minister obviously referred to the fact that last week Aidan White, general secretary of the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists, paid a brief visit to Hungary at the invitation of the Hungarian Journalists' Union and was asked by the latter to send a three-member fact-finding delegation to Hungary to examine the enforcement of the freedom of the press.) Antall emphasized that Hungary was perhaps the country that granted the fullest freedom to the press in the world, so such requests were only destroying the prestige of the country. He stressed the government's commitment to democracy and the free press, and urged to put an end to the debate between parliament and the government on the one hand, and the press on the other.

As we reported earlier, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall demanded the floor once again during Monday's special session of parliament.

In his contribution, Antall emphasized that he would very much welcome the law on the order of appointing leaders of the national media, putting an end to the unpleasant situation which has emerged between parliament and the government on the one side, and the press on the other.

"I think the image a country has and the one it creates of itself is a common national responsibility", he went on.

"It comes to something, I agree, when responsible organizations ask for foreign assistance and foreign arbitration to decide whether or not the press in Hungary is free. Now, if a banana republic acts in that way, well, that's understandable. But in Hungary, where, I can quite confidently say, the freedom of the press is wider than anywhere in the world, a step like that exclusively serves to deteriorate Hungary's external image and reduce confidence in the country".

The prime minister raised the question whether any journalists had been hindered in his work, or whether there was any paper against which proceedings had been taken for writing anything against government members, the speaker of parliament, or the president of the Republic.

"In a country where the press can safely attack the president of the Republic, the speaker of parliament, the prime minister and the ministers, it is political immorality to question the freedom of the press", Antall said.

The prime minister stressed his conviction that the Hungarian Government, parliament and all political parties taking part in the renewal were unambiguous advocates of the freedom of the press, and had not taken any step which would have violated it. No kind of hysteria, persecution complex or deliberate political manipulation could be reason for questioning the freedom of the Hungarian press.

On this score, Antall emphasized the need to enact an advanced press and information law which guarantees the freedom of the press and defines in all aspects its responsibility in a way that the latter should never come into conflict with the freedom of the press.

"The Hungarian Government guarantees the freedom of the press in the country, and has repeatedly taken a stand in this spirit.

"All accusations stemming from the misinterpretation of steps taken in institutions under state or government control, and from jumping to tendentious conclusions, are unfounded.

"I believe we consider the free press and everything connected with it an integral part of the law-governed state of Hungary. No organization or body can allow itself to question these measures of the freely-elected parliament and the government answerable to it", Prime Minister Jozsef Antall stressed.

The special session of parliament is to resume on Thursday [2 August] with a plenary meeting.

Law Adopted on Media Appointments

LD3007174490 Budapest MTI in English 1543 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—The bill on the order of electing leaders of the national media (including the Hungarian radio, the Hungarian television and MTI) was presented at Monday's parliamentary session by Prime Minister Antall.

The essence of the motion is that appointing and relieving the leaders of these medias will be the task of the president of the Republic, at the proposal of the prime minister who is to take into account the related opinion of the relevant parliamentary committee. (A related motion tabled last week was voted down by parliament, given that it included the setting up of a committee for the independent political information, which would 'supervise' the press and would have a right to give its opinion. No agreement was however reached on details of setting up such a committee or outlining its tasks.)

In his motion the prime minister also said the government does not oppose the setting up of the said committee, but it would be advisable to continue the six-party discussions on details of the operation of such a committee.

The bill was passed without debate with 271 votes in favour and three abstentions.

The session continued with the general debate over the bills on local governments.

Horvath Addresses Parliament on Self-Government

LD3007112190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0829 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Speech by Interior Minister Balazs Horvath before the National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Last week the National Assembly party factions, deputy groups, and, in part, the independent deputies and government deputies, responsibly assessing the situation as unfavorable from the viewpoint of citizens, sat down at the negotiating table. After several days of preparation and coordination an agreement was reached on those basic issues of the self-government bill which until then had been approached differently. [passage omitted] We tried and managed to negotiate with the parliamentary parties, and on the fundamental issues we reached the following agreement:

We agreed on separating the sphere of tasks and the competence of the mayor and the notary; on the issue of strengthening the directing role of the mayor's office, or the mayoral office, and of the notary's public authority role; on the matter of opening up the significance of village and town political forums; on perfecting the regulation relating to the metropolitan self-governments, together with the fact that a separate bill will be drawn up for the capital—in this connection there was an initiative by our Young Democrat friends; and on the matter of working out the details and precise points of the rules connected with the economic bases and earnings of the self-governments.

We agreed that instead of lord-lieutenant, this office-holder should be called commissioner of the Republic. On the issue of the new kind of regulation as to his regional operation and appointment, we have dismantled the three basic types of the local authority election system. In their place we are putting forward two types and propose that the esteemed parliament debate and adopt these: extending the direct election of mayors up to and including localities with 10,000 inhabitants.

In the course of the already alluded-to coordination, however, we did not manage to agree on some issues. Thus, a National Assembly decision is also necessary on the issue of whether a town can ask to be declared a county town if it has 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. [passage omitted]

Esteemed deputy ladies and deputy gentlemen, the debates of coordinating discussions on the self-government draft bills have made even more unequivocal the well-known fact that local self-governments can only be really independent if they have the appropriate economic basis and funds. This question is often put in these terms: With regard to self-governments, everything depends on what kind of guarantees the administration can give for the economic foundation of local self-governments. It is indubitable and indisputable that in this field the administrative guarantees are of outstanding significance. For this reason it is the determined intention of the administration, of the government, that after the new laws have come into effect it should not leave the self-governments— the local self-governments— on their own economically. The sources, kinds, and legal titles of self-government undertakings are declared in the self-government bill; their conditions and extents, on the other hand, are laid down in the connected bills. [passage omitted] However, I would like to point out that the government is not able by itself to create the financial basis or security of self-government management. For this there is also definitely a need for willingness on the part of the whole society to help, a process in which the National Assembly—you, in other words—can play a large part. [passage omitted]

Constitutional Court Elects New President

LD3007162790 Budapest MTI in English 1525 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—In its Monday session, the 10-member Constitutional Court of Hungary elected its president and deputy president. (Up to now, the court was headed by the deputy president, Laszlo Solyom.)

The Constitutional Court elected Laszlo Solyom president and Geza Herczegh deputy president for a three-year term.

President's Interview

LD3007210690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Contrary to its usual custom, the Constitutional Court today made a decision on personnel questions rather than professional matters; the 10-member body elected its new president. The mandate of the president, Dr. Laszlo Solyom, is for three years. Tibor Hollauer talks to the new president:

[Begin recording] [Solyom] I am 49 years old, a lawyer and a librarian by qualification. Before becoming a constitutional court judge, I worked as an academic and taught at universities at home and abroad.

I had been involved in politics since the beginning of the eighties. I started at the Duna-kor, then I joined the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] as a founding member, and afterward became a member of the MDF national presidential council. This way I fought through the period of the Roundtable and became a constitutional court judge last fall. Since I took on this post I stopped taking an active part in politics.

I have my own ideas about what the Constitutional Court should be like.

[Hollauer] What should it be like?

[Solyom] Stable, impartial, independent. And I see that during this very sensitive period ours will be the task, through our decisions about the weekly modifications to the Constitution, to write the new, invisible Constitution. To clarify and spell out—and do so extensively and on a theoretical basis as well—the contents of the constitutional rights to freedom.

Each week 40-50 cases reach us; there are already 900 of them, which is an enormous amount.

[Holauer] Can it be imagined that the Constitutional Court could represent in the future a power center against the leading government party, which the government maybe has to take into account when making its decisions?

[Solyom] Not only can it be imagined, this is the role of the Constitutional Court.

[Hollauer] What is the authority, the basis on which your future activities, and maybe activities making very tough decisions, rests?

[Solyom] Our strength is primarily professional strength, as it is slowly becoming a rule in Europe, and to some extent in the United States as well, that the political disputes of the parties end up in the constitutional courts. The issues that they cannot settle on the political battlegrounds are eventually decided by the constitutional courts. [end recording]

Official Discusses Military Academy Exchanges

LD2707163390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Excerpts] A teaching method has ended at the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy. Peter Szorenyi interviewed Colonel Janos Gallovicz, deputy commander of the academy.

[Begin recording] [Gallovics] In the coming academic year we would like to, and will, deal with the issues of direction, principles of implementation of the Hungarian defense doctrine, and the evolving Hungarian Army.

[Szorenyi] I do not know whether the books can be rewritten and adjusted overnight....

[Gallovics, interrupting] Naturally, it cannot be done overnight, and could not be done in the future, had it not been for the fact that we have done this in previous years. The Hungarian military leadership had formulated a battle order which was different from that of the Warsaw Pact. [passage omitted]

[Szorenyi] Have you received scholarships for your students from member countries of NATO?

[Gallovics] Last year, Belgian, Dutch, French, and U.S. military academy delegations visited us and promised to send teaching materials. We received invitations to their academies. Fulfilling these invitations is, I think, a question of politics on the one hand, and the creation of the material conditions on the other, because we know that the teaching of foreign students at these academies is done in return for money. [end recording]

New Military Attorney General Appointed

LD3007143390 Budapest MTI in English 1318 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—Arpad Goncz, interim president of the Republic, relieved from his office Brigadier General Dr Jozsef Kaman, military attorney general and deputy supreme prosecutor, with effect from August 1, at the brigadier general's own request owing to his retirement, with due recognition of his merits.

Colonel Dr Tamas Kovacs was appointed by Mr Goncz to the office of military attorney general and deputy supreme prosecutor, and promoted him brigadier general.

Defense Official Queried on Upcoming Changes

LD2907100490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0630 GMT 29 Jul 90

[Text] I wonder if the Hungarian Army is prepared for the time when we are no longer members of the Warsaw

Pact and not yet members of anything else—if, that is, we ever will be. In other words, is there a new Hungarian military doctrine? This is the question I put to (Gyorgy Szentesi), head of the security policy main department of the Defense Ministry.

[Begin recording] [(Szentesi)] I think that this business of leaving the Warsaw Pact is not as simple as it appears at first sight, because it is not a question of our leaving the Pact's military organization on one day or another. It will be an 18-month run-up after which, regardless of whether this November, in Budapest, the Pact's Political Consultative Committee adopts a decision that may not be favorable to us, the Hungarian Republic will leave the Pact's military organization by December 1991. This does not mean that we will sever all ties with the Pact, but if there remains within the by-then modified organization of the Pact a body of a consultative and conferring nature, we shall naturally remain in that body as long as the Pact organization exists, but at all events for a certain period.

Regarding Hungarian military doctrine, it must be said that our military doctrine thus far now has not been really independent; it has been a part of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, with our leaving the Pact—to be more precise, its military organization—principles will have to be formulated that apply to the armed defense of the Hungarian Republic, and, naturally, demands will have to be formulated as well.

[Announcer] Here one often hears talk about the concept of all-round [korkoros] defense; there is even debate as to whether this concept is at all relevant. The essence, I think, is that so far the Hungarian Army has been facing West, and now it has to face in all directions.

[Szentesi] Well, all-round defense would be relevant if the country were threatened by all-round danger. I would rather say that the danger could come from any direction, but at this moment we cannot discover any attempts to violate the Hungarian Republic's sovereignty and national independence.

[Announcer] There was a Hungarian announcement that the present 106,000-strong Army will be reduced to 75,000. Apart from this, there are also the Vienna armed forces reduction talks. Is there a danger here which could be formulated in these terms: that in Vienna a framework figure will be decided which the Hungarian Republic would consider insufficient for its own security?

[(Szentesi)] I believe that the framework figure which will be decided will not be considered insufficient. Though this is a drastic reduction compared to the existing status, it will be necessary to withdraw outworn and outdated weapons, and a reduction of this extent will also apply to neighboring countries— that is, to the neighboring countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. So, they, too, will make a proportionate reduction in armaments, first and foremost. Vienna will not stipulate numbers [of personnel].

This present Hungarian Army does not accord with our future defense doctrine, in other words our defense principles. We have inherited an armament, a (?dislocation), in other words a [word indistinct] a structure, which does not really serve Hungarian national interests.

[Announcer] In the future, where does the Army want to procure those modern weapons which up to now we have bought from the Soviet Union, in a more or less modern version?

[(Szentesi)] The bigger problem for the time being does not lie in procurement, because, after all, we do not really have the money for procurement, either from here or from there. The problem is simply that we have to maintain the working capacity of the remaining stock of military equipment; this means procurement of spare parts, component parts, and perhaps the replacement of tools which inevitably need to be replaced. It is not just a question, in the case of an aircraft replacement, of having to replace the aircraft itself, but also the service system that goes with it. And as long as the airbases and technical service installations in our country are basically equipped for Soviet aircraft, we cannot just buy one or two Western planes. Running order has to be maintained, and for this we must have appropriate bilateral agreements geared to those countries where we will procure these tools— basically the Soviet Union, but in certain respects also, to Czechoslovakia and Poland.

[Announcer] I imagine that in view of the similarity of political systems, there will not be any particular problem for Poland and Czechoslovakia to supply the Hungarian Army with weapons. But I wonder if the political intention will exist in the future on the Soviet side?

[(Szentesi)] I believe that if the new relationship definitely prevails between the Hungarian Republic and the Soviet Union—namely, that we shall guarantee that no kind of offensive intention will threaten the Soviet Union from the territory of Hungary, and that the Hungarian Republic will not allow its territory to be used for an advance against the Soviet Union—then, I would not think there would be any obstacle to the Soviet Union's supplying us with all the necessary tools for maintaining the running order of the Army. [end recording]

Interior Minister Interviewed on Policies

Argues for Phone, Mail Intercepts

LD3107083690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] The police need to be able to use the so-called forbidden instruments—that is, phone-tapping and mail interception. Interior Minister Balazs Horvath voiced this view in a statement which appeared in the [Vienna] KURIER today. According to the interior minister, the present system which ties the use of the mentioned methods to permission from the justice minister is

wrong. For example, in the case of so-called hot-pursuit investigations, it is impossible to wait for the prescribed three days' processing time.

It has to be accepted that the police will always use phone-tapping and mail interception; we only have to make sure such instruments could never again be used for political purposes, the interior minister told KURIER.

Comments on Procedures, Soviet Influence

AU3007113290 Vienna KURIER in German 30 Jul 90 p 6

[Report on interview with Interior Minister Balazs Horvath by Georg Berenyi; place and date not given: "Fear Does Not Abruptly End"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **On Possibilities To Free the People From Fear**

"Today nobody has reason to be afraid in our country. However, the reflexes of fear do not stop abruptly. This is precisely why I am determined not to authorize any proceedings because of political offenses, not even against the politically responsible people of the former regime, except for crimes that are liable to criminal prosecution— for example, granting refuge to terrorists."

On Foreign "Cooperation" in State Terror

"Permanent representatives of the Soviet state security service worked as 'advisers' in the Interior Ministry and in the Defense Ministry. They not only controlled things, they also had a say in routine decisionmaking. Now they are gone. We are radically reducing their possible indirect spheres of influence. At the same time, we are striving for international cooperation in a completely different sense. For example, I recently visited Austria's interior minister. We have found a common language— just as with my West German, French, and Italian colleagues. We exchange valuable information."

On the Future Use of Police Powers in Hungary

"Of course, we must be prepared for dangers to the security of the country, whether increasing crime—a concomitant of the economic crisis—or international terrorism, for whose combat we are developing our special unit 'Komondor.'"

Plan To Replace Agriculture Minister Denied

LD3007203190 Budapest MTI in English 1851 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 31 (MTI)—In a statement forwarded to MTI, government spokesman Balazs Laszlo denied the allegation of some press publications that the idea of replacing Minister of Agriculture Ferenc Jozsef Nagy by MP Geza Zsiros had been raised. These reports are lacking all foundations and there is no talk about any reshuffle in the government, the statement says.

The debates on personnel and other issues within the Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP) do not affect the government and the coalition. Personnel issues were not raised at all when the ISP leaders visited the prime minister on July 27, Friday. Their talks focused on good cooperation and appropriate legislation. For this reason, the sides did not issue any separate communique.

Industry-Trade Minstry Holds News Conference

LD3007160990 Budapest MTI in English 1448 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—Newsmen were briefed about the progress of the change of leadership at companies supervised by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the process of restructuring and the first six months' results of tourism, at a Monday press conference held in the ministry.

The ministry supervises 87 industrial and 15 trade companies. A change of leadership already came about at 28 companies, five company leaders were relieved from office at their own request, one director was transferred while the others were put on pension at their own request. The present new leaders took part at competitions to win the appointment.

State secretary of the Ministry of Industry, Henrik Auth, said a government resolution is to enter in force in a few days on re-establishing the company councils at state companies until September 15. Half of the council's members plus one person are to be delegated by the workers themselves. The council is due to confirm directors in the position within 15 days or to elect the company's new leadership.

A Control Committee is to be created for the management and supervision of companies employing over 100 persons. These committees are to comprise prominent experts. The idea that membership in one of the governing parties would be preferred in the appointment of future leaders was firmly rejected by minister of trade, Akos Peter Bod.

The ministry's decentralisation efforts were also a subject of discussion, including the indication by 25 of the ministry's companies of their wish to secede. The ministry is due to make its related decision based on professional deliberations.

Imre Gellai, leader of the National Tourism Board informed that Hungary was visited by a total of 14.5 million persons in the first half of the year, which is up by 80 percent over last year's comparative figures. The increase was recorded from primarily Western states, but the number of visitors from neighbouring Romania increased by 33-fold, running to 3.2 million over last year. Tourism of the GDR declined to one-third its former level, but according to July figures there is an increasing number of East German citizens paying with DM [deutschmarks].

There were 128 international conferences held in Hungary in the first half of the year. The General Assembly of Italian travel agencies was held in Budapest and a similar event of the British travel agencies is to follow in the course of the year. The Hungarian Tourism Board is planning to host a further 180 international congresses this year.

The convertible currency returns from tourism was up by 98 per cent to 289 million dollars in the first five months of the year, over last year's figure of 145 million dollars. Foreign currency deposits by citizens rose to a total of 500 million dollars, some of it arising from tourism.

Two hotels of medium category were opened in Budapest in the first half of the year, and another three will follow by the end of the year, with Finnish, Austrian and West German cooperation.

Competition Office To Replace Price Office

LD2707124990 Budapest MTI in English 1209 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—In an effort to encourage conditions for a market economy in Hungary, the government decided yesterday to abolish the Price Office and to establish a competition office.

The government also intends to develop new legislation concerning the rules of competition and pricing, and ban unfair competition. It will safeguard the fairness and freedom of competition and specify sanctions for abuses of economic power and exploitation of monopoly positions.

The government proposes to create a cartel office later that will watch over mergers and other inter-company transactions.

The government has also decided to set up a committee for privatization, which will be responsible for developing a scheme for the reform of ownership and privatization. It will be headed by Mr Gyorgy Matolcsy, state secretary of the Prime Minister's Office.

Smallholders Head Speaks to Anticommunist League

LD2807024390 Budapest MTI in English 1811 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Brussels, July 27 (MTI)—Minister Without Portfolio Gyula Kiss, general secretary of the Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP), left Brussels for Budapest on Friday afternoon. Mr. Kiss had been in Belgium since Tuesday [24 July].

Mr. Kiss told MTI's correspondent that the Smallholders' Party has been invited to the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), an international organization rallying conservative and right-wing parties and figures, and operating in 86 countries.

The leading bodies of the Independent Smallholders' Party will decide about the offer. Mr. Kiss, as general secretary of the ISP, addressed a conference organized by the world league on Wednesday, dealing with national minorities and human rights, and detailed the position of his party in these issues. The invitation followed this address.

In this context, Mr. Kiss noted that the name of this conservative party federation is misleading: anti-communist views are not determining elements of its activity, it rather works to safeguard conservative values.

President Goncz Opens Gypsy Solidarity Day

LD2807215990 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] A Gypsy Solidarity Day began in the Hungarian capital. The cultural and political event was opened by Interim President Arpad Goncz.

The president emphasized that, in his view, at the dawn of the changing of the system the largest of the minorities got into a tragic position: They had become the victims of the economic crises. The problems of the gypsies are partly social and partly the problems of self-awareness. The solution to the first problem appears to be relatively simple, according to Arpad Goncz, but the task of creating self-awareness cannot be achieved without the support of The whole of society. This is an extremely difficult task, he stressed, but the solution is a question of life or death for the country. To work this out is the task of the gypsy intellectuals, the task of the Phralipe [Independent Gypsies association], among others.

[Correspondent] Does the fact that you accepted the invitation of the Phralipe mean that in your eyes they are the representatives of the gypsy community?

[Goncz] No, I feel Phralipe is the most important among the organizations. I regard it as a start, which at present is the most characteristic expression of the self-organization of the gypsies.

[Announcer] Nor were the fine arts missing from the program of the day of solidarity. The exhibition of gypsy painters, which is combined with an auction, was opened by the Indian ambassador to Hungary. Afterward those attending the event were able to hear the views of only the two of the six invited parties who were present—the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the SzDSz [Alliance of Free Democrats]. So we heard that both parties agree that, regardless of the changing of the system, the economic situation which had developed has serious effects on the least qualified gypsies.

Relations between the majority and the minority are also likely to deteriorate in the future. Both parties regard positive discrimination as essential for the solution of the gypsy issue.

Latest USSR Troop Withdrawal Figures Listed

LD3007161290 Budapest MTI in English 1450 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30 (MTI)—In the course of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, 29,460 Soviet citizens left the country until [as received] Monday morning, Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, told MTI. Altogether 14,730 soldiers, 4,078 civil employees and 10,652 family members have departed, and 6,800 pieces of military equipment and 147,800 tonnes of material have been pulled out.

Up to Monday morning, 215 troop-trains and 185 trainloads of equipment, altogether 410 trains, crossed the Hungarian-Soviet border. This means that 30.3 per cent of all trains agreed upon have left the country. According to schedule, 428 trains must leave until late July. The deadline will most probably be met, Keleti said.

Since the beginning of the troops withdrawal, 31 passenger trains and 35 container trains have left for the Soviet Union. Together with them, a total 476 trains, 26.9 per cent of all, have left the country.

Bank Official on FRG Credit, Trade Surplus

LD2707203490 Budapest MTI in English 1445 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 27 (MTI)—With Deutsche Bank as lead manager, a group of West German banks has granted Hungary a stand-by credit of 500 million DM [Deutsche marks] with a one-year maturity. The Bonn government will undertake guarantees for 90 per cent of the credit.

Commenting on the credit line, Frigyes Harshegyi, vice-president of the National Bank of Hungary, said that the credit agreement was reached during Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's visit to West Germany last month.

The Hungarian prime minister would have liked an 800-million-DM stand-by credit line, and this is the sum he actually agreed upon with Chancellor Kohl. However, the chancellor also suggested that since other Western European governments have shown willing, they should also be involved in credit guarantee arrangements.

Negotiations are currently being held about the remaining 300 million DM, and other Western European governments are also likely to undertake guarantees.

At the beginning of 1990, Hungary's borrowings for the year were projected at 2,500 million dollars. Such a sum would finance the planned 550-million-dollar current account deficit and Hungary's debt service obligations, which amount to 2,000 million dollars.

Since Hungary's external balances have seen a more considerable improvement than expected, it is possible that less credit will now be needed.

Preliminary figures show that as on July 26 Hungary's hard currency trade surplus has already reached 700 million dollars, and the half-year figure shows that the current account surplus amounts to 200 million.

Should this trend continue, it is imaginable that last year's current account deficit of 1,400 million dollars will be entirely worked off by the end of the year, meaning that the process of Hungary's indebtedness will end.

FRG Company Buys NEPSZABADSAG Shares

LD3107083490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0500 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] As of today, the hitherto largest circulation daily paper, NEPSZABADSAG, became partially foreign owned.

Yesterday afternoon NEPSZABADSAG Limited was formed, and the socialist daily thus became the property of an independent, nonpolitical, private company. The news is announced on the title page of the paper.

Of the 340 million forints basic capital, the largest share belongs to the West German Bertelsman Company, to the value of 140 million forints. But the majority of the shares remains in Hungarian hands. The remaining 200 million forints worth of shares are divided between the Free Press Foundation [Szabad Sajto Alapitvany], Agrobank, the General Bank for Assets Transfers, the Flame Publishing Company, and the editorial office of NEPSZABADSAG.

Official Reviews GATT Uruguay Round Talks

LD3007131790 Budapest MTI in English 1141 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30, (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungary, along with a number of other small countries, is waiting for the US and the EC to reach a compromise so that the GATT Uruguay round can come to a successful conclusion, a Hungarian Ministry of International Economic Relations official said after last week's talks in Geneva.

The official felt last week's talks were a success, as the tense atmosphere seems to have relaxed somewhat.

Hungary, as a large exporter of agricultural products, would like to see non-tariff barriers removed and export subsidies cut.

Hungary's agricultural exports account for about a third of its 6-billion-USD hard-currency exports.

IMF Consents to Second Credit Withdrawal

LD3007133590 Budapest MTI in English 1137 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Budapest, July 30, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The International Monetary Fund has consented to Hungary's drawing the second, 40-million-SDR [Special Drawing Rate] tranche of a one-year, stand-by credit of 160 million SDR (206 million USD).

The IMF came to its decision after the Hungarian Government had set about implementing its package to cut budget deficit.

The IMF fact-finding mission which visited the country recently decided that Hungary is on target to meet the conditions of the agreement, and keep the state budget deficit under 10 billion forints.

IMF representatives will again come to Hungary this September to check how the country is complying with the stated targets and decide about disbursing the third, 40-million-SDR tranche of the credit.

The IMF delegation will then probably stay on until the end of the year to discuss with the Hungarian Government the particulars of a three-year agreement between Hungary and the IMF.

The government expects to have a detailed, three-year programme all ready by September, and intends requesting IMF assistance to implement it.

One of the principal aims of this programme is to stop the growth of the country's 20 billion USD external debt.

This implies that foreign trade, tourism and services will have to produce a surplus of 1.5 billion USD annually to enable the country to finance the interest burden on its debts.

Senior National Bank of Hungary officials trust that the annual sum of 2 billion USD required for capital repayment will be available on the international capital market.

They hope to borrow between 1.2 and 1.5 billion USD, with the difference of between 500 and 800 million USD a year possibly coming from the IMF, the world bank, the European investment bank, the EC, and other organizations.

Skubiszewski Discusses Warsaw Pact Reforms

AU3007110790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Krzysztof Leski; place and date not given: "We Are Revising The Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] [Leski] Hungary has said it wants to leave the Warsaw Pact quickly. Poland has declared, however, that the Pact can serve as an instrument to facilitate the march toward a united Europe. Would you care to explain in what way it can fulfill such a role?

[Skubiszewski] I cannot explain because I never said that. Poland has not made any such declaration. What you say is not true. All kinds of information like this is being thoughtlessly repeated. Why? Let me give you the most recent example. In an interview broadcast by Radio Free Europe on 30 June, I heard that Prime Minister Mazowiecki had gone to Budapest to compel Prime Minister Antall to keep Hungary in the Warsaw Pact. One has to combine an ignorance of our foreign policy with a lack of responsibility in order to say things like that in front of a microphone.

Right now the West does see a certain role for the Warsaw Pact, realizing that it serves as a guarantee for the USSR while the question of a united Germany's military status is being resolved.

However, the political role of the Warsaw Pact member states as a group is a problem, because these countries are no longer a unified group.

I also consider it possible that NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as two alliances cooperating with each other, may eventually play a certain role in establishing the provisions of a system of European security. Whether that will be the case will soon be apparent. Right now, the Warsaw Pact is not fulfilling such a role. I see the Pact as several separate countries instead of a group of countries.

The Warsaw Pact is in a crisis. However, I do not rule out the fact that, apart from discussing the CSCE, Vienna, and Geneva talks with NATO, the Warsaw Pact will also discuss certain issues concerning armaments and confidence-building measures. This is also a NATO idea, but right now it is just a hypothesis.

[Leski] You say the existence of the Warsaw Pact is essential as long as a new system of European security is still absent. But at the same time you say that the Pact should become a political structure rather than a military one. In today's Europe, is Poland's security really meant to be safeguarded by an alliance whose essence constitutes a threat to the West? Is there a stronger political link between Poland and the tyrannical new Romanian regime and postcommunist Bulgarian regime than between Poland and the West Europe countries of NATO?

[Skubiszewski] I never said the Warsaw Pact is "essential." Once again, this is a fabrication. As far as authoritative views are concerned, I refer you to the 26 April government report.

Poland will not artificially prolong the life of the Warsaw Pact. The Pact is not an essential platform of cooperation today. We perceive cooperation in many forms—bilateral (particularly with our neighbors, including the USSR and Germany); trilateral (Poland-Czechoslovakia-Hungary); and regional (including with the Baltic republics and Danubian group of countries). But most of all, we see cooperation as embracing all of Europe, with emphasis on rebuilding the link with the EC, with whom we are interested in political cooperation, though we are primarily concerned about economic cooperation.

There is no threat from the West. I have said so many times.

By remaining in the Warsaw Pact, Poland has no political objectives that differ from those of the countries belonging to NATO and the West European Union.

[Leski] In your opinion, what exactly should be involved in the Warsaw Pact reform that is currently being drafted?

[Skubiszewski] The Pact is subject to modification on account of the political changes inside its member states. As long as it exists, it should conform to the letter of its purpose—a pact of collective self-defense (or defense to be more exact) as approved by Article 51 of the UN Charter. That is all. For a certain time, it will also be a forum of consultations between its members. Therefore, there is still room for the Political Consultative Committee, though this should now be at the foreign minister level rather than the defense minister level. On the other hand, coordination and joint decision making are essential. Also essential today are various military bodies created outside the provisions of the Pact. The Pact only calls for a joint command, not joint Armed Forces. It is certain that the Prague talks will also discuss a revision of the Pact itself, not just of its practices until now.

FRG Officials, OPZZ Officials Hold Talks

LD3007164990 Warsaw PAP in English 1612 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—A delegation of parliamentarians from the North-Rhine-Westphalia Land of West Germany, now in Poland at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affaris, today held talks with the OPZZ All-Poland Trade Union Alliance.

The West Germans took interest in social policy in Poland, particularly concerning unemployment, health care, pension and disability payments issues. They also presented the situation in this respect in their country.

The sides agreed on the principles of cooperation between the OPZZ and the national representation of

pension and disability payments recepients and the Land Board of North-Rhine Westphalia.

Economists Discuss Polish-FRG Relations

LD3007165490 Warsaw PAP in English 1628 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bonn, July 30—A dozen-or-so person delegation of Polish economic experts, led by director of the Polish Foreign Ministry's Department for International Economic Relations Jaroslaw Mulewicz, came for two-day talks here today. Its partner is equally numerous delegation of West German experts, led by Director of Department of the West German Foreign Ministry Dr Jelonek.

The sides today signed a Polish-West-German agreement on restructuring the Polish debt which was initialled in Warsaw recently. The agreement envisages the rescheduling of the repayment of Polish debts towards West Germany, amounting to 3 billion West German Marks (1.9 billion dollars), for 14 years.

The agreement is part of the overall package of decisions taken by the Paris Club in February 1990 aimed to facilitate Poland's repayment of its entire debt totalling 41 billion dollars.

West Germany is the first member of the Paris Club that signed an agreement with Poland to reschedule the date of the repayment of Polish debts.

Poland says that the repayment of the debt is a solution that does not fully satisfy it because Poland raises also the problem of releasing it at all of part of its debt.

Officials React to Reports on Terrorism Links

LD2807043490 Warsaw PAP in English 2129 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—Reacting to an article carried in the Italian "ESPRESSO" weekly, suggesting that Warsaw was one of the centres of arms supplies for terrorists, and that Abu Nidal sought throughout the world on charges of terrorism, was a partner in the "SAS" export-import operations in Poland, and the "Cenzin" company allegedly attached to the Ministry of Defence, Poland's Minister of National Defence Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk told PAP that "Cenzin" is not subordinated to the Defence Ministry and that the ministry has no influence on the company. It does however have contact with the company as it buys arms through it.

On the other hand, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Majewski recalled that in 1985 or 1986 THE NEW YORK TIMES and later on THE WASHINGTON POST published reports similar to those now carried by the Italian press, with the difference being that they were not as "sensational" and untrue (as the Italian reports), said Majewski.

The American dailies wrote that the "SAS" company purportedly had ties with Abu Nidal and handled matters associated with terrorism. After the American Embassy supplied more credible information, at the request of the Polish Foreign Ministry, action was taken to close the company. This finally occurred in 1986 or the beginning of 1987. The Polish state treasury lost about 5 million dollars in connecton with the shutting down of the "SAS." "We nonetheless thought that Poland's good name was more important than financial losses of this kind," Majewski added.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have any information whether this company actually did have ties with Abu Nidal. We very much doubt in such ties although, as the Americans suggested, Abu Nidal visited Poland on several occasions. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not however determine this. Specific action was taken to apply greater scrutiny in controlling the possible entry of such people into Poland," the Foreign Ministry official said.

Poland Seeks Interrogation of Katyn Perpetrator

LD3007183890 Warsaw PAP in English 1715 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—The Polish Justice Ministry learnt that Pyotr Karpovich Soprunenko, who was NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] major in the 1940s and who signed the lists of execution of Polish officers murdered in Katyn, lives in Moscow at Sadove Kolo Street.

In this situation, Justice Minister Aleksandr Bentkowski asked Soviet General Public Prosecutor Aleksandr Sukhorev to interrogate Soprunenko in the presence of representative of the Polish Justice Ministry in the person of Deputy General Public Prosecutor Stefan Sniezko.

Government Protests Lvov Travel Restrictions

LD3007185290 Warsaw PAP in English 1705 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—Polish officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the vice voivod of Przemysl held a meeting with Lvov's district authorities at the Polish consular representation in Lvov on July 28.

During the meeting the Polish side criticized a resolution of the Lvov District Council of July 1 which places restrictions on the travel of foreigners to the city and limits the possibilities of the residents of the district to pay foreign visits which affects family and other contacts of Poles residing there with Poland.

The representatives of the Lvov authorities promised to present the Polish stand and postulates to the presidium of the district council and to send a memorandum containing an explanation and possible decisions to the Polish side.

Sejm Fails To Adopt UN Children's Amendment

LD2807195190 Warsaw PAP in English 1853 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—The Sejm today did not avail itself of its right to authorize the president to ratify an international convention, namely the convention on children's rights adopted by the U.N. National [General] Assembly last November 20.

Eighty states have signed the document so far, and ten also ratified it or acceded to the convention, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski said and added that when the convention entered into force, after its ratification by twenty states, it would constitute one of the main acts on human rights.

The discussion on the bill turned into a debate on the situation of Polish children. Following a few proposals by deputies as to the modification of certain articles of the convention and some legal doubts, the Sejm resolved to send back the bill on ratification to the appropriate commission. The second reading of the draft was scheduled for September.

Mazowiecki Receives Soviet Ambassador 30 Jul

LD3007165290 Warsaw PAP in English 1555 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki received Soviet Ambassador to Poland Yuriy Kashlev here today.

Pakistanis Attempt To Cross Into GDR

LD3107105390 Warsaw PAP in English 0902 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 31—Fifteen Pakistanis have tried to illegally cross the Polish-East German border thinking they were going to a united Germany. They were apprehended by Polish border guards in Dobieszczyn, Szczecin voivodship.

They said they did not know there were still two German states and expected to arrive in a united Germany.

International Youth Congress Adopts Charter

LD2707204390 Warsaw PAP in English 1453 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—An international congress of independent youth organizations and movements of Central and Eastern Europe closed its four-day debate here today.

The congress, organized by the Polish Independent Student Union, NSZ, was attended by over 100 representatives of several tens of organizations who discussed the east-west relations, economy, ecology, schooling and problems of national minorities.

On the last day, the congress adopted a document called the "Charter '90"—a declaration of joint activities aimed at creating an integrated Europe.

Russian Trade Unionists Visit Warsaw

LD2707210790 Warsaw PAP in English 1440 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 27—A delegation of the Independent Trade Unions of the Russian Republic is staying in Poland at the invitation from the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions OPZZ.

During their few-days visit, the Soviet unionists held meetings with OPZZ leadership, members of other trade union federations and with unionists of enterprises in the Bialystok Voivodship.

They also got acquainted with OPZZ's stand on socio-economic reforms in Poland and discussed the possible scope and forms of their cooperation with OPZZ.

At a press conference today, Vice-President of the Trade Unions of the Russian Republic Vasilyev Romanov said they were particularly interested in experience gained by the Polish labour movement in the period of changing the economic system to the market-oriented one.

Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk Outlines Policy

LD3107133390 Warsaw PAP in English 1202 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 31—"I come out in favour of a strong Army because I believe that Poland needs such Army. This should be an Army with the indispensable defence sufficiency. The defence system of a state stems from its political strategy," newly appointed Minister of National Defence Piotr Kolodziejczyk told the TRYBUNA daily today.

"If we accept the worst variant, i.e., that we have no allies around us, we must prepare ourselves for the expansion of the Army and allocate huge sums to that purpose. With an optimistic variant—when new friends join old ones and Europe and the world are covered by an efficient security system—one can do without an army and local police can manage to secure internal safety.

"Who should be our ally and on what terms? What about border guarantees? What defence forces should we train? We, army men, would like to know the answers to these questions soon but I doubt if near future can bring them.

"Germany is different today. Historic experiences however tell us to be cautious. Nobody knows what the future developments may be in the East, either. The Soviet Union has guaranteed our security for over 40 years—will it continue to do so? What to do if violent unrest erupts behind the eastern border or if separate states are established? There are many question marks here.

"Poland does not intend to wage war against anybody. We want however to have such military forces which would make an attack against our country profitless. We will continue to restructure the military forces so that the number of soldiers can be cut and the technical condition improved. A soldier with a gun as a symbol of the contemporary Army must be replaced with a skilled engineer with his access to modern technologies."

Vetting of Security Service Employees Continues

AU3107071790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28-29 Jul 90 p 1

[Jerzy Jachowicz report: "A Sieve for the SB"]

[Text] The screening of former Security Service [SB] employees has been completed in 22 voivodships. Out of a total of 4,000 people screened, exactly 2,000 have passed this screening.

Let us recall that this screening is being applied to former SB staff who have applied for jobs in the police, Office of State Protection, and other units under the control of the Interior Ministry. It applies to everyone who carried an SB identity card up to 31 July 1989.

Out of a total of 250 former SB employees in the Gdansk urban community network, only 13 percent have been rejected for employment. In most small voivodships, the percentage of rejections has been slightly above 50 percent. In Olsztyn Voivodship, out of 237 job applicants, 52 percent were turned down.

In Tarnobrzeg Voivodship, rejected job applicants (72 percent out of 202) called the work of the local screening commission an act of revenge against "the most valuable and educated people." They said they would appeal to the Civic Ombudsman. They also decided to set up an Association of Former Interior Ministry employees.

On the other hand, during a recent meeting with Sejm deputies from the Citizens Parliamentary Club [OKP], Interior Minister Kozlowski was worried that some of the rejected people, especially those who are young, might turn to crime. He said that many might also be interested in working for foreign intelligence services.

The screening commissions consist of OKP deputies and senators, representatives of citizens committees, employees of deputies and senators offices, "Solidarity" activists, and representatives of the independent police trade unions.

The voivodship screening commissions will complete their work by the end of July. SB employees who fail their screening may appeal to the Central Qualifications Commission (headed by Interior Minister Kozlowski), which will make the final decision.

Supreme Chamber of Control Reforms Viewed

AU3007145390 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 Jul 90 p 3

[Interview with Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski by Jerzy Pilczynski; place and date not given: "The Supreme Chamber of Control Nearer to Parliamentary Control"]

[Text] [Pilczynski] After the last Sejm debate you emerged as the sole candidate for the chairmanship of the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK]. If the Sejm appoints you, do you intend to reform this institution?

[Romaszewski] I put forward my candidature precisely on this basis. I really intend to take reforms one step further. Not just to reform NIK, but to make certain changes in our parliamentary system. We have reformed various organizations—namely, the judiciary, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and local administration, but the institutions that serve parliament have remained in the same form as they were before.

[Pilczynski] But parliament itself has changed....

[Romaszewski] Yes, but here is another problem. Past Sejms were a facade. Often their function consisted in rubber-stamping decisions. Now, the amount of work that deputies and senators have to cope with exceeds their capacity many times over. From my own parliamentary experience, I have come to the conclusion that if the Sejm wishes to continue to exist and function, we have to strengthen it. I consider parliament to be one of the most important institutions of democracy. The prestige and effectiveness of parliament has to be strengthened by the bodies that are there to serve it. NIK is such a body.

[Pilczynski] It seems that NIK always functioned better when it was closely tied to the Sejm, and much worse when this link was weak, or worse, when NIK was subordinated to the government. At present, NIK is under the Sejm's control. Do you see any advantage to be gained by making it even more subordinate?

[Romaszewski] I would even support its integration with the Sejm. I am not suggesting that we should have the kind of support that U.S. congressmen get—namely, eight to 12 people working for a representative, and 20 to 30 people for a senator; and to this must be added the several thousand people working in the Library of Congress, and several other thousands in various research institutes. However, I think that in Poland we also have to provide more support for our own parliamentarians. I am a wholehearted supporter of the U.S. system where strong executive and strong legislative powers are quite clearly kept separate from each other.

Were this to happen here and now in Poland our parliament would be exposed as a very weak institution. If, for example, on 20 December we receive 13 draft bills for consideration, and on 28 December we, as a parliament, adopt all of them, then this is pure fiction and not

democracy. In effect, all we are doing is giving the government 13 votes of confidence.

[Pilczynski] Your ideas would imply a change of role and tasks for NIK.

[Romaszewski] NIK's control function must not be limited. At present, because of the enormous volume of legislation parliament is considering, it has practically ceased to exercise its control function. That is why NIK's role should be reinforced.

Regardless of what will happen, I foresee a need to develop an economic analysis and research team to serve the Sejm's needs. We must have information on the likely effects of future legislation. At the moment deputies and senators are almost helpless when it comes to assessing the implications of a budget or its implementation. We are simply not in a position to verify these things. We are making decisions on the basis of assumptions.

[Pilczynski] In the past NIK analyzed the existing state of affairs rather than making speculations into the future.

[Romaszewski] That is why the second element I would like to expand would monitor how this legislation was being implemented. In the Sejm and Senate there was even talk of forming a special commission that would do just that. It seems, however, that this would not be the best answer. At present we pass various laws which are then followed by their executive decrees. Nobody knows much about these decrees, and then there are the practical effects of our original decisions, about which we know next to nothing.

[Pilczynski] There is also the question of investigations that arise, for example, from complaints received by deputies and senators.

[Romaszewski] It is debatable whether we should leave these matters as they are, or transfer them to NIK. I would stress that this could be feasible, if NIK was integrated with the Sejm. I would even suggest that, if possible, NIK ought to be housed within the Sejm complex of buildings. At the very least, NIK ought to have a representative office in the Sejm.

[Pilczynski] Who would draw up the agenda of NIK tasks?

[Romaszewski] On the one hand, I think that this would come from the complaints received—this would be the control aspect—and on the other, from parliament's current legislative program and needs. To be honest I have not thought about this aspect in sufficient depth. My decision to stand for the chairmanship of NIK is relatively recent, and was taken on the basis of my thinking on parliament.

[Pilczynski] NIK was recently strongly criticized, as a result of which suggestions were made that wholesale changes in NIK, including personnel changes, were necessary. What is your opinion?

[Romaszewski] My answer is somewhat superficial, but I think that as an institution created in the preceding political period. NIK is not doing such a bad job. Regarding middle management, I am convinced that it is composed of very highly qualified and honest people. I am not thoroughly familiar with these issues, but I know that the reports we have recently been getting from NIK have been honest and very competent; for example, the Demidow fraud on the building contracts in Libya, which runs into billions. NIK was the sole organization that honestly presented the truth. From experience, I know that there are stronger and weaker local offices. In this matter I would rather be more cautious, and I would not recommend any revolutionary changes.

[Pilczynski] But do you not fear that these changes may become necessary? The professionalism of NIK inspectors is linked to the old command-redistribution system. Given the changes in our system, these aptitudes and habits may prove to be unnecessary ballast?

[Romaszewski] Absolutely, but this is the same problem that other institutions face. It is a question of training, and that has always continued. I think that there will be younger people who will gradually and naturally replace the old cadres.

[Pilczynski] Representatives of other political groups are afraid that the original political criteria of NIK cadre selection will merely be replaced by a new set of criteria.

[Romaszewski] I do not see a problem here. The essential thing is professional qualifications, and not political preferences. I think that NIK will not allow itself to be used in political games but will stringently investigate all excesses.

[Pilczynski] Do you see a need to amend legislation that controls NIK, for example, strengthening the positions of NIK employees and their independence, and fixing new criteria of responsibility?

[Romaszewski] Yes. This strengthening should be reflected in improved material conditions, because NIK employees are very badly paid. NIK employees have to be professionals of a very high caliber, and they have to be materially independent. Regarding legal status, I think that this could be drafted on the same lines as the legislation governing the way the prosecutor's office functions—namely, a hierarchical structure, and a provision that allows a functionary to decline to conduct a particular investigation.

Regarding legislation that currently governs NIK, this has to be amended. At present, NIK has no powers to investigate municipal institutions, because when new legislation was adopted this point was overlooked. NIK should have the power to intervene everywhere where public money is involved.

[Pilczynski] NIK is one of the elements of an unusually expanded and inefficient system of state controls. Apart from NIK, there are some 20 other control institutes that are active in central government administration. Do you think the whole system needs an overhaul?

[Romaszewski] NIK should be an instrument of parliamentary control, and the government should have its own instruments of control. I do not want to say anything on the subject of their eventual form, because that is a matter for the government. We have to remove all elements of government control over NIK from our present legislation. Cooperation with the government is one thing, taking on tasks at the government's command is another.

[Pilczynski] In conclusion, I would like to ask you a specific question. What is your opinion on the subject of anonymous complaints?

[Romaszewski] I am too familiar with the way our local regions work to assume a position of principle. We have to be penetrating here. Of course, this cannot lead to immediate investigations. From past experience we know that many people in our present situation would be committing "suicide" if they were openly to antagonize local connections and certain group interests. The problem is incredibly delicate.

Economic Indicators for Jul Reported

AU3107122690 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Jul 90 p 3

["K.B."-signed report: "Central Planning Office Report—Stagnation is Still There"]

[Text] Research carried out by the Central Planning Office twice a month in 136 industrial, construction, and trade enterprises, as well as 36 participating bank departments, still shows that the economy is stagnating.

There are certain changes, but the differences between the successive indicators obtained and future prognoses of economic units still reflect the expected variations in trade conditions that occur each month (the closer one gets to the first of the month the higher the general economic activity), rather than any qualitative change in the overall market situation. The figures received for the first half of July 1990 confirm this state of affairs.

Production and Finance: An increase in the value of their sales at current prices was reported by 31 enterprises in the first half of July. Some 30 enterprises reported an increase in the second half of June, whereas for the period before the first July, 73 enterprises reported an increase. Enterprises reporting a fall in sales numbered 68 (67 and 26 for the same periods as above). The cyclical nature of this trend is quite obvious.

Some 25 enterprises, compared to 14 in the first half of June, report an estimated increase in realization prices. Nine enterprises reported that they will be increasing their prices within the next few days, and 115 do not intend to increase their prices. There has been no general improvement trend in enterprises ability to pay. This state of affairs was reported by 79 enterprises, and 93 do not foresee any changes in the immediate future. Enterprises reporting an increase in their indebtedness numbered 35 while only six consider that there has been an improvement in credit repayment punctuality. The participating banks report a fall in the number of enterprises that have a zero credit rating. The number of such enterprises now stands at 69 (in the middle of June there were 78). However, compared to the total number of enterprises that these banks service, this number is minimal and amounts to only 0.8 percent. Some banks, for example, the General Economic Bank in Piotrkow Trybunalski, report growing interest in the circulation of bills of exchange (up to a limit of 0.5 billion zlotys in value). Banks from the Poznan area have also reported an increase in settlements between enterprises by bills of exchange.

Industry: An increase in production has been reported by 13 percent of the participating enterprises. In the first half of May and June the comparable percentages were 10 and 14. The situation of individual enterprises varies. "Petrochemia" in Plock reports a fall in output. It is currently processing an average of 25,000 tonnes of crude oil in a 24 hour cycle, whereas its processing capacity is some 40,000 tonnes. Part of the crude oil comes from its accumulated reserves. Enterprises are continuing to adjust to prevailing market conditions. There is a search for new market outlets and a widening range of sale incentives. Some factories ("Metalplast" in Leszno, The Furniture Factory in Swarzedz, and "Romet" in Bydgoszcz), actually report an increase in their work forces.

The retail market: Despite the demand barrier there has been noticeable growth in sales in some cases. The "Centrum" department store in Poznan reports increases of 30 to 40 percent in its turnover. A new feature there is the opening of a bank counter offering credit finance for the purchase of goods up to a limit of one's annual salary. The store also offers discounts of 1.5 to four percent on purchases above 500,000 zlotys. As a result, sales of televisions, refrigerators, carpets, and other more expensive household articles have been boosted.

Shops are beginning to change hands as a result of the termination of leases. In this process the general public is the main loser, because food stores, cafes, small service outlets, and post offices have begun to disappear. In an effort to counteract this trend, local authorities have begun to implement measures by introducing a sliding scale of commercial rents payable.

Foreign trade: Results for this period show declining exports to the first and second payment areas. Imports from the first payment area are still falling, whereas imports from the second payment area have risen slightly.

The labor market: The percentage of enterprises reporting a fall in labor levels has increased to 64 percent in the first half of July (in the second half of June it stood at 57 percent and in the first half of June it was at 53 percent). Only 14 percent of participating enterprises report staff increases. The main reason behind the shrinking work forces is that contracts of employment are being terminated at the employees own request.

Independent Credit Banks Foundation Established

LD3007194190 Warsaw PAP in English 1710 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Gdansk, July 30—A founding meeting of the Polish Foundation for the Development of Self-Government Credit Banks was held here today.

They are to be set up in Poland as peculiar social savings and credit banks cooperating with the American credit union. They would specialize in giving inexpensive credits for consumer purposes, in Poland chiefly for flats.

The foundation, whose notarial deed was signed in the presence of President of the World Council of Credit Unions Ajax Cracy, expects to gain about 500,000 shareholders (private persons and firms) in Poland.

Council of Ministers Approves Development Policy

LD3007222590 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—At today's session the Council of Ministers, headed by Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, critically evaluated the current state of the country's spatial organization as part of a discussion on the state's strategic goals in the field.

The government approved of a concept of the state long-term spatial development policy, especially for a period till the year 2000.

This policy will aim to develop such a spatial structure of settlement and the economy that should ensure access to jobs, services and recreation to the population all over the country.

The Council of Ministers adopted a number of executive acts to the law on the state protection office. The regulations define in detail the procedure of checking identity papers, searching citizens and their luggage, as well as using truncheons and weapons by functionaries.

The adopted regulations are to ensure that functionaries abide the law while undertaking the above measures, especially while using weapons.

The Council of Ministers adopted the contents of a letter to be sent to the International Monetary Fund which informs the organization on the hitherto implementation of the programme of economic recovery, conclusions stemming from it and further plans of the government.

Referring to imports of large quantities of alcohol in 1989 and first months of this year, the cabinet obliged the ministries concerned to thoroughly analyze the issue with particular stress on its causes and losses sustained by the state budget.

Commentary on Poland, Need for 3-Party System

AU3007211090 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jul 90 p 2

[Jerzy Surdykowski commentary: "Republicans and Democrats"]

[Text] After the formation of the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action" [ROAD], with Zbigniew Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, as a second political wing of "Solidarity," and in direct opposition to the Center Accord, one has begun to hear voices saying that in Poland there is now a chance that a two-party system, along the lines of the one in the United States, might come into existence. On the one hand, we would have the Center Accord playing a similar role to the one played by the Republican Party, and, on the other, there would be ROAD playing the role of the Democrats. Each would form a nucleus and center of consolidation around which the two future parties would be created. The advantages of a two-party system do not have to be recalled here; it is sufficient to point to the efficiency and political stability of such democracies as the U.S. or British ones, or, where the political evolution of the last few decades has given systems that are almost two party, for example, West Germany or France.

However, even given the most favorable conditions for the formation of a two- party system, a three-party system seems most likely to develop in Poland. This is the result of a very large agricultural population, and, compared to the West, the backward nature of the economic and population structure of rural Poland. This is a tangible fact, and the Polish peasant will continue to have his "own" political representation—separate from the city—which will continue to defend his separate interests, even though these interests are the interests of an agricultural community that is backward and unproductive. It was no different in the West where the peasant parties had their great heyday a few decades ago. Later, with the gradual depopulation of the villages and the appearance of the large mechanized farm that developed at the expense of the traditional peasant farm, they gradually waned. Whatever may have been the faults of that process, it would be infinitely more preferrable and would better reflect the reality of Polish political preferences than the present situation, where only the Citizens Committees, set against a mosaic of many parties and even smaller political movements, have any real say.

A system of two or even three parties would require that all these fledgling parties coalesce around one of the main forces, which on the one side could be formed around the Center Accord, and on the other, around ROAD. The peasant movement has already been mentioned above. All those who found themselves outside

these three main forces and centers of consolidation would be condemned to political extinction. They would simply not stand any chance in the electoral campaigns. The following questions come to mind. First, will these two "Solidarity" groupings form such nuclei, and have they matured enough to seize such an opportunity? Or will they remain new elements in the present mosaic of many parties that do not amount to very much? Second, will such a change of direction be approved by the activists from the citizens movement from which the two groups have originated and will they get the approval of the voters to whom they are making the political appeal?

If a two- or three-party system is the future scenario for Poland, then these future parties—following the model of the West—should be pragmatic and not ideological, and they should compete on the basis of programs and candidates. In Poland there is an absence of a strong middle class, and this seriously hampers the prospects for a two party-system. However, there are many people who are intensely interested in the success of the current government's program—with its amendments— but will this be enough?

Powers of Parliament, Presidency Viewed

AU3007082090 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 July 90 p 3

[Piotr Winiorek commentary: "Constitutional Debate—What Kind of President, What Kind of Parliament?"]

[Text] The creators and drafters of constitutional systems are in the same situation as inventors of technical equipment. They are not altogether free in their choice of the solutions that are theoretically feasible. They have to take into account the expectations of the consumers, the costs of construction and implementation of their system, and the effects that this might have on its surroundings. Disregarding all those who are true innovators and discoverers, the drafters and the constructors use a limited range of standard solutions, tailoring them to a particular need and adapting them according to their own possibilities.

One should not anticipate that the creators of future constitutional solutions will give their imagination free rein and introduce state institutions and mechanisms in Poland that will be completely original and unheard of anywhere in the world. On the contrary, one ought to expect that they will utilize the tried and familiar structures. Certain matters have already been decided and will not form the subject of serious constitutional debate—for example, whether Poland is to be a republic with a president at its helm, whether there should be a parliament in our country, whether the government should be in the form of the Council of Ministers, whether independent courts should oversee the application of justice, whether local power should repose in local self government bodies, and so on.

The important question is what specific form these institutions should take, what powers they should have, and what is to be the relationship between them. This is particularly relevant to two institutions that are regarded as crucial to the two pillars of executive and legislative power, namely, the parliament and the presidency.

Although it would be a gross oversimplification, one can say that Polish constitutional history from the time of independence can be reduced to the conflict between the extent and the relationship of the executive and the legislative organs.

It is recognized that the law of 3 May 1791 strengthened the king's position and gave the country a government that was answerable under the Constitution and to parliament. The Sejm, composed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, kept its far-reaching and mainly legislative privileges. However, it was to develop into an organ that functions in the modern and rational tripartite division of power.

The first full Constitution of post-partition Poland, dated 17 March 1921, and especially the way it was applied in practice, ensured that the legislative organ became dominant. The office of president was pushed to the sidelines and the fate of successive governments was made dependent on the fluctuating party alliances. This state of affairs helped the Belvedere camp launch an attack on the prevailing political conditions and helped it in its struggle for power under the slogan "against the Sejmocracy" and "party politicking."

From 1926 (and quite visibly from 1935, that is, from the adoption of the April Constitution) parliament began to decline in influence. Formally, the deciding influence in the state now lay with the president. In practice, however, the true presidential position was not as strong as it might have appeared in the Constitution, at least as long as Marshal Jozef Pilsudski was at the country's helm.

After 1944, it was not the mutual relationships between the legislative and the executive power (this division was formally abolished in 1952) that were to be important, but the plane of real and nominal decisionmaking centers in the state. The center of power was now outside the constitutional organs. Power resided in the leadership cadres of the Polish Workers Party, and later, the Polish United Workers Party. All the important and many of the less important decisions were made by them and the administrative and legislative organs became mere tools used to implement them. Representative bodies declined completely.

This much written about state of affairs had disastrous effects on the social prestige of the country, its system of justice, its democracy, and the efficiency of the state. The lessons to be learned are that a political system should be so constructed that the true centers of power are located in those places provided for by the constitution.

The good and bad experiences postulate a preservation of a balance between the legislative and executive powers, including the president. I would be against

giving more power to parliament, as I would be against increasing the prerogatives of the president. Looking at the existing constitutional arrangement throughout the contemporary world, I would reject the two extreme solutions of, on the one hand, the traditional parliamentary-cabinet arrangement, and, on the other, the classic presidential system. If necessary, I would seek a model where the strong position of a president and government is identified with the true authority of a democratically elected and functioning parliament.

Poland needs a strong presidential authority because we are in the throes of a fundamental reconstruction of the sociopolitical and economic systems, and this is likely to continue for a long time yet. Under such circumstances, there is always a danger of a destabilization of the state. It is necessary to strengthen the president's position by concentrating prerogatives of authority in the hands of a person who has the support of society and can take fast and effective decisions in the interests of the whole nation. On the other hand, reconstruction of the system and the efficient functioning of the state will be impossible without wide social participation that does not have any representation; without clashes of interests and opinions; without clashes of ideas and programs; in short, without pluralism and democracy. The most appropriate forum where all this could come to the surface is a parliament.

After this general historical review, I would like to make the following detailed suggestions:

The president should be universally elected for a longer term than the parliamentary one. Apart from the usual powers conferred on heads of state (appointing and receiving ambassadors, the granting of presidential pardons, bestowing of decorations), he should have other specific powers. For example, the right to make basic decisions concerning foreign and defense policy, to instigate legislative initiatives, to have a suspensive veto concerning certain legislation, to have the right to issue decrees on the basis of appropriate legislation, to dissolve parliament before the expiry of its term, to appoint and dismiss the premier, to chair the Council of Ministers, to introduce a state of emergency for a limited time and under the control of parliament, and to call a general referendum. The president would be the civil head of the Armed Forces and would be constitutionally answerable to the Tribunal of State. He could only hold office for two presidential terms.

As for parliament, we have to decide what its structure will be. The present bicameral arrangement is the result of the "roundtable" and reflects the price that was paid by the then ruling camp for permission to institute the office of the presidency and certain electoral privileges at the Sejm elections. The restitution of the Senate was, to a certain extent, a move to restore the balance between the opposition and the pro-government forces. These arrangements are beginning to lose their relevance with the decline of the "roundtable" political contract.

The existence of the Senate has somehow to be justified. Merely referring to past Polish tradition cannot be the answer. It is not totally persuasive to say that the existence of a second chamber rationalizes the legislative process. Sometimes it does, and sometimes it does not. I would not have anything against the existence of a second parliamentary chamber provided that it was representative of interests different from those that are represented in the Sejm. I would support a Senate that was, for example, a representation of local self government, academic, regional, and professional bodies. Such a chamber would not be elected directly, but by the appropriate organs of self- government (for example, by the voivodship sejmiks). Its primary task would be to participate in the legislative process as it does now. It would not, however, have any powers concerning supervisory control of the working of the government, state appointments, or the right to impeach the president. These prerogatives should belong to the Sejm.

The Sejm must be the core and the most important component of legislative authority. It should be constituted on the basis of a five-percent threshold elections [wybory piecioprzymiotnikowe], thus proportional elections. It would have the task of passing legislation (with the Senate's participation), drawing up the state's budget, amending the Constitution, and ratifying international treaties. It would also be responsible for making appointments to some state posts, for example, the head of the Supreme Chamber of Control, the Citizens Ombudsman, the state tribunals, both the Constitutional and State Tribunals, and it would exercise parliamentary control over the government.

The government cabinet, appointed by the premier (the president would have a say concerning the foreign affairs and defense posts), would continue for as long as it enjoyed the confidence of the Sejm. If a vote of no confidence were passed, the president would have to appoint a new premier, and the latter would form a new government. I believe that the introduction of such structures would strengthen the executive authority without lessening the power of parliament. Members of the government would also be answerable under the Constitution, to the Tribunal of State.

As can be seen, the above suggestions are a rather far-reaching modification of the available solutions that are allowed by the present Constitution. They implement the principle of the tripartite division of power, which is not questioned by any serious political grouping in Poland today.

Cabinet Outlines Police Firearm Use Guidelines

LD3007190190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] The subjects of today's meeting of the Council of Ministers are: a draft letter to IMF authorities concerning economic policy; a draft plan regarding Poland's town and rural planning; and four draft legal acts,

concerning the functioning of the Office for State Protection. They envisage, among other things, that the functionary has the right to use firearms, but when and under what conditions? Here is Piotr Stachanczyk, director of the office of the Minister of Internal Affairs:

[Begin Stachanczyk recording] In order to use firearms, the functionary must meet several conditions. First, he is bound to call upon the person in possession of a firearm to behave in a manner compatible with the law, or the person committing a crime must also act in accordance with the law [as heard]. Second, in the case of pursuit, he should call upon the person to stop. Where people are being transported under escort, he should warn the person under escort of the possibility of the use of firearms. Next, before firing at the criminal, he should fire a warning shot into the air. The functionary is also obliged to use firearms in this way solely in order to disarm the criminal. His intention must not be to kill the man. The functionary must not use firearms against certain categories of people, that is, old people, invalids with visible handicaps, visibly pregnant women, and children under the age of 13. One exception, dictated by life itself, exists here, namely: If a person belonging to one of these three named categories is in possession of a firearm, and, with the aid of this firearm, is trying to kill someone, the functionary may use his own firearm against this person, and may simply shoot. [end recording]

Democratic Action Founding Congress Held

LD2807194590 Warsaw PAP in English 1824 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—Funding members of the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action (ROAD) met here today. The meeting adopted provisional regulations of the movement's activity until a founding congress.

A founding council of the movement was appointed, composed, among others, from all-Poland plenipotentiaries Zbigniew Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, deputies and senators who have joined the movement and provincial plenipotentiaries.

The meeting voted for general presidential election. It was announced that ROAD membership exceeded 4,000. Statements by Bujak, Cezary Jozefiak and Andrzej Wielowieyski initiated discussion on identity and outlines of a programme of the Democratic Action.

According to Bujak only by respecting law and the constitution Poland may be brought to the democratic Europe.

Professor Jozefiak underlined that the movement proposes a road of seeking and constantly correcting the programme, and of calculating social costs of all moves.

Wielowieyski opted for a "tamed capitalism" and revolutionary transformations in public awareness, and not only in the state and economy.

In a personal address, Jacek Kuron explained he has joined the movement because the centre coalition which put forward the postulate of political acceleration was set up.

I took fright, he said, we are launching a force we will not be able to stop. So it was necessary to organize a movement of people of good will acting on the principle: Go ahead, but without brawls.

What should the Democratic Action be, and what should it not be? [This] is how Adam Michnik his address, received enthusiastically.

ROAD does mean a split in the Solidarity but is a political form of something termed the Solidarity spirit Michnik said.

We want to be above personal conflicts, to build a compromise of all reasonable forces in Poland for a democratic order. We want to be neither the left nor the right wing, Michnik stated.

Press Conference

Immediately after the plenary session the 200-strong founding council of the movement held a meeting, the course of which was presented at a press conference that followed.

Aleksander Labuda was appointed head of the programmatic team and Ludwik Turko became chairman of the Statute Commission. Adam Michnik is to work out a concept for the functioning of a political council as a quick response team at the movement's leadership.

Most of the questions concerned presidential elections.

We consider it a wrong thing if a change at the presidential post were to destabilize [the] situation in Poland, Zbigniew Bujak explained. ROAD suggests the following political schedule: Amending the constitution so it provides a possibility for general presidential election, and then holding election of the president, parliamentary elections in spring, and at last adopting a new constitution.

Newsmen learnt, among other things, that:

—ROAD plans to hold talks with other political forces if Poland which would like to form an alliance for democracy,

—Deputies-ROAD members will put forward an initiative to amend the constitution in the part concerning the procedure of electing the president as well as take up work on their own draft for a new constitution,

—Lech Walesa started running for the presidency too early, he loses on it and so does Poland. The Solidarity leader has ceased to be above divisions. Today he is backing the centre coalition and we do not think he might be our candidate,

—There are barriers for former Communist Party members clearly defined in the ROAD founding declaration, the movement originates from the solidarity ethos.
—A founding congress of the movement will be held in two months at the earliest.

Democratic Action's Frasyniuk on Program

AU3107084390 Gdansk TYGODNIK GDANSKI in Polish 29 Jul 90 p 4

[Interview with Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, leader of the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action," by Jan Jakubowski; place and date not given: "We Avoid the Word Party"]

[Text] [Jakubowski] Is the "Action" already a new party?

[Frasyniuk] No, it is a citizens movement. The "action" does not possess any kind of internal structures.

[Jakubowski] However, you have said that you will only admit individual persons for the time being.

[Frasyniuk] We are undoubtedly heading in the direction of a political organization—that is, people will join us, because of certain views and certain activities pursued within the framework of the organization.

[Jakubowski] Then how, in your opinion, does a political organization differ from a party, and why are you avoiding the term party?

[Frasyniuk] I could say that like everyone in this country we are avoiding the word party because of its negative past connotations. However, that is only one of the reasons. We believe that Poland lacks a tradition of forming parties and the creation of a party should be the product of a process whereby people and communities work out a party's form and ideology through discussion. I think that today drawing on the period between the wars on the communist past is an appeal to relics of the past.

[Jakubowski] So, you do not want to be a party in the classical sense?

[Frasyniuk] I do not know what the end result will be. Everything is still in its initial stages. Perhaps a party will emerge in the future, but it is equally possible that a party will not emerge.

[Jakubowski] How are we to understand your statement that you are to the west of the Center?

[Frasyniuk] The Center is the first organization to have entered the political scene in a very determined manner. But is it actually a center? For there to be a center, there has to be a polarization into left and right. That does not exist yet, and the political scene is still empty although things are slowly developing. So, to show where we stand in relation to the Center Accord, we have said that we are to the west of it. That is to say, we intend to build a modern society that will govern itself democratically from the outset. We cannot accept the election of a president by a parliament that has not been elected democratically, which is what the Center is proposing.

[Jakubowski] In what other ways do you differ from the Center?

[Frasyniuk] At the present time it is difficult to talk of any fundamental programmatic differences. Neither structure has presented a definite program, especially with regard to the economy. Both are in favor of a market economy. Perhaps we will differ over social programs, but that is difficult to say in advance. However, we do at present differ in our attitude toward the Mazowiecki government. The Center rejects and we back the philosophy behind Mazowiecki's way of governing. We also support the direction of this government's reforms, although we intend to propose our own adjustments to certain actions.

[Jakubowski] As we understood it, the Center does not reject the direction of the government's actions, but what it is seeking is more an acceleration of the pace of reform.

[Frasyniuk] But we think that electing the head of state in an undemocratic manner checks rather than accelerates reform.

[Jakubowski] So, what in your opinion would be a true acceleration?

[Frasyniuk] The creation of a situation in which society would fully participate in the democratization process.

[Jakubowski] Do you think that there is a danger of a dictatorship?

[Frasyniuk] At the moment there is a very real danger of chaos, of anarchy in public life. This may produce a situation in which the only way out will be the assumption of power by an authoritarian president. We set up our grouping to prevent this very thing from happening.

[Jakubowski] To prevent the kind of chaos that could lead to the emergence of a dictatorship?

[Frasyniuk] Yes.

[Jakubowski] Isn't it perhaps the case that Democratic Action was formed because the Center Accord, as a clearly defined force, had begun to accumulate political trump cards?

[Frasyniuk] The Center deserves credit for being the first large organization to have emerged on the political scene and for proposing certain actions—a speeding up of the creation of political organizations and the process of self-definition on the part of society. We hoped that the force that would be a guarantor of stability until the next elections and would help institute the most difficult reforms would be "Solidarity" along with allies in the form of the citizens committee. However, that did not

come about. This concept was also abandoned by Walesa. This means that union activists will have to define themselves in political terms sooner than we expected. In addition, they have to do so outside the union, in political groupings, to prevent a conflict within the union, which has ceased to be an active agent in politics and has become a subject of politics instead.

[Jakubowski] How are we to understand that?

[Frasyniuk] Quite simply, the union and its leadership in the National Commission do not have an influence on what goes on in politics. They also do not have an influence on their own chairman. The union has ceased to play any kind of role in the Lech Walesa Citizens Committee, of which it was one of the founders. It is being torn apart by people and organizations that are overwhelmingly against "Solidarity," its symbols and legend. It is worse than that, they are also opposed to a strong labor movement and are ready to do everything possible to make it as weak as possible.

[Jakubowski] We understand that you intend to defend the union through an influential political organization. However, how do you reconcile being in the leadership of the union with being in the leadership of another organization, which is something that runs counter to the "Solidarity" Congress resolution.

[Frasyniuk] For the time being I am only a Democratic Action leader and not a member of its ruling bodies. However, there will no doubt come a point at which I will have to decide which organization I want to devote my time and energy to.

[Jakubowski] What kind of plans do you have regarding further actions?

[Frasyniuk] First, we will hold a meeting at the parliament and immediately after that we will hold an organizational congress on 28 July, at which we will close the list of founding members. We will also draw up a schedule of further activities at it.

[Jakubowski] What is the purpose of the meeting at the parliament?

[Frasyniuk] It is to be a briefing. I am also not going to hide the fact that we would like to win over some, well, I would say a significant number of deputies and senators form the "Solidarity" list. I think that these people are our natural power base in view of our values.

[Jakubowski] In this respect you do not differ from the Center, which cites the same values and the same power base.

[Frasyniuk] Today, everyone refers to "Solidarity," because such is our political scene, but in actual practice, different people see these values differently. For me, for example, one of the great values of August 1980 was that it saw the integration of all communities and overcame the communist division between the workers and the intelligentsia. Today, we are witnessing attacks on the intelligentsia. Here and there people are beginning to look for non-Poles, and divisions that fragment society are being created. So, those August values are being threatened.

[Jakubowski] As you mentioned the intelligentsia, how would you explain the absence of Bronislaw Geremek's signature from the list of founding members, although he announced the formation of your grouping in a recent interview for LIBERATION without actually giving it a name?

[Frasyniuk] I think that it is because he is afraid of the kind of questions that you are putting to me. That is to say, questions such as whether it is possible to reconcile participation in a political organization with being chairman of a parliamentary club that is to stand above party divisions. I would very much like Bronislaw Geremek to be a member of our grouping, but I understand perfectly well the dilemmas that he faces.

[Jakubowski] Like the Center Accord, you want to see presidential elections as soon as possible. The Center already has a candidate. Do you?

[Frasyniuk] We do not. In order to have a candidate, one has to have the candidate's consent, and, in addition, we believe that there should be several candidates so that they are true elections.

[Jakubowski] However, as we understand it, your grouping has not put forward several candidates.

[Frasyniuk] It definitely has not.

[Jakubowski] If Walesa enters the election as the Center's candidate, will you campaign against him?

[Frasyniuk] We have still to discuss the subject. After all, the movement was only set up a few days ago.

[Jakubowski] Do you intend to seek to persuade General Jaruzelski to resign? Geremek, in the interview that was mentioned, said that only unrest in the streets could do that.

[Frasyniuk] General Jaruzelski has lately displayed a great deal of political wisdom, and I think that he is aware of the destabilization that is taking place in the country. That is why I think that his political instincts will not let him down on this occasion either. It would, of course, be better if General Jaruzelski were to make such a decision of his own accord than if some grouping were to bring people out into the streets. Incidentally, that is something that we also fear, and that is another reason why we decided to form the grouping.

[Jakubowski] Finally, why the curious name, an abbreviation that means road in English?

[Frasyniuk] The name Democratic Action was proposed by Wroclaw. This is because we think that the organization should be very dynamic, both organizationally and intellectually, especially as we are appearing on the scene

rather late. Citizens Movement, on the other hand, was a Warsaw proposal and is a reference to a name that symbolizes part of "Solidarity." It was by chance that this combination of ideas gave rise to an abbreviation that works out splendidly in English and does not sound too bad in Polish either.

Solidarity, Center Accord Officials on ROAD

AU3007162890 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28-29 Jul 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Reaction to the Action"]

[Text] Following the formation on Monday of the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action" [ROAD], a group of "Solidarity"-connected politicians, trade unionists, and intellectuals (most of them members of the original Lech Walesa Citizens Committee and signatories of the Krakow initiative), we asked several participants in the Polish political scene to comment on this event.

Barbara Malak, "Solidarity" spokesman: I am pleased with the emergence of ROAD, and I think its opponents should be pleased as well, for example, the Center Accord, which has been calling for other groups in the "Solidarity" movement to create an identity for themselves.

The involvement of "Solidarity" activists in ROAD is understandable, for they support the Mazowiecki government's philosophy, which stems from the philosophy and ethics of "Solidarity."

On the other hand, the "Solidarity" congress resolved that no political parties would be created, and trade union activists engaging themselves officially or semiofficially in politics are viewed askance.

I think it is difficult to reconcile trade union activity with political activity.

But that is merely my personal opinion—the "Solidarity" authorities have not adapted any stance vis-a-vis ROAD.

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Center Accord: The emergence of a second political group out of the "Solidarity" movement is something natural and favorable. It is difficult to say anything on the basis of a mere programmatic declaration. The call for a presidential election before the parliamentary election has been borrowed from the Center Accord, but it also signifies a break with the way of thinking that was typical of the period when the Krakow initiative emerged. This is also a positive feature.

On the other hand, I cannot agree with the view, presented by Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Zbigniew Bujak at a news conference, that there should either be a strong presidency, or a strong democracy. This is a false idea, and difficult to agree with. The Center Accord suggests a presidential system modeled on the French one, and it is difficult to accuse France of not being a democratic state. On the basis of the list of founders, which contains very well-known people, as well as people I have never heard of, I think this will be a left-wing group, similar to Western social democratic ones.

Jozef Slisz, "Solidarity" Polish Peasant Party: It is good for political formations enjoying broad social support to emerge. I think ROAD is a group which many people in Poland will approve of.

A political stage consisting of the Center Accord and ROAD, with the "Solidarity" Polish Peasant Party between the two, is in a position to determine Poland's future.

Leszek Moczulski, Confederation for an Independent Poland: There has been a need for a political group like this since at least 1981. We welcome it with a maximum of applause, because we think Polish political life needs strong partners with whom one can argue, discuss, and cooperate. The Action may be a very significant group. I think it will be a democratic left-wing group, in the good, European sense of the term.

It would be good if ROAD considered itself to be a political party, for political milieus are hiding themselves within amorphous structures instead of subjecting themselves to the harsh rules applicable to parties.

Henryk Wozniakowsski, deputy government spokesman: The government is pleased with the emergence of genuine political groups with a definite program and clear objectives, for this encourages political culture and makes political life more foreseeable and therefore safer.

ROAD contains many valuable and well-known people, who have proved their worth in political and civic activity. Just like the Forum of the Democratic Right, ROAD subscribes to the Krakow Alliance for Democracy, with its positive, though not uncritical, support for the government. Support from this direction, and in such a form, will certainly be advantageous for the government as well as the country.

Center, Democratic Action Prospects Assessed

AU3107081390 Gdansk TYGODNIK GDANSKI in Polish 29 Jul 90 p 1

[Jan Jakubowski commentary: "Accord, Action-Movement"]

[Text] A second political grouping, called the Citizens Movement "Democratic Action," has been established two months after the Center Accord developed out of "Solidarity." The signatories of the founding declaration include many people who have been endeavoring to create a form of political representation since December

of last year, since the famous citizens committee conference on the "Solidarity Ethos."

That they failed on that occasion was largely due to Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who accused the organizers of the event of trying to create a single party with a base in the form of the committees and with a central command organ. The struggle for control of the hearts and minds of the committees—that is, for the regional political structures—went on until the end of June. It was waged jointly by the leaders of the Citizens Parliamentary Club and other supporters of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government who were also looking for support in the committees. There was opposition to this from Walesa, who began by removing the ideological leader of that tendency, Bronislaw Geremek, from a position in which he was able to influence the committees (by appointing Zdislaw Najder chairman of the Citizens Committee), and then removed the architect of the regional structures, Henryk Wujec, until he finally addressed the committees and brought about a polarization of views that made it completely impossible to maintain an umbrella organization.

Meanwhile, in May of this year, "Solidarity" spawned a political formation, the Center Accord, which came out for a resolute acceleration of the process of change in Poland and the final abandonment of the roundtable "decisions." Its opponents tried to portray it in the worst possible light by leveling charges at it of destabilizing the country, threatening the government's reforms, and finally, attempting to introduce authoritarian government. The Center endured these attacks and did not go on the defensive, but, on the contrary, assumed increasingly broader ranks and won many supporters.

Democratic Action is a reply to an increasingly stronger Center. Bronislaw Geremek announced the swift formation of the grouping in an interview for LIBERATION, and expressed regret that the name "center" had already been taken. Outstanding "Solidarity" activists Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Zbigniew Bujak have become its official leaders. Its signatories include such prominent political personalities as Adam Michnik and Henryk Wujec, as well as moderate politicians linked to TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY. However, Bronislaw Geremek is not among them. Like Walesa and Mazowiecki, he probably does not want to officially back a particular grouping to be in a better starting position when some decisive point is reached.

Essentially, Democratic Action's political program does not differ from that of the Center. It even includes early presidential elections and the rapid replacement of the old nomenklatura. For the time being, the groupings only differ in their concepts of the powers of the presidency. The Center is in favor of a strong presidency along French lines, and Democratic Action is in favor of the weakest possible office of president, one that is close to the German model. They also no doubt differ in their attitude toward Lech Walesa. The Center wants him to occupy a special place in the political scene, whereas Democratic Action sees him as posing a threat to democracy and would like to see him removed from the political scene.

Both groupings do not at present want to describe themselves as political parties and prefer to use mysterious terms instead (accord, action-movement). Nevertheless, it seems certain that they will enter presidential elections and probably the parliamentary elections as rival groupings with their own candidates. As forces that have grown out of "Solidarity," they can no doubt count on extensive public support. However, whether either one of them will obtain the support of a majority of the electorate is open to question. It seems more likely that they will both have to enter into alliances with the classic political parties on the left and right that already exist, with the strongest peasant party at the present time, the Polish Peasant Party, holding the balance.

Alliance of Solidarity Factory Cells Planned

AU3007112890 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Jul 90 p 1

["kak"-signed report: "A Network of Accord"]

[Text] "Solidarity" activists from major enterprises wish to reestablish a link between these enterprises. Such a link existed before martial law and later went underground. It propagated the principle of workers self-management and monitored the living costs of workers' families.

Jerzy Borowczak, deputy chief of the "Solidarity" branch in the Gdansk Shipyard, told us that the idea of reestablishing this network arose during the recent meeting with Sejm deputies and senators at this shipyard.

An organizational meeting, closed to journalists, was held at the Gdansk Shipyard on Tuesday [24 July]. It was decided that representatives of between 30 and 50 of the largest plants in Poland would meet in Krakow on 24 August and create an Accord of "Solidarity" Inter-Factory Committees.

Jerzy Borowczak told us that the Accord is to be an advisory body, not an alternative to the "Solidarity" National Commission. It is to deal with prices and wages, among other things. Its activists also want to influence the drafting of rules on implementing the law on privatization and to help establish proper conditions for more workers to hold shares in their companies. They believe that the "Solidarity" factory commissions should be entitled to nominate their own candidates for the parliamentary elections.

The following work places have joined the Accord so far: The Gdansk Shipyard, "Wujek" Coal Mine, Sendzimir Steelworks in Krakow, Paris Commune Shipyard in Gdynia, Cegielski Plant in Poznan, Warsaw Steelworks, Adam Warski Shipyard in Sz czecin, "Linodrut" of

Poznan, the Northern Shipyard in Gdansk, and the Pilsudski Refitting Shipyard in Gdansk.

When we asked Barbara Malak, press spokesman for the "Solidarity" National Commission, about this Accord, she said that she had never heard of it.

Citizens Committee Creates Political Commission

LD3007131990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0200 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] The main substantive result of the Sunday [29 July] meeting of the Citizens Committee attached to the chairman of Solidarity—a meeting in which Lech Walesa took part—was the creation of a political commission, the aim of which is to prepare political analyses for the Citizens Committee and to hold talks with representatives of various political groupings regarding their cooperation with or participation in the work of the Citizens Committee.

A committee was set up to control the financial policy of the Citizens Committee, while Andrzej Kostarczyk, Jerzy Minke, and Jacek Maziarski have been authorized to prepare an outline for a daily Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity newspaper. The next meeting of the Citizens Committee is set for 16 September.

New Spokesman for Walesa Appointed

LD3107084590 Warsaw PAP in English 0829 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 31—Andrzej Drzycinski has been appointed new press spokesman for Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, The ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily quoted today head of Walesa's secretariate Krzysztof Pusz as saying.

Drzycimski, 48, is a historian and journalist. He took part in the 1980 strike at the Gdansk shipyard, and was interned after martial law had been imposed. He wrote, or was co-author, of a dozen or so books on the second world war.

He is starting his job as Walesa's spokesman early next week, the paper said.

Social Democrats Discuss Progress of Pluralism

LD2807195590 Warsaw PAP in English 1827 GMT 28 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 28—The sociopolitical situation of the country was the main topic of today's meeting of the National Council of the Polish Social-Democratic Union PUS. The debate was presided over by Tadeusz Fiszbach.

Dr Wojciech Lamentowicz who is advocate of the creating a strong centre-left in Poland attended the meeting. The debaters spoke positively about the progress made in the field of introducing pluralism to political life of the country. The meeting discussed a concept of possible alliances during the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Polish Socialist Party Congress in Scp-Oct

LD3007222890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2100 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] A congress commission of the Polish Socialist Party [PPS], whose composition includes leading representatives of the PPS, led by Jan Jozef Lipski, the Provisional National Committee of the PPS, the Polish Socialist Party-Democratic Revolution [PPS-RD] and the Polish Socialist Party in exile, has met in Warsaw. It was decided to call a congress of the Polish Socialist Party to integrate these structures. Statute, program, and organizational congress commissions were appointed. An adopted resolution envisaged the congress taking place in Warsaw between September and October 1990. The resolution was signed by Czeslaw Boronwczyk of the PPS-RD, (Grzegorz Miuta) of the Provisional PPS National Committee, Jan Jozef Lipski of the PPS, and Wlodzimierz Olejnik of the Central Foreign Commission of the PPS.

Federation of Greens Holds Second Congress

LD3007195390 Warsaw PAP in English 1750 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Lublin, July 30—The second congress of the Federation of the Greens ended its five-day debates at Dabrowka near Lubartow in the Lublin Voivodship. The congress debated from July 25 to 29 and about 150 Greens, including foreign guests and activists of almost all ecoloical organizations and movements in Poland, took part.

The gathering adopted resolutions on results of the Chernobyl disaster, introducing ecological education, and resolutions against importing poisonous wastes and banned pesticides from the West.

The congress took decisions on steps against building a water dam on the Dunajec River and the nuclear power plant in Zarnowiec. It also adopted a stand on starting work on ecological vision of Poland's development.

Lower House Adjourns Until Sep

LD3007132390 Warsaw PAP in English 1219 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Warsaw, July 30—The Sejm (parliament's Lower House) will meet at its next session in September. For the first time since the parliamentary elections last year, deputies will have a longer break. Recently, the Sejm met nearly every week.

Over the last 12 months, the Sejm passsed 113 bills and adopted some 90 resolutions.

The coming September is to see a political debate by the Sejm on the date of the termination of this term of office. The House will also discuss the future of the Polish power industry (mainly nuclear power). The Sejm commission appointed to examine police's conduct during farmers' protests at the Agriculture Ministry and in Mlawa is expected to finalize its work.

September may also bring more details as concerns the case of selling imported alcohol in Poland.

*** Aims of National-Liberal Party**

90P20081A Bucharest LIBERALUL in Romanian 29 Jun 90 p 1

[Dan A. Lazarescu article: "The Party of the Future"]

[Text] Rarely in history has a European society been so traumatized as Romanian society was in the past decade of our century. Subjected to a constant process of disinformation and of the exhausting of the elite—that is, of that thin layer of persons who, by their very presence, are able to transform a people into a nation—today's Romanian society cannot be considered to have entered into convalescence yet.

The ill-fated, devastating ideology of communism still persists in obtuse minds. The beneficiaries of this ideology are found, with painful exceptions, implanted in their positions, from top to bottom, from the former Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the most unimportant people's council.

The fate of the totalitarian regime was sealed once and for all by decisions which were much more important than the will of its beneficiaries up to now. But the latter are undertaking, in order to prolong the benefits of the depravity, rearguard harassments, fighting, step by step, to defend positions which, until recently, were destined, irrevocably, to be lost.

One of these tactics of temporary, painful harassment, was the tactic of putting the true national opposition parties in the same class as neototalitarianism, and as a slime of pseudo-parties, fronts, alliances and other democratic eccentricities, the majority of them manipulated by others.

Another tactic was infiltrating, into the ranks of the authentic opposition, corrupt and declasse elements, and scoundrels, ready to do everything to satisfy the disgusting aspiration to get ahead at any price; at the price of any humiliation and walking on corpses, if necessary.

The existence of such degenerate elements, available for this disgusting tactical operation, in the bosom of the people, is a proof of serious moral and social defects. It shows the devastating consequence of the bureaucratic-totalitarian regime which overwhelmed Romania and corrupted its intellectual and moral essence for almost half a century.

The National-Liberal Party, also subjected to these painful operations of tactical maneuvers from outside, has eliminated them triumphantly, so far, just as it is eliminating, scornfully, all the painful, aberrant changes launched by the vipers' nests of totalitarian obedience.

Putting their entire confidence in the final decisions of those who have assumed the gigantic responsibility for the recovery and re-orientation of life on the entire planet, the National-Liberal Party seems to be the only one of the Romanian political groups which has learned the real imperative of the present time—the modernization and re-Europeanization of Romania, by all methods and at a pace which our party wants to be exponential.

Force cannot be used to do good for a people. The degrading demonstrations at which we were present, during the first four months of 1990, can result in the placing of an entire people on the index, so that this people is considered, in the book of the fates of peoples, to be unworthy of prosperity and freedom. But effervescences oriented from the shadows must not be confused with a true, healthy moral structure of the Romanian people.

Believing in the profoundly European character of this people, the National-Liberal Party knows how to use all the energies to bring about, at this decisive moment for the fate of a people, a return to the bosom of European culture, civilization, freedom and economics. Only on this condition can an entire people recover from the degrading stamp of bureaucratic totalitarianism.

The following are written today on the glorious banner of the historic National-Liberal flag: prosperity, freedom, a courageous struggle against totalitarianism, ideologies of all types and bureaucracy. And, above all, its return to the Europe of the future, without delay, is written.

We are for a free, prosperous, and, finally, integrated Europe in which each nation will have the power to develop, harmoniously, all its specific traits, eliminating, at the same time, by extensive contact with other peoples, all defects and all negative national characteristics.

The National-Liberal Party has the task of representing the privileged carrier of the policy which aims at the reintegration of Romania in European society.

By this mission which it is, at the same time, both ready and willing to bring to a good end, the National-Liberal Party is experiencing its second youth.

Some five quarters of a century ago, under the intelligent rule of the great king and creator of the State, Carol I, the National-Liberal Party took control of an Eastern society, corrupted for one and one-half centuries by the Phanariot regime, and traumatized by a century of a consular regime, and guided it toward the light and toward prosperity. The National-Liberal Party was put in the forefront of all the creative energies of Romanian society. It knew how to discover them; it knew how to prepare them; it knew how to protect them legally and materially; and it knew how to utilize them.

After one-half a century of a type of Asiatic production and obscurantism, the National-Liberal Party is resuming, calmly and steadfastly, the liberating work of the people, outlined as far back as 1843 and formulated in the heroic period of the exile and of the ad-hoc divans, under the protective shield of the victorious Europe in the liberation war in the Crimea.

The National-Liberal Party is the privileged partner of all Romanians whose creative efforts are oriented, from

now on, toward freedom and prosperity, for the liberation of Romanian society from the spectres of obscurantism, dictatorship and backwardness.

The National-Liberal Party is the privileged partner of the intelligentsia.

The National-Liberal Party is the privileged partner of Europe.

The National-Liberal Party wants to be the privileged partner of all the co-inhabiting nationalities.

The National-Liberal Party is, therefore, the Party of the Future.

* Brucan on NSF Actions To Control Unrest

90P20084A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Jul 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Silviu Brucan by U. Valureanu; place and date not given: "Silviu Brucan Distances Himself from the Leadership of the National Salvation Front and Criticizes the Government"; first three paragraphs are ROMANIA LIBERA introduction]

[Text] Silviu Brucan continues to distance himself from the leadership of the Front. In an interview which he gave to ROMANIA LIBERA on Saturday, when he returned after a month abroad, he accuses the Front of being concerned only with maintaining and consolidating its power. He praises the program presented by Prime Minister Petre Roman but criticizes the government for the most recent price increases. Brucan harshly criticizes the way in which the authorities acted on 13-15 June and admits that it is possible to have a dialogue with most of the people in University Square, by stressing the disastrous situation of the country in the area of international prestige. In his opinion, the persons governing should learn how to govern, by relying on fewer words and more work.

In a new analysis of the events of the Revolution, Brucan refers to the scenario of a pre-Revolutionary plot which aims at infiltrating the party, the army and the Securitate, but the party was impossible to penetrate. However, he does not respond to the accusations that "the revolution has been stolen" and says that others will have to be asked why the button which would have stopped the radio and television broadcasts in December 1989 was not pushed at the Central Committee headquarters.

During the interview, which will probably have repercussions in domestic political life, Brucan rules out the option of the communist development of Romania and seems to be alarmed by the existence of great social differences in the United States, not realizing that the differences exist in the framework of a remarkable general level of well being. Do the statements of the former leader of the National Salvation Front show an inclination toward the opposition parties? After his return to the country, he did not meet right away with Iliescu and Roman but he had talks with the leaders of the opposition, since he was concerned with improving Romania's image in the international sphere. When he was abroad, Brucan had important meetings in Moscow, where there are many programs but the stores are empty, which suggests some conclusions for Romanian politicians, too. Here are extensive excerpts from Silviu Brucan's interview to ROMANIA LIBERA:

[Valureanu] Mr. Silviu Brucan, there has been a lot of speculation in regard to the events of December 1989. Some people say that it was not an authentic revolution but only the result of a plot prepared ahead of time for the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime. There is talk about the "stolen" revolution, diverted from its anti-communist ideals. Now, almost seven months after those dramatic days, what is your opinion, as a man who was in the midst of the action then?

[Brucan] It is a very serious issue with which historians will certainly be concerned. What I can say now is that for us, the people who opposed the Ceausescu dictatorship, there was a scenario for the necessary changes in Romania and, given the structure of the government, a realistic scenario had to take into consideration the three principal actors: the communist party, the army and the Securitate. We know from military science that you do not attack an intact unit but you must make a breach in it so you can defeat it. The problem which was posed was to make a breach in each one of these forces of power and repression. In regard to the army, the plot devised in 1983 and 1984 by a number of generals, headed by General Ionita, minister of the armed forces, General Nicolae Militaru and General Costyal, failed. However, it showed that such a thing is possible if it is better organized. In regard to the Securitate, a distinction should be made between Securitate troops and repressive organs. I believe that from the point of view of the three actors, the 22 December Revolution was successful, especially in regard to the breach in the army and the Securitate. However, it was less successful in regard to the party, in the sense that it was not able to make a serious breach in the party leadership which would lead to the overthrow of Ceausescu. So, there was a scenario. The extent to which it was carried out will be evaluated by the historians. The matter of the popular outburst in December is better known and I have dealt with it on other occasions.

[Valureanu] In newspaper articles, various actions against the dictatorship have been mentioned, some of them during the past decade. However, practically nothing was done and if it were not for the youth of 21, 22 December and the following period, discussions of a conspiratorial nature on "how we should get rid of Ceausescu" probably would be continuing today. If the famous meeting in the Palace Square, at which a large crowd was able to mass in the center, had not been organized, do you think that Ceausescu could have been overthrown?

[Brucan] I believe that you are right in regard to the popular dimension of the Revolution. But when I talk about the scenario I am referring to the three principal forces on which it had to be acted out. The meeting set off the popular outburst which led to the overthrow of Ceausescu. However, the subsequent behavior of the forces is interesting in evaluating the 22 December event. Not at Timisoara nor on 21 December but only on 22 December did the army change its attitude and move over to the side of the Revolution. The ranks of the Securitate were also greatly split, in the sense that the majority of the Securitate troops moved over to the side of the Revolution.

[Valureanu] Since you are talking about the Revolution, I have a question for which I have been unable to find an answer. I heard that at the headquarters of the party Central Committee—where there is a radio and television studio—it was possible to stop a radio or TV broadcast. Just by pressing a button. If there was a real desire not to permit radio and TV broadcasts put in the service of the Revolution, then there was no need to try to occupy the headquarters of these institutions by force, with the victims resulting from such actions. However, no one pushed the "button." It would have been sufficient to destroy, by a few blows, antennas and other vital institutions without which the programs could not be transmitted. Attacks were launched, an entire country was "excited," as they say, all-out fighting followed and many people were killed or injured in actions which could be considered useless. Do you have any explanation?

[Brucan] I cannot respond to such a technical question because, I would say, it is addressed to others who will have to respond. I cannot give a competent response.

[Valureanu] What do you think about the political situation now that you have returned home?

[Brucan] The principal positive element is that new institutions have been set up after the elections. The president, parliament and government have begun their activity. According to what I heard from the members of the Front and the members of the opposition, parliamentary activity got off to a good start. Everybody thinks that the program presented by the prime minister is very positive and the opposition parties, especially the liberals, say that the "cream" has been skimmed off it. Now I believe that the most important thing is to move from the program to action. I am returning after more than a week in Moscow. I learned there that during the past five years there have been more programs and speeches than in the entire history of the Soviet Union, but the results are not seen—that is, nothing is found in the stores, nothing works well. I think that we should learn and and make conclusions from this experience. What we need now is a moratorium on official statements, interviews, declarations. There are too many of them and people are sometimes at odds because of them. I believe that we should return to the wise Romanian saying "less talk and more work." The most important thing now is to ensure the efficient operation of the government and of the state apparatus, especially the economic apparatus. People are finding out that there are quantities of meat and sugar which wait to be unloaded and are not unloaded. In the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy, the economic apparatus is more important than ever. I believe that we must proceed very energetically with those people in the apparat who show signs of inefficiency, negligence, deceit, and laziness. I would like to make one comment in regard to the activity of the government. A six-month moratorium on wage demands cannot be set up if, the next day, you announce price increases for gasoline, paper and other products, increases which widen the gap between prices and wages. There should be more consistency in the policy of the government.

[Valureanu] Where were you during 13-15 June?

[Brucan] In Japan, and, unfortunately, I learned, with sorrow, how disastrous the events of those days were in the international sphere. Romania managed to be the only country in the East which was excluded from all the Western programs of aid and cooperation. In regard to the events themselves, I would say the following. When you make a move in chess you must gauge the moves of your opponent. When you have decided to evacuate University Square you should have expected a very violent reaction on the part of the people who were there or who were associated with this action. When I left the country there was information that the people in the Square had made serious preparations for a very violent reaction in the case of forced evacuation. The government should have made serious preparations for handling this reaction. And, if it was not prepared, it should not have made a chess move.

[Valureanu] But could any other move be made to continue the dialogue begun a few days earlier.

[Brucan] In University Square a clear distinction should be made between two categories: the, let me call them, "professional" group which was the nucleus of the force which occupied the square and the masses of students and intellectuals who assembled there, who had demands and with whom it was possible to dialogue. It was not possible to have a discussion with the professionals whose clear and categorical objective was the overthrow of the existing government. They were not interested in dialogue and they were not the type of people to carry on a dialogue. But, there should have been a dialogue with the masses of students and intellectuals who had legitimate demands and who saw a number of signs that old methods were being used and that old officials were returning to powerful positions. It was a serious mistake on the part of the leadership not to engage in a dialogue with this group on time. However, there could be no discussion with the professional organizers.

[Valureanu] Who do you think these professional organizers are?

[Brucan] Now that they have been arrested let us see the results of the investigation. I would like to add that the

events of 13-15 June revealed some organic weaknesses of the government—first of all, the fact that it was not able to form an effective force to keep order, a real police force, and the fact that it left such an important task in the hands of an incompetent man like General Chitac. Since January I have been insisting that he be replaced but he has been kept in his position.

[Valureanu] Do you believe that there was an attempted coup on 13 June?

[Brucan] I do not believe it was an attempted coup but it was a very violent reaction by the group which was the nucleus of University Square.

[Valureanu] According to what I have read over the years, the first step in an attempted coup is a simultaneous, surprise attack on important strategic targets, a simultaneous attack, not an attack on the police first of all, to get some weapons, and then on the Ministry of the Interior, to get some other weapons and then, after that...

[Brucan] No, I do not believe that it was a coup. But I believe that it was an action which has a precedent in earlier actions, when the principal building of the government on Victory Square was successfully attacked. There should have been a serious investigation, a trial in which it would be shown who forcibly entered the palace on Victory Square,who was behind them, what instruments they used and where they got them. If all these things had been done at that time, I do not think that the events which took place in University Square would have occurred; the same elements were acting, on a larger scale. On the other hand, I must say that no democratic government can keep people who are accused of a political crime under arrest for almost a month without producing convincing evidence of their guilt. This is especially true if you spoke about putsches in the past without proof of them. If these things had been understood, there would not have been the case of Marian Munteanu or Friday's demonstration, which our government does not need. I believe that it was a case which showed an astonishing lack of political understanding. But the stubbornness with which a case like this was treated shows that what I once said—that it is hard to learn democracy but it is a thousand times harder to learn how to govern democratically—is unfortunately confirmed. The people governing us have not yet learned how to govern democratically. A democratic government uses only legal means. But the arrival of the miners in Bucharest was not legal means. It was extralegal means, resulting from a situation beyond the government's control. After six months, the government should have known how to use legal means to control the situation and to maintain order in the country.

[Valureanu] What is your opinion about the critical reaction abroad to the calling in of the miners?

[Brucan] This was to be expected because the government was not in a position to create legal means and it had to use extralegal means, which you do not control. You do not know what they are doing, you cannot guarantee what they will do, etc. The best evidence of this was what the miners did in Bucharest.(To be continued).

Munteanu's Father Wants U.S. Embassy Protection

AU3007170890 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 18 Jul 90 p 1

[Letter from father of arrested student leader Marin Munteanu to U.S. Embassy issued on 16 July]

[Text] Mr. Ambassador,

I am engineer Vladimir Munteanu, the father of student Marian Munteanu, president of the Students' League of Bucharest University, who was arbitrarily arrested and who is being held in custody by the Romanian authorities with the intention of staging a trial against him. I ask for your approval that I and my whole family be put under the protection of the United States.

This request is prompted by the following causes:

—I have often called on Romania's prosecutor general, Mr. Robu, but he turned down my request that I be allowed to visit my son Marian Munteanu. I consider that I have not been given permission to visit him so that I cannot see that he is being mistreated and subjected to pressure.
—I am constantly being followed and threatened.
—My telephone is tapped.
—During our absence, people broke into our home with keys that fit the locks and stole 10,000 lei we kept there and a Realintic [brand name] radio set. When we called them, the police refused to investigate the case.
—Likewise, the home of my son, Marian Munteanu, was entered and searched on several occasions, during the absence of his wife, Claudia Munteanu. All this happened after Marian Munteanu's arrest. Engineer V. Munteanu,
16 July 1990

Cluj Demonstrators Request Munteanu's Release

AU3007201490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1816 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/7/1990—A peaceful demonstration to express solidarity with Marian Munteanu was staged in Cluj-Napoca on Monday evening. The demonstration was organized by the local branch of the World Union of Free Romanians. The speakers—including Doina Cornea demanded the immediate release of Marian Munteanu and of the other people arrested during the events in the capital city over June 13-15. The demonstrators chanted anti- communist and anti-government slogans. Two motions of protest were adopted and they are to be sent to the government and the Prosecutor General's Office.

Prosecutor General To Review Munteanu's Case

AU3007201290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1800 GMT 30 Jul 90

["Justice: Communique From Romania's Prosecutor General"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/7/1990—In a communique to the "ROMPRES" news agency, Romania's Prosecutor General, Mr. Gheorghe Robu, shows that several people ask for the release of Marian Munteanu, who was arrested after the events in Bucharest over June 13-15, 1990, and says: "Considering the interest Marian Munteanu's case has aroused, in the next three days I will look into the charges brought against him and analyse the opportune character of the steps that have been taken and I will inform public opinion of the results."

Deputies Pass Bills, Ban Property Sale

AU3007105490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0706 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—The Assembly of Deputies which resumed its works Saturday morning passed the bill on adoption. The law removed a discriminating condition in the old system which required the approval of a higher power body for the adoption by a Romanian citizen of a child whose citizenship was not Romanian or by a foreigner of a Romanian child, and at the same time added provisions for the further protection of the adopted children.

The lower house approved Saturday afternoon the bill on Romania's legal status of inland maritime waters, territorial sea and contigual zone. Essentially, the new act, with territorial sea waters being measured from the most advanced land outposts, increases the country's maritime area by about 300 sw. Km, all while enabling a more correct delimitation of the territorial waters, and of the Black Sea continental shelf and exclusive economic areas.

The chamber also enacted the bills on joining the European Conference on Satellite Communications—Eutelsat, and the International Organisation for Maritime Telecommunications by Satellites Inmarsat that open our country to Europe through this modern system of telecommunications.

In context, Ion Ratiu, a member of the chamber of deputies, asked Parliament that independent television stations be allowed to operate.

Andrei Chirica, minister of communications, who attended the session, and the Chamber's Speaker Dan Martian told Ion Ratiu and the other members of the house that both the government and the president of the country favoured the idea of such independent television stations, but that their operation had to be regulated by a law which is in the making.

The next plenary meeting of the house is scheduled for Monday.

The Chamber of Deputies approved Saturday morning the amended bill on temporarily banning real estate alienation through acts between living persons. This is a transient law that bans until a new land [as received)0 is enacted the alienation of all land inside settlements or outside them through acts between persons. This, because of the inappropriate character of the land property law which allowed land speculation to go unchecked, farmland to be restricted, the destination and classification of agricultural land to be changed at will, unauthorised building to proliferate inside settlements and outside them, an excessive scattering of farmsteads, large farmland areas to go uncultivated, and other such phenomena with very serious economic and social consequences.

Mediation Commission Proceedings

AU3007201690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1802 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/7/1990—On Monday, July 30, Romania's Senate resumed its proceedings hearing the reports of the commissions of mediation with the Assembly of Deputies relative to the differences between the amendments suggested by the two chambers of the parliament. These reports refer to the bill on the proclamation of Romania's national day, the draft law temporarily banning sales of terrains and the bill on consent to child adoption.

In connection with the first bill, the Assembly of Deputies introduced one more article in the text the Senate approved. The draft law in its final form, which was approved by the two chambers, proclaims December 1 as Romania's national day and abrogates the Council of Ministers' August 18, 1949 resolution which declared August 23 as Romania's national day, as well as any other dispositions running counter to the new law.

The senators also approved the other two bills that made the object of mediation between the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies.

The Senate also heard a report of the specialized commissions on the draft law on measures to protect the population against speculation.

According to a resolution the Senate passed on July 28, when discussions on that bill were adjourned, the legal commission of the Senate started to look into the respective draft law together with a similar body of the Assembly of Deputies and in consideration of the conclusions reached by the economic commissions of the two chambers.

After that analysis, it was agreed by consensus, with government representatives included, to amend and complement the original draft. Consequently, the title was changed into "Law to protect the population against illicit commercial activities." Furthermore, a new article

was introduced to abrogate dispositions in the Criminal Code and the 1972 law in connection with home trade activities.

The Senate adopted the bill in its final form.

The Senate also discussed and endorsed a draft law on pays for managerial posts in prefect's and mayor's offices.

Conservation, Wages, Commercial Bills

AU3007202490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1808 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/7/1990—On July 30, the Assembly of Deputies gathered in plenum to discuss and endorse the draft law on pays of managerial posts in prefect's and mayor's offices.

In the afternoon, the legislative forum endorsed a bill on the abrogation and amendment of dispositions in the 1987 law concerning the conservation, promotion and development of forests, their rational economic exploitation and the maintenance of the ecologic balance. The new provisions are intended to provide for forest regeneration, the avoidance of wood degradation and the limitation of the damage caused by pollutants. At the same time, a better ecological prophylaxis is attained.

The Assembly of Deputies also discussed a bill on the population's protection against illicit commercial activities. When working out that normative act, the government considered the growth of parasitism in commercial market activities and the population's discontent with the frequency and scope of those phenomena, which call for the institution of an adequate legal framework to penalize these violations and prevent their recurrence. Essentially the new bill defines illicit commercial activities, as well as a number of measures to fight them, including various penalties.

Diplomatic Ties With NATO Planned

AU3007103390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0957 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—Romania intends to establish diplomatic relations with NATO, daily "ADEVARUL" announces resuming a statement of Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase in an interview with the national radio.

In connection with Bucharest's intention to set up diplomatic relations with NATO, Romania's foreign minister, the newspaper says that Prime Minister "Petre Roman invited NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to Bucharest." [sentence as received]

Daily Reports Doina Cornea Criticism Abroad

AU3007210690 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jul 90 p 4

[Unsigned note: "Doina Cornea on Situation in Romania"]

[Text] According to AFP and the Associated Press, Doina Cornea has called for an enquiry under international aegis into last June's bloody events in Romania. In an open letter to President Ion Iliescu, published by newspapers belonging to Belgian press group "Vers L'Avenir," she has also asked for the release of people arrested during the repression in which the miners took part.

In Mrs. Cornea's opinion, President Ion Iliescu betrayed the December revolution in order to turn it into an "extreme left, totalitarian, and repressive counterrevolution." She accuses the president of intolerance, of rejecting dialogue, and of maintaining and rebuilding the Securitate.

In an interview granted to the special envoy of the group "Vers L'Avenir," Doina Cornea said that she has again been receiving death threats after distancing herself from the Romanian power. She has asked the international community to exclude Romania from its cooperation programs and has approved the measures taken by the European Community, which froze the signing of a trade agreement with our country.

Premier Roman Arrives in Madrid for Talks

AU3007105290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0700 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 30/7/1990—Romania's Prime Minister Petre Roman arrived in Madrid for talks with his Spanish counterpart Felipe Gonzalez, as well as with other political personalities and representatives of the social, economic and cultural life of the host country.

This is Prime Minister Petre Roman's second visit to Spain this year. During his first visit in April he discussed with the Spanish Premier Felipe Gonzalez and was received by King Juan Carlos.

Health Minister Receives PRC Ambassador

AU3007190190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1745 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Talks were conducted in Bucharest between Bogdan Marinescu, minister of health, and Wang Jinqing, ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Romania.

The focused on the updating of the two countries' convention on cooperation in medical assistance to the population and insisted on aspects related to traditional medicine (acupuncture, traditional pharmacy) deciding that the aforesaid convention should put conditions in place for the Romanian staff's training in the respective medical techniques. Romanian experts will attend specialized courses in brush-up centres in Beijing, Shanghai and Harbin, as well as in a traditional medicine centre to open in Bucharest, where Chinese professors will teach.

Iliescu Receives Ivory Coast, Egyptian Envoys

AU3007202190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1900 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 30/7/1990—The president of Romania, Ion Iliescu, received on 30 July at Cotroceni Palace, Adonis Manouan, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Ivory Coast, who delivered a message from the Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. The prospects for a growing bilateral relationship were discussed.

Mahmud al-Sayyid al-Sa'id, Egypt's ambassador, paid a farewell call to Ion Iliescu today. Both sides stated their willingness to broaden and further deepen the bilateral relations in all fields of activity.

Markovic: All Republics Want To Stay in SFRY

AU3107083090 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 90 p 5

[Dara Vucinic and Cvijetin Milivojevic report: "Yugoslavia, the Wish of All the Republics"]

[Text] Every part of the country where we have recently been holding talks—that is, in each of our republics—wants to remain part of Yugoslavia.

This was said last night by Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council [FEC], on the "Open Screen" program, which was prepared by Skopje Television. He said this in reply to the first question from the hosts, Ana Panovska and Ljiljana Altiparmakova, on the results of the just-ended visits by the premier and his team to all our republics and about the republics' desire to either remain or not to remain in some kind of joint state.

We entered into these talks not as a forum that tours the republics but as a government that is offering its program and wants to talk, to hear opinions, to exchange opinions, and to conduct dialogue backed up with arguments without any previous restrictions and exceptions, Ante Markovic stressed. He added that relations in the country were only one of the issues discussed during this tour of Yugoslavia, which lasted several days.

In discussing relations in our country, the FEC president went on to say, we sought not to discuss whether we are in favor of one or another form of relations among peoples and nationalities and, in the final analysis, among our states, but to discuss the content and quality of these relations and, on this basis, to see whether the system that we are constructing is the type that creates the opportunity for us to develop relations which will provide the foundations for us to build an efficient economy, a pluralist society, a law-governed state, and, in actual fact, a society and state which will also champion social justice.

From this standpoint, we quite unreservedly started off in every community with the question of whether they are in favor of remaining part of Yugoslavia or not. That is to say, if they are not in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia, we would make it possible for any part of the country—in a peaceful way without any mutual tensions whatsoever—to seek their own solution if they thought this was the best one.

Everywhere we received the reply that every part of the country in which we had talks, every republic, wants to remain part of Yugoslavia.

Of course, even actually conducting talks in a system which has become a pluralist system represents progress. It was particularly positive that the response was that everyone nevertheless wants to remain in Yugoslavia. Of course, each had their own reasons for doing so, but there was agreement over discussing the content of these relations, their quality, and the system that we are constructing, so that this will be the reference point from which we want to construct these relations.

If we have decided on constructing a common society on the basis of the principles of a market economy, political pluralism, and all basic principles, then we need time to construct these relations. The dilemma was over whether we should, in the meantime, stop the process of reforms and wait until we have reached agreement or whether we should allow this process to continue without blocking life; not halt the system, changes, and current life; and actually facilitate the progress of the reforms which, if they are successful—and I have no doubt that they will be—will assist and facilitate a definite response and agreement on how we will construct the basic relations in the community. We decided on the latter because the package of economic measures is our most major political event.

The journalists then asked a question on the abilities of the federal government to ensure the functioning of the state as a whole in a situation whereby, for example, Slovenia proclaims its sovereignty, the Kosovo Assembly is dissolved by the Serbian one after some of the Albanians delegates tried to proclaim the province's sovereignty, and so on.

In reply to this, Ante Markovic drew the attention of the host to the fact that she had repeated the same mistake that many people made in Yugoslavia when they talk about the same problems that she was talking about. That is to say, she did not mention the FEC's package of measures which should in fact settle many of these matters. Mentioning that at the moment he would not like to deal with the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of what had been happening in some republics, Markovic continued:

In Slovenia, we were informed that they had nevertheless postponed the debate on some of the specific proposals that the Executive Council had prepared for the Assembly session. Some other military-type questions had remained on the agenda. Regarding Kosovo, it is clear that the declaration on the province's sovereignty adopted by the delegates of Albanian origin could not help but provoke a reaction from the republic of Serbia. However, on the other hand, it is illogical and unusual for the whole system in the province to be suspended. This is the first such suspension that I have heard of in our country.

Nevertheless, all this is basically the secondary consequences of one vast positive process, that is to say, of the huge changes that are under way in our country.

It is in fact a clash between the reform processes promoted by the new system and the old structures, regardless of these structures being old or newly elected. It is obvious that if somebody has decided in favor of a development of democracy—and we are deciding fully in favor of a development of democracy and in everything that we do we strive to advance in a democratic way and to develop the entire system with as much

democracy as possible—then the one who does not want to accept such a way of solving matters, but the methods of blackmail and exclusiveness, has to be examined. He should check himself and society should check him. It should be seen whether he really advocates democratic interests.

There is often a fear of what these new processes bring, because a system which demands economic efficiency and independence of citizens and economic entities, a system which implies the rule of law and which is a multiparty system, and so forth, demands of the teams that assume power that they possess knowledge, experience, that they know about affairs, and that they create conditions in which individuals are able to adopt decisions by themselves. This deprives certain structures of power to a great extent, and these structure fear these new processes.

Markovic agreed with the statement by the hosts that the FEC has not been spared pressure or criticism. He said that there have been "happenings" of the people, workers, and peasants, general strikes, and the like. "In December, when we were embarking on the program of reforms of an anti-inflationary nature, pressure was exerted against us, but the results of the reform themselves have best refuted the critics."

Everything that we did until then was a prerequisite for embarking on that reform program, creating a completely new structure of our society.

These are in fact revolutionary changes, but the program is dismissed as being marginal. Now it appears that it was not really difficult to achieve the convertibility of the currency, and that it also was no problem to destroy inflation. As if we ever had a convertible currency in this country for more than two or three months! Now we have reduced inflation to a zero rate and have performed a terrific liberalization and opening to the world. Up to 23 July, exports increased more than 26 percent, imports increased slightly more than 37 percent, and our foreign exchange reserves exceeded $9 billion. We have made communications with the world possible and have obtained the world's support. I can say with pride that the most developed part of the world, both professional and political, has assessed our program now as very good and as a program that has opened the way to major changes.

Many questions by viewers referred to "burning" current political problems in several parts of the country. Markovic did not excessively dwell on the specific problems of political life in the republics. However, he provided a concrete answer to everything that related to the functioning of the federal state. For instance, the premier replied as follows to the question as to why the federal law on political association is late:

No party can be democratic if it stops on its democratic road immediately after election successes, if it prevents further democratic changes in society, and if it believes that all democracy has been exhausted with its assumption of power. The FEC has been proposing the adoption of the law on political association for some time now. However, some republics have used all the tricks in the procedure to prevent its adoption. It seems that some parties fear the competition of Yugoslav parties.

The next question was tied to this reply. It referred to Markovic's statement after the 14th extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: "The party is falling apart, the state remains."

The premier said that the FEC has a program which is generally Yugoslav, and this is a program that as such leads us into Europe and the world, but it is also a program in which every part of the country and the country as a whole may find themselves. Thanks to this program, everybody will note that in this system it is better to pull together than separately.

If the federal elections were held today, the FEC would receive tremendous support from the voters, as the results of a public opinion poll show in Belgrade, Ljubljana, Skopje, and Sarajevo. Ante Markovic commented as follows:

In our situation, which indeed is very unstable, in which people see so much uncertainty, in which all sorts of tensions—social, political, and general—are increasing, in which it is becoming fashionable to look for mutual clashes rather than dialogue and agreement, the FEC has offered a program which has shown that it is possible to build a democratic, humane, and progressive society. We can do the impossible. When last December I waved a convertible banknote, not many people believed that the currency would indeed become convertible. People also did not believe that we would reach a zero rate of inflation, that we would have such foreign exchange reserves.... This on the one hand inspires our people with pride that we have been capable of achieving this. On the other it gives confidence to the program proposers because the results are already showing.

It is an unpleasant fact that in a year that has produced the second best harvest, wheat prices have not been determined by the market. There is no economic logic in having a good harvest and high prices, the premier said, commenting on the dissatisfaction of Serbian and Vojvodina farmers with the wheat-purchasing prices.

We guarantee to buy up all producers' surpluses. We will buy about 300,000 tonnes of wheat for our reserves at the market price. In a year which will yield a total of 6.2 million tonnes of wheat, one can also think of exporting it. However, Markovic said, it is our view that the monopoly should be combated precisely by opening the borders to flour imports, primarily to bring the influence of the world market into our country.

Speaking about housing reform, Markovic said that the FEC has decided to sell all socially owned apartments. Every republic can also do this by itself. We are doing this as an example with the apartments serving the

federation and the apartments controlled by the Yugoslav People's Army. I think that one should certainly begin this process of selling socially owned apartments, of course under certain conditions that people are able to master. Further, we must strive for economic rents; otherwise the gap will be great.

The new package of reforms is more important than the preceding one was because everything done until now has been just a prerequisite for our reaching the present level and for implementing radical reforms.

Markovic stressed, however, that in order to begin making real changes, the structure of ownership must be changed. It is not possible to change the structure of industry, the economy, and society without changing ownership. The aim of the FEC is to introduce property democracy, which will also change the managing attitude. This is necessary because without defining the ownership, there can be no market of capital or labor.

The FEC therefore introduced the Pay Law, which envisages shares and bonds, although these are a peculiar substitute necessary during this transitional period. The federal government expects that by selling shares and bonds, it will in 10 years obtain the between $75 and $80 billion necessary for further development. Social property would thus be sold to the workers, citizens, and the pension funds. This law is not coercion, however, but an attempt to fill the legal void. There was also the alternative of nationalizing property, Markovic stressed. He immediately added that this would take us 40 years back and bring us into a situation when we would experience what state socialism has experienced: state socialism is disintegrating partly because of this inefficiency.

The changes advocated by the FEC will put everything in its place, Markovic stressed, because until the structure of ownership is changed, we will have in the political arena parties founded on national, religious, or any "anti" basis, which may also be anticommunist. These parties, as well as those that have gained power, have no economic program because there exists no ownership structure on which they could take their stand.

Having stressed that it is good that we already have an "explosion" of private, mixed, and cooperative enterprises which have taken a large space in the market, Markovic stressed that unfortunately they are not covered by our statistics because they have not been adjusted to the conditions of mixed and private ownership. The statistics cover only social ownership in production, trade, and prices. According to the latest reports, 30,000 new private, mixed, and cooperative enterprises were set up in Yugoslavia by the middle of July, while the number of social enterprises totals something over 20,000. We estimate that by the end of the year, we will quite certainly have at least 60,000 if not more newly formed enterprises under private and mixed ownership, which will employ over 200,000 new workers. It is important to mention that, among other things, prices in the private sector are between 10 and 15 percent lower than the prices in the social sector. If it is calculated that prices in June decreased 0.3 percent; the decrease is 3 percent if the private sector is taken into account.

One of the questions posed to the premier read: Can civil war be prevented after the decision to suspend the organs in Kosovo?

I am a supporter of democratic changes, democratic dialogues, and of searching for all solutions in a democratic way. Kosovo is obviously a great problem, but it is a civil and human and especially an economic and political one.

We are fully aware of this. It would demand a great deal of time to work out all the causes that have led to this problem. The relations arising from the former Constitution led to tension between Serbia and the province. I think that we must search for solutions in a democratic way and through a democratic dialogue. It certainly is not good that a declaration is adopted which may be comprehended as a demand for secession, just as it is not good that a situation is reached when an assembly is suspended. One should strive so that the disentanglement of events is made possible by democratic means. The FEC and I personally are prepared to involve ourselves as people and as politicians in disentangling the situation, so that we may bring it back to at least the situation that prevailed a month or so ago, and so that relations are defined through normal processes and through the holding of multiparty elections.

[BORBA] Do you think that Serbia's decision on suspension is constitutional, and why were innocent children allowed to die?

[Markovic] The Constitutional Court and the Legislative Commission decide whether something is constitutional or not.

[BORBA] Why are there no provinces in Croatia, such as Lika and Dalmatia?

[Markovic] I do not know whether the prerequisites exist for setting up provinces there. This is a specific question that concerns Croatia.

[BORBA] What about the rights of Macedonians in neighboring countries?

[Markovic] We will have the right to raise the question of our national minorities in other countries to the extent that we treat the national minorities properly in our country.

Regarding questions that are specifically connected with Macedonia, one knows that they refer to the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. Some time ago, I talked with the Bulgarian premier about the Macedonian minority. He remarked that some Great Macedonia ambitions exist. We said that this was excluded, that it had no support from our country, and that it was a matter of civil rights. I advocated this thesis.

It is the right of every person to decide what he is and to express himself ethnically, to have a right to cultural, civic, and other facilities. We do not demand anything else. He agreed with this in our talks at that time.

[BORBA] Our country conducts a two-faced policy, and it advocates reciprocity of relations with both Albania and Greece.

[Markovic] As far as we are concerned, our policy cannot be called two-faced, but one can say that some other policies toward us are two-faced.

[BORBA] What if the Socialist Republic of Macedonia is forced to proclaim a break of relations with Greece?

[Markovic] One should first check what Greek Premier Mitsotakis actually said. We are in diplomatic contact with Greek representatives on all these questions. I hope that through a democratic dialogue we will make it possible, in the interest of both countries, to solve all the disputed questions in the way that the European Assembly and all the institutions in Europe demand that the questions of rights of persons, peoples, and nationalities be solved. Regarding the break of diplomatic relations, only Yugoslavia as a whole still determines that.

[The following passages are boxed within the body of the item:]

Agreement Is Possible

The FEC advocates that all 24 amendments to the SFRY Constitution be adopted. Eleven amendments obtained the consent of all the members of the Constitutional Commission, and the remaining 13 were adopted by a majority vote. For some of them, only one vote was against.... We have had talks in all the republics and until now we have clarified individual questions and were told that even those republics that had the most objections—Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia—will reexamine their "reservations" about some amendments.

Otherwise, all the amendments that delete about one half of the Constitution will pass. Likewise, all those that define the economic system also have a good chance of passing. The same applies to those that define the political system, rights and freedoms of people, and the multiparty system. The exception is the amendment that relates to the Federal Chamber, where Serbia demands "one man, one vote" and Slovenia wants the Federal Chamber to be abolished. This is not logical because ultimately even Slovenia had elections to the Sociopolitical Chamber and the Communal Chamber, as well as the Associated Labor Chamber, which quite certainly are incompatible with the system we are building. According to this logic there is no reason for anyone blocking the existence of the Federal Chamber or the elections to this chamber by the end of the year. This new Federal Chamber, which will be set up in multiparty elections, will then, among other things, decide what the Constitution will eventually be like.

The amendments that do not pass will be neither considered nor adopted, but the discussion of them will continue. The FEC will propose that all the amendments not agreed upon should be an issue at multiparty elections, and then they should be decided.

Program of the Entire Country

Asked what keeps him going so that despite many improper objections he does not "give up," and whether he has anything special to add in conclusion, Ante Markovic said:

I wish to express my thanks for the support which, judging by numerous telegrams, is coming from many citizens. I believe that we are working on a program which offers a great opportunity to this society. This society deserves to live a better, more democratic, and richer life than it has so far. This is not a program of a single team or of a single man, but the program of this country. We are kept going by our debt to the new generations who deserve to live much better than we have.

Tax Does Not Mean Centralization

We opted for the European taxation system, the system of value-added tax, as far back as one year ago. When we explained this to Croatia and Slovenia, they immediately said: "We are in favor of this system." Therefore, we are not talking about some kind of centralization, but a normal, compatible system of taxation, without which a market economy would ultimately not be able to function.

FEC in Elections at Federal Level

Answering the question of a Skopje Television journalist whether the premier can found his own party or rally a coalition around the FEC's program, Markovic said:

"This FEC has already been functioning for more than 16 months. It has been working day and night on the program which is being accepted by all the republics and provinces, particularly all citizens. With this has the federal government not carried out major preparations for the elections at the federal level? I do not believe that any part of Yugoslavia can join Europe today without the government's program. This is the only program that is recognized by everybody in the world. It is therefore logical that the team which has done so much on this program and brought to its most fruitful stage should have not only the right but also the duty to try and rally all progressive forces in the country that are ready to extend their support to this program at the federal elections.

About Information

At a time when the Yugoslav media is considerably fragmented, the FEC has been trying to ensure information dissemination at the national level. With this aim in mind, Markovic said, the government is currently taking

over several federal newspapers and is conducting talks with Yugoslav radio and television centers concerning the launching of a Yugoslav information program.

Slovene Recruits

[BORBA] Will the young people in Slovenia and Croatia succeed in depoliticizing the Yugoslav Peoples' Army, and how does the FEC view all this?

[Markovic] I do not believe that the youth will depoliticize the Army. We, as the FEC, have decided to carry out the depolitization of administration and are already working on it. We proposed the Law on Administration, which is moving in that direction. Depolitization is what will ultimately be carried out in all aspects of society.

Guarantees

[BORBA] What kind of guarantees do our banks provide to somebody who has been working for 20 years in Sweden and wants to put his money in a bank?

[Markovic] They provide top guarantees, like all other banks in Europe that operate under the conditions of a market economy. Our banks provide somewhat greater guarantees if the money is deposited in the form of savings. In this case even the state provides guarantees. If the money is used to purchase stocks, then the guarantees would be the same as those provided by banks in other countries.

[BORBA] A viewer is the owner of old stocks. Will they be valid once the Treska work organization becomes a joint stock company?

[Markovic] We have not yet had a case like that. He will probably have to talk to the Treska organization.

There are also some calls to reexamine the Law on Denationalization. We have solved part of it through the Law on Founding Cooperatives. With this law we enabled cooperatives to regain the possession of everything that was nationalized through the founding of agricultural-industrial combines.

[BORBA] Has the return of confiscated property been envisaged?

[Markovic] The situation concerning this varies from case to case. There are some people whose property was nationalized because this system considered it to be inappropriate. There are also those who were tried for various events in the war and had their property confiscated because of that. There is no single answer to this question.

There Is No Conflict With Kadijevic

Answering the viewers question, the president of the FEC rejected the rumors carried by some media about a conflict with Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense.

Markovic laconically said that Veljko Kadijevic was a member of the FEC and the team which is carrying out the aforementioned reforms.

Improper Monopolists

Answering the question about what action the FEC will take against the disobedient republics, which have increased the price of gasoline, bread, flour, electricity, and so forth, disregarding the federal regulations, Ante Markovic said that this was the case of monopolists who emerged from the consensus economy and who are now using their positions.

We were of the opinion, Markovic said, that this move concerning the price of oil products in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia is in fact an administrative decision of the executive councils of these republics rather than the oil industries. The prices were set in violation of the laws in this country because these prices are under the FEC's control. What they have done is also extremely improper toward this branch of industry and toward the federal budget, because we relieved the oil industry of 20 percent of sales tax and left the funds to the oil industry to make good the losses that have been amassing in the last few years. During this year these funds will probably amount to something between three and four billion new dinars, which is over 500 million Deutche marks.

Let there be no illusions. We have opted for a new development which assumes the building of infrastructure, particularly the transportation network, because developing a modern society will require communications within that market and with the European and world markets. We know that from these sources we have to set aside funds for the construction of roads and the use of international loans. [as published] Together with the International Bank and the EC we have opened the way for the construction of roads in our country. We want to stimulate such construction, but I think that we should, not affecting the anti-inflationary measures, first financially rescue the oil industry and then embark on the construction of roads.

The Croatian Executive Council has already indicated that it would agree to reduce the price of oil, provided that Slovenia and Serbia agree to do the same. I think that this should be done. We will organize talks about it and hope that they will produce results.

As far as the prices of communal services are concerned, these prices were frozen only in the first six months. They are now free. We assumed that they would not rise above the level which they have now reached. However, this a matter for communal, city, and other assemblies because it is in fact they who have been making such decisions and such high prices. I must say that the prices of some communal services were lower, like, for example, in Belgrade, where the cost of renting accommodations is indeed low. As a friend of mine said, an accommodation was like two-three packets of cigarettes.

Presidency Denounces RELINDJA Commentary

LD2707213290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1314 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—The SFRY Presidency's Press and Information Office was authorized to issue the following statement:

The newspaper RILINDJA published a commentary on 26 July, which inaccurately and maliciously interprets the SFRY Presidency's stance that possible solutions for the future mutual relations within Yugoslavia and for the future of the country's constitutional system are best sought through talks with republican and provincial leadership. The paper claims that "the SFRY Presidency holds that the future of Yugoslavia can be determined without Albanians and by excluding Kosovo from an all-Yugoslav space." It also states that "talks about the future of Yugoslavia were held with the republican presidencies and the Vojvodina Presidency, but not with legitimate representatives of Kosovo," and that "in ignoring a federal unit, the SFRY Presidency showed that it is not interested in the fate of a part of the country."

These claims made by RILINDJA are completely inaccurate and ill-meant.

When initiating these talks, the SFRY Presidency, in agreement with the presidents of all republican and provincial presidencies, including the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, arranged dates for the talks. The talks with the leadership of the Socialist Autonomist Province of Kosovo were scheduled for 12 July, but, at the proposal of the Kosovo Presidency, they were postponed until 17 July.

When this issue was discussed at a session of the SFRY Presidency, also attended by the president of the Kosovo Presidency, Comrade Hisen Kajdomcaj, the SFRY Presidency suggested that the Kosovo Presidency decide who, apart from members of the Kosovo Presidency, would attend the talks. However, the Kosovo Presidency informed the SFRY Presidency that the agreed talks could not be held "because conditions for them are not met as a result of the status of the Kosovo Presidency following the current situation in Kosovo."

Regarding the current situation, it should be said that at this stage of talks, neither assemblies nor executive councils of the republics and provinces are officially involved, and that the Kosovo Presidency exists and operates legally. The president of the Kosovo Presidency took part in the work of the SFRY Presidency at this stage.

In any case, reasons why talks have not been held should not be sought in the SFRY Presidency. The SFRY Presidency holds that the talks could have been and could be held even under the existing conditions.

TANJUG Views Reaction to Markovic Party

LD3007223390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2157 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—The decision by Prime Minister Ante Markovic to form a party of his own, i.e. of his government, has met with approval of many political parties and citizens. An initiating Committee for the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia was set up in Belgrade on Monday, to make preparations for the party's founding conference and to be in charge of other activities prior to it.

The most frequent opinion in a poll conducted by TANJUG on Monday was that what Markovic offered on Mount Kozara, in Yugoslavia's Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic, yesterday was the "only and best way of [word indistinct] Yugoslavia and bringing it closer to developed Europe and the world." "The Yugoslavs have at last been offered a realistic chance for countering the country's disintegration," respondents pointed out.

"The Alliance of Reformist forces is the only chance to form at the Yugoslav level an important political force for the forthcoming multi-party elections in Yugoslavia," a meeting of the Socialist Party of Montenegro was told today. Leaders of the Republic's Democratic Party described markovic's initiative as the "only chance to put a modern concept of democracy in opposition to nationalism."

A similar conclusion was reached by a majority of parties in Yugoslavia's republic of Macedonia. The Macedonian Social Democratic Party found it "natural to join Markovic's party" because its own programme corresponds to the Federal government's programme of reforms. The Party of Yugoslavs, the Democratic Party of (ethnic) Hungarians in [word indistinct] and the Democratic Socialist Alliance of Bosnia-Herzegovina today also announced their intention to join the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia.

Shkelzen Malioi, an Albanian opposition leader in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia's Republic of Serbia, told TANJUG that Markovic's reformist alliance was an "option which has chances" but that the Yugoslav crisis was "too deep."

From headquarters of the Croatian Democratic Union, the party which overwhelmingly won the April-May Elections in Croatia, came the position that "everbody in Yugoslavia has the right to form a party," with a reserve that the "concept of Markovic's federal Yugoslavia is nevertheless a thing of the past."

Similar doubts were expressed today by leaders of political parties in Slovenia, where Yugoslavia's first non-communist government was voted in three months ago, and where tendencies for a confederation to replace the existing federation are strengthening.

Democratic Party Executive [words indistinct] held that Markovic was entitled to form a party provided he had

previously quitted the League of Communists of Croatia. [words indistinct] democratic changes. Leaders of the Socialist Party, the People's Party and the Peoples Radical Party of Serbia ctiticized the Yugoslav prime minister for having promoted his party on Mount Kozara yesterday "at the state's expense" and with the kind of publicity the opposition can only dream of.

Addressing about 100,000 people who attended a rally on that historic place from World War Two, Markovic annunced the formation of a party open to all who support the programme of reforms proposed by his government.

First Collective Bargaining Contract Signed

LD2707200590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1413 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Ljubljana, July 27 (TANJUG)—For the first time in postwar Yugoslavia, organized workers and employers have signed a collective contract after accord was reached here between representatives of the free trade unions and the economic chamber of Slovenia, Yugoslavia's most industrialized republic.

Along with the basic rights, the contract guarantees the minimum wages of around 3,100 dinars (240 U.S. dollars) for full hours and specified output. When negotiations opened several months ago, the T.U. demanded the minimum of 4,200 dinars (360 U.S. dollars) while the economic chamber offered half the sum.

The branch contracts, only to be signed, and certain contracts in enterprises may provide for raising the workers' rights and wages still further.

Slovenia's Kucan Warns Against 'Party Interests'

AU2807180590 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 23 Jul 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Milan Kucan: Now Is the Time for Creative Work Which Demands a Further Building of Democratic Society"]

[Text] Kapele, 22 Jul—At a brass band convention to mark the 140th anniversary of the Kapele Fire Brigade Brass Band and a festive rally on the Uprising Day of the Slovene People, Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of Slovenia, stressed the significance and connection between apparently quite unconnected events: the remembrance of the beginning of the struggle of the Slovene people against the occupiers, the struggle for freedom against the Fascist and Nazi threat to the Slovenes and European democracy, and the jubilee of the Kapele brass band.

As Kucan said, the two events are nevertheless connected by something that cannot be overseen: brass bands in Slovenia had a significant influence on the shaping of the cultural and national identity of the Slovene people. Speaking about the current political situation, he said among other things:

"The challenges and problems that are now before us are great and fateful. Neither the old ones, piled up in the past, nor the new ones generated by the present circumstances and the desire for a quicker denouement of the crisis will by themselves be sufficient for our mature answers. Spasms, disagreements, dissatisfaction, and impatience are an understandable accompaniment of these processes. They can be resolved only through sensible, tolerant, and democratic activities, through cooperation of the political forces, and through a joint search for solutions. Therefore, it is necessary as soon as possible to turn away from the election campaign and the competition of people's and parties' programs typical of the election time to the implementation of these programs. Election time is behind us. Now is the time for creative work, which demands of us to continue to build a democratic Slovene society, and to fulfill the expectations and the trust of the people. These expectations are above all connected with peace, political stability, nonviolence, and particularly with successful economic activities and reliable social security. The warning of the Free Trade Unions with their September general strike is more than convincing and becomes more and more justified every day that workers and peasants problems are not being solved. We are more and more intensively living under conditions which demand that work by workers and intellectuals should regain its respect and reward. There have been too many warnings against straying into a situation in which we would offer fresh hatred instead of fulfilling these expectations and trust of the people, and in which, through dividing people and splitting the nation again, we would annul the foundations of the democratic vision and successful development of Slovene society that have been laid. The price of freedom has been too great, and too much has been invested—including the symbolic reconciliation—in the elimination of some unhealed wounds on the national body, that we could again push the Slovene people to an uncertain future and that we could and should allow ourselves such a conduct.

"We must be concerned when we see that principles are being trampled upon, principles which we all who actively took part in the election campaign supported, so to speak, as at a plebiscite. Proclaiming or crudely imposing party interests as national interests, clashes between party leaderships without democratically consulting the electoral body merely strengthen blind, unproductive confrontations which are not and must not be in the interest of the people and not to the credit of the emerging sovereign Slovene state and its international prestige and affirmation. Vehement references to an abnormal situation, as strong as they may be, cannot justify superficial and even professionally questionable conduct and measures. Even less can the solving of our problems and the settling of our future be helped by a priori attitudes, forceful implementation of otherwise legitimate rights, a renewal of ideological and political uniformity, turning a sincere and responsible elimination of individuals injustices into a hysterical witch hunt

against the adversaries, and denigrating everything that has been achieved in the past 45 years."

Bosnia Reserve Officers Support Markovic Party

LD3007165690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1346 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—"In light of the many initiatives we received from members and from basic and municipal Federation of Reserve Officers organizations, we are informing you with great satisfaction, pride, and responsibility that we are united in our support for the reform concept whose creator and protagonist you are." Thus reads the message that the Presidium of the Republican Conference of Bosnia-Hercegovina Federation of Reserve Officers sent today to Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council following his speech on Mt. Kozara.

Bosnia-Hercegovina reserve officers also stress that their 104,000 active members will be consistent interpreters of the reform commitments which they will specifically implement. They say they will also join the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia, which, they believe, will make their activity as a nonparty and independent social organization even more immediate and responsible during the period ahead.

Bosnian-Hercegovina Assembly To Have One Chamber

AU3007171690 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The delegates of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina failed to adopt changes to the republican constitution and a package of election laws. Two Assembly Chambers again lacked a quorum which was not secured until later. Ljubomir Nikolic has the details:

[Nikolic] What we anticipated and expected has happened. The Sociopolitical Chamber and the Chamber of Associated Labor did not have a quorum this morning. There was a rush to find delegates, and the quorum necessary to make decisions was secured only after 1400 [1200 GMT].

Despite an opposing view on the part of the majority of the assembly committees, the republican constitutional commission decided this morning that the future parliament of Bosnia-Hercegovina will consist of only one chamber. According to the members of the commission, this will ensure better proportional representation of the peoples and nationalities in the assembly and eliminate the possibility of one of these, in case there is a coalition between the other two chambers, being subordinated.

One should point out, however, that the leaders of various opposition parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina, except the Muslim Party and the Youth Party, favor a two-chamber assembly. [passage omitted]

At today's session delegates demanded more information about the visit by the delegation of this republic to Zagreb, because the meager statement that was issued did not indicate the similarities and differences in the views of the Bosnian and Croatian leaderships, especially when it is known that Bosnia-Hercegovina is in favor of a federation while Croatia insists on a confederation.

Delegate Rajko Krunic wondered how Tudjman was able, according to the press, to say that the views of the two republics are only slightly different, that they are almost identical.

Muhamed Berberovic, member of the republican presidency and the delegation that went to Zagreb, said that the shorthand notes of the meeting held in Zagreb exist, and that they will be presented to the delegates. [passage omitted]

Foca Prisoners Protest Amnesty Provisions

LD3007154590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Foca, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—Today in the penal-corrective center in Foca, one of the biggest institutions of its kind in Bosnia-Hercegovina, most of the prisoners refused to accept food or to carry out their daily tasks, dissatisfied with the realization of legal provisions on amnesty.

They are requesting that decisions be carried out more frequently on the reduction of prison sentences, therefore contributing to the humanization of the policy on leveling criminal sanctions. The administration of the penal-corrective center has relayed the demands of the inmates to the republican secretary for justice and administration.

Serbian Assembly on Election of Key Officials

AU3007165890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] [Announcer] Candidates for people's deputies in the Serbian Assembly may be nominated by parties, movements, alliances, associations, and groups of citizens. The same rule applies to the candidates for the president of the Republic. This was stated at the session of the Serbian Executive Council during the adoption of the draft law on the election of people's deputies and the draft law on the election of the president of the Republic. Marinela Raznatovic reports:

[Raznatovic] The multiparty system that is being introduced by the Constitution was of crucial importance for the adoption of the new law on the election of people's deputies. For the first time in 45 years the citizens are guaranteed the opportunity to elect people's deputies by a secret ballot on the basis of free, general, equal, and direct election rights.

People's deputies, as the draft law states, would be elected in electoral units [izborne jedinice] every four years. The elections would be scheduled by the president of the People's Assembly 15 days before the end of his term of office at the latest. Candidates could be put forward by parties, movements, alliances, associations, and groups of citizens. Candidates must meet only one condition: They must have the signatures of 500 citizens in their electoral unit.

Considering the multiparty character of elections, the principle of presenting candidates to the electorate is introduced for the first time. Election campaigns must end 48 hours before the opening of the polling stations.

The results of elections would be established on the basis of the principle of the majority election system. In other words, the deputy's mandate will be given to the candidate who has the majority of votes, provided that the turnout at the elections in an electoral unit is at least 51 percent.

Regarding the dismissal of deputies, the draft law proposes stricter conditions in order to prevent discrediting and dismissal of people's deputies as a method and consequences of party rivalry.

Candidates for the president of the Republic could also be put forward by registered parties, movements, alliances, or associations, individually or jointly, or by a group of at least 100 citizens. Any citizen of the Republic may be proposed for the president of the Republic provided that he is between 35 and 65 years of age. The candidate who receives the majority of votes will become president. The procedure concerning the dismissal of the president is initiated by the nominator if he collects the signatures of at least one quarter of the electorate in the Republic.

The elections for the president of the Republic in 1990 will be scheduled by the Presidency of Serbia.

This is the essence of the draft law on the election of people's deputies and the president of the Republic. The final decision will be made by the Serbian Assembly after a public debate.

Serbian Socialists Adopt Draft Constitution

LD3007201490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1826 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—The largest Yugoslav republic, Serbia, was ready to discuss with other republics the future of a Yugoslavia which would suit all, but was also ready for another possibility—a Serbia as an independent state, it was set out on Monday at a Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) main committee's executive session.

The leadership of the SPS, recently formed after the League of Communists of Serbia and the Serbian Socialist Alliance merged into a single party, on Monday adopted the draft of the new constitution of Serbia. As assessed, the draft constitution showed that Serbia was ready to give up a part of its sovereignty for a Yugoslavia which would respect the interests of all its republics and peoples.

However, it was assessed negatively at the session that even now in some parts of Yugoslavia—after more than 70 years since its [word indistinct] anti-Yugoslav atmosphere is being [words indistinct] points scored with ones own nation.

Serbian Militia Alleged Repressions in Kosovo

AU2707135290

[Editorial Report] Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian on 24 July carries on page 14 three 200-word reports on the behavior of the Serbian militia in Kosovo. Under the headline "Militiamen Search Citizens," a "D.D."-signed report states:

"While the state distributes large quantities of weapons to Serbs, the militia of Serbia are continuing to search Albanian citizens and their houses throughout Kosovo, looking for firearms. Citizens are searched everywhere: in the streets, in their homes, in cafes, tea shops, and other public places. The population has been seized by a psychosis of fear and alarm at what the future may bring. It has been reported that the homes of Albanian families have been searched in the communes of Obilic, Podujevo, Pec, Vucitrn, Istok, and elsewhere.

"There was also a strict police search the evening before last in Istok Commune, of the kind that can only be seen in films about totalitarian systems. The militia descended from their Pinzgauers and searched citizens closely wherever they were, in the streets and cafes, pointing weapons at them from their motor vehicles. Citizens dared not move and stood with their hands held high."

Under the headline "Horror in the Jashanica Family," an "S.Q."-signed report with the dateline of "Lipljan, 23 July" states: "Shortly before 2300 yesterday evening in Fehmi Jashanica's apartment at No. 8 Aksic Brothers Street in Lipljan, a scene of exceptional horror took place. As the family was resting after the day's work, and in the presence of their guest Sadik Syla, who resigned from his post as a militiaman in this commune a few days ago, three militiamen, two of whom were from the Serbian Secretariat for Internal Affairs, broke down the door without warning and entered by force. They pointed their rifle barrels at the family, and attacked Sadik Syla, kicking him and beating him with rifle butts. After this manhandling, they carried him to the local militia station. The members of the family suffered deep shock and a trauma which will be hard to forget. Fehmi's wife Kimete, his daughters Ganimete and Florije, and Teuta Zeqiri, a young girl who was also a visitor, fainted and were given medical aid.

"As Afrim Jashanica said (like his father, this young man was also struck by the militia), Sadik was sent back to

this family after 30 minutes at the militia station, where he was insulted and manhandled. He was asked among other things for the 1,000 German marks which Agim Mala [former Pristina Television director], Fehmi Agani, and Jusuf Buxhovi [members of the Presidium of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance] were said to have given him as a reward for handing in his militia uniform. They also asked him to tell them what would happen in Pristina on Monday, 23 July."

Under the headline "Beaten Because of a Picture of Skenderbeg!," a V. Bytyci-signed report with the dateline of "Prizren, 23 July" states:

"There is still no end to the physical assaults, manhandling, and repression on the part of the Serbian militia.

"The young men Ruzhdi Kadrijaj from the village of Petrovo and Nehat Bojaxhiu from Prizren were fresh victims of this repression at about 1900 the evening before last in the Marash district of Prizren. A car with three Serbian militiamen stopped them. They were then manhandled and insulted because of their nationality, and finally severely beaten. The two young men told us that this happened because Nehat was wearing a T-shirt with a picture of the legendary Albanian hero Skenderbeg. The militiamen first asked him who this was, and on being told that it was Skenderbeg mounted on a horse, they pointed their revolvers at Nehat, forced him to remove the shirt, and set fire to it with a cigarette lighter, saying that all the Albanians will burn like this! They then attacked the young man with their fists, insulting him continually. Finally, they took away his identity card and did not return it."

Kosovo Serbs Buy Weapons, Ammunition

AU3007131090 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 25 Jul 90 p 11

[S. Popova report: "The Legal Arming of Serbs and Montenegrins"]

[Text] Vucitrn, 24 Jul—The Administrative Secretariat for Internal Affairs in Vucitrn has never had so much work as recently, especially its official for weapons and ammunition. In recent days, a large number of Serbs and Montenegrins have been seen at this secretariat, submitting applications for weapons or collecting licenses. The queue of Serbs and Montenegrins recalls the days when there were shortages of basic foodstuffs on the market.

We did not succeed in obtaining any information from the official for weapons and ammunition in our quest for objective information about the phenomenon of the legal arming of Serbs and Montenegrins. Fortunately, not all sources of information are closed to journalists. For instance, we managed to ascertain the fact that on 20 July alone the Vucitrn department store sold 113 revolvers, one M-80 rifle, one M-8 rifle, five CZ 75/16 hunting rifles, two CZ 7x62x39 carbines, six CZ 8x56 carbines, and two other carbines. On the same day, 1,130 bullets were sold. We managed to discover that those who obtained weapons included one Albanian and one Romany Gypsy.

We were told unofficially that worn-out guns, as well as less worn-out second-hand guns, are also being sold at the Vucitrn department store these days. It seems that these weapons were confiscated some time ago from people without gun licenses. We also unofficially learned that a long list of Serbs and Montenegrins asking for gun licenses has arrived at the Vucitrn Administrative Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and not to this secretariat alone in Kosovo. It must finally be stressed that it used to be the practice to "vet" applications for gun licenses several times, but the procedure is now a swift one!

DSK Warns Against Arming Serbs, Montenegrins

LD2707214190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1313 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Pristina, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—The leadership of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [Demokratski savez Kosova—DSK] warned at today's news conference of the danger which may arise, as they said, in the present situation with the arming of members of the Serbian and Montenegrin nationality in Kosovo. Explaining that this is causing indignation among Albanians, DSK Chairman Ibrahim Rugova called for an end to the "issuing of permits for fire arms," which, he has ascertained, are given to Serbs and Montenegrins by a "simplified procedure."

Zekerijah Cana assessed this as "yet another act of terrorism with which the non-Slavic population in Kosovo is being threatened."

The explanation of officialdom that the "weapons are being issued for the self-defense of Serbs and Montenegrins" is simply farcical. As Cana said, the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo enjoy the protection of the state and are in any case armed.

The additional enrolment of students from Belgrade, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, and Nis in the first year at Pristina University was qualified as a "Stalinist method," because "the enrollment of Serbian students simply deprives young Albanians of the right to study, and also about 300 Serbs, and Monenegrins who, despite excellent results, have been unable to enroll, for example, in the Faculty of Medicine."

This "fact" forces us to demand of Pristina University that it enroll in September all remaining Albanians who do not succeed in enrolling at one of the universities throughout the country, Rugova said. He added that "it can now be seen that the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo are used as a means by the state organs when it serves their allegedly higher aims."

Rugova today repeated the demand that "the assembly and its Executive Council, as the only legitimate organs in Kosovo, should resume their work as soon as possible."

"Our party," he added, also calls for the immediate unblocking of Pristina radio-television and "an end to the pressure being applied to Pristina's RLINDJA by the state organs and the Belgrade press which wants an end to the publication of the only paper in Albanian."

Today's news conference was again held on the premises of the Writers Society of Kosovo, to which the police have banned entry for the past three weeks, but now allowed them inside.

In response to the only remark from a journalist that Serbia today began the registration of parties and associations, Rugova replied that this is "in accordance with Serbian law" and that they are waiting for a Kosovo law on the political association of citizens. Besides, Rugova added, there is no one in Kosovo to register us, unless the police do it." [quotation mark as received]

Five Political Parties Registered in Montenegro

LD3007113590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0926 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Titograd, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—Five political parties have been registered formally in Montenegro so far. According to Mihailo Nikolic, the republican secretary of justice, the parties have been registered in the following sequence: the League of Communists [Savez komunista]; the Democratic Party [Demokratska partija]; the People's Party [Narodna partija]; the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro [Liberalni savez Crne Gore]; and the Party of Socialists [Partija socijalista], which has just been formed and has emerged in the process of the transformation of the Socialist Alliance of Working People. There are 17 political organizations in Montenegro at the moment; some are "old" and some new.

Montenegrin Communists Announce Congress

AU3007190990 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Montenegro, which is discussing the program and organizational transformation of the party, is currently underway in Titograd. The members of the Central Committee are assessing the current debate on the election platform of the League of Communists. They have already adopted the draft of a new constitution and a declaration on the future activities of its members. The date of the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Montenegro has also been set. Here is a report by Jagos Stojanovic:

[Stojanovic] In order to fully transform the League of Communists of this republic, which has over 70,000 members in 2,000 organizations, the members of the Central Committee have scheduled the 11th congress. The congress will be held in two parts: The first part will be held sometime in October when the party is expected to transform itself from a sociopolitical party into a modern, democratic, left-oriented political party with a new statue, whose draft was adopted today, and with new program documents. The second part of the congress would be held after the multiparty assembly elections. This part of the congress would concentrate on cadre and organizational changes. [passage omitted]

Parties in Serbia To Register Beginning 29 Jul

AU2907171690 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 90 p 1

[I. Anojcic report: "Registration of Parties in Serbia Beginning 29 July"]

[Text] Today's Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic [SR] of Serbia should carry the law on political organizations, according to Valdeta Popovic, general secretary of the Assembly of the SR of Serbia.

Among other things, this law will set out in clear detail the procedure for the registration of political organizations by the responsible organ, the Secretariat for Justice and Administration of the SR of Serbia. According to Article Seven of this law, a political organization is inscribed in the register on the day its application is submitted to the Republican Secretariat for Justice. By being inscribed in the register, a political organization becomes a juridical entity.

Article Ten of the law states that authorized persons will submit applications for the registration of political organizations in the register of the responsible organ. An application must be accompanied by the founding act of the political organization and evidence of meeting the criterion for registration, that the political organization possesses at least 100 adult members.

If the responsible organ does not issue a decision concerning the inscription of the political organization in the register within a period of 30 days and does not issue a decision to reject the application, the political organization is to be considered entered in the register under Article Ten, paragraph four.

The Official Gazette of the SR of Serbia, to be published today, will bear the date of 21 July. Article 21 of the law on political organization states that the law comes into force eight days after its publication in the Official Gazette of the SR of Serbia.

Socialist Party of Serbia Registered

LD2707155190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—Registration of political organizations began this morning in the Republican Secretariat for Justice in Belgrade. At 1200 the first party was registered—the Socialist Party of Serbia.

According to Aleksandar Veljkovic, senior adviser in this secretariat, several other applications have been received, but these parties cannot be registered because their documentation is not complete.

Until the law on elections is adopted, all registered parties will be able to hold public meetings without hindrance, Veljkovic said. When the election law is passed, all registered political organisations will be able to participate equally in the "preelection campaign."

Croatian Serbs' Declaration of Autonomy

AU3007205090 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jul 90 p 7

["Text" of the "Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian People" adopted in Srb on 25 July]

[Text] Proceeding from the universal principle of a people's right to self-determination, including the right to secession, and proceeding from the existing norms in the SFRY Constitution and in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and particularly the provision of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia whereby the Socialist Republic of Croatia is also the state of the Serbian people in Croatia, and for the sake of protecting its national sovereignty and freedom, the Serbian people who live on the historical territories unified by the present borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia have adopted and issued at the Serbian meeting held in Srb on 25 July 1990 a Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian People.

1. Within the borders of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which is also the state of the Serbian people who live in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, the Serbian people are, on the basis of their geographical, historical, social, and cultural specificities, a sovereign people with all the rights that constitute the sovereignty of peoples.

In establishing new relations in Yugoslavia, the Serbian people in the Socialist Republic of Croatia have the full right to take a stand, either together with the Croatian people or independently, on a federative or a confederative state structure .

The form that the Yugoslav community chooses cannot be adopted without the participation of the Serbian people in Croatia, and this particularly holds true for cases of legitimate secession. Peoples secede and not states.

The Serbian people give themselves the right to decide with whom they live on the historic territories which are joined by the present borders of Croatia, in which regime they will live, and how they will associate with the other peoples in Yugoslavia.

No one has the historic right to determine the fate of the Serbian people who have lived here for centuries, even before the creation of the state of Croatia.

2. On the basis of their sovereignty, the Serbian people in Croatia have the right to autonomy. The elements of this autonomy depend on the federative or confederative structure of Yugoslavia.

Under conditions of a federative state structure, the Serbian people have the right to the unhindered and unrestricted use, for official and private purposes, of the Serbian literary language, the Cyrillic script, schools and Serbian school programs, cultural and political institutions, enterprises, press, and Serbian radio and television.

The organization of this autonomy will be implemented only through full communal self-management, particularly in communes where the Serbian people are in the majority, and through these communes joining together into communities.

Under the conditions of a confederative state structure in Yugoslavia, the Serbian people in Croatia have a right to political-territorial autonomy.

3. A Serbian parliament [Srpski sabor] has been set up as the political representative of the Serbian people in Croatia which will meet in Srb.

A Serbian national council has been set up as the executive organ of the Serbian parliament.

The Serbian national council has the right to organize plebiscites for the Serbian people to decide on all issues that are important for their position in Croatia and Yugoslavia, as well as other issues that concern the realization of Serbian sovereignty and autonomy.

4. The Serbian national council is an independent organ which implements the decisions of the Serbian parliament and this declaration between the two sittings of the Serbian parliament. It also prepares questions on which the Serbian parliament will make a decision and the Serbian people will vote.

5. At its meeting on 25 July 1990, the Serbian parliament proclaims as invalid for the Serbian people in Croatia all the constitutional and legal changes which negate their sovereignty as a people and reduce their autonomous rights.

6. The Serbian people in Croatia are demanding nothing more than those rights which other modern peoples in Europe have had and enjoyed for a long time.

Croatia's Tudjman on Croatian-Serbian Relations

LD2807041990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1932 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Zagreb, 27 Jul (TANJUG)—Despite attempts to destabilize the new democratic order in Croatia, we can with conviction consider that what we have achieved so far provides a guarantee that we will achieve a stable system and normal conditions for the life together of all

citizens. In this way we will also achieve the preconditions for normal contractual processes of negotiation between Croatia and Serbia and other nations and republics in Yugoslavia in a democratic way.

This was stated by Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, in an interview of Croatian Television and the Vjesnik newspaper, in which he pointed to "the historical majority in the establishment of the democratic of Croatia."

Tudjman also drew attention to "the critical element" in future circumstances, when, to oppose the session of the (Croatian) Assembly at which the Republic of Croatia was proclaimed, "an assembly of Serbs was conjured up, and when there was a desire not only to provoke disorder but also the necessity of intervention or a political settling of scores, and even military intervention." However, with the amendments which we have adopted, Dr. Tudjman said, and with the political and economic sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, we are creating the conditions for the elaboration of a new constitution and for the strengthening of democratic authority. It is clear that we will not allow any violation of the territorial integrity of Croatia.

Replying to a question on the Yugoslavia People's Army, Dr. Franjo Tudjman stressed that the Yugoslav Army should nevertheless show greater understanding for democratic developments in Yugoslavia and the world. But despite this, the Yugoslavia Army should be given recognition for so far remaining on one side and for thus sticking to its basic task—and that is defense from external aggression.

In keeping with the demand for the organization of a new Yugoslavia—if it wishes to survive, and it can survive only on confederal bases as a federation of states—one of the important questions we will raise will also be the question of the organization of the Army, Dr. Tadjman said among other things.

Macedonian Muslims Protest 'Nationalist' Parties

LD3007130290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1138 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Skopje, July 30 (TANJUG)—The Association of Muslim macedonians has urged all Macedonians who are Muslims to fight with all available means against the missionaries of nationalist parties who are trying to recruit Muslim Macedonians for the separatist idea of a greater Albania.

Specifically naming only the Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia, made up solely of ethnic Albanians, the association warned that the respective party was using the Muslim religion for its separatist goals, fanning religious intolerance and causing a rift between Macedonians on a religious basis.

In the public statement issued today, the Assocation of Muslim Macedonians qualified the abuse of Islam for political ends as a flagrant violation of religiouis rights and freedoms and a blow to democracy.

"The Muslim Macedonians can in no case be members of nationalist parties which directly side with the ethnic-Albanian opposition in the province of Kosovo, because that opposition irrationally urges the creation of a Republic of Kosovo and, thereby, of a greater Albania at the expense of Yugoslav territory, that is, of the terrorities of the republics of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro," the statement stresses.

Democratic Action Party Demands Muslim Autonomy

LD3007161690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1445 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJ8UG)—The Democratic Action Party (DAP), which rallies Muslims in Yugoslavia, on Sunday [29 July] demanded cultural and educational autonomy for Muslims in Sanojak, a region in the Republic of Serbia, writes the Belgrade daily POLITIKA today.

The party's rally in the region's centre Novi Pazar yesterday was attended by about 30,000 people.

In case of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro uniting Muslims in Sandjak will also demand political autonomy, speakers at the rally said. The party will shortly change its name to the Party of the Yugoslav Muslims, learns POLITIKA.

The demands were formulated on the example of those of Serbs in Croatia who last week also asked for educational and cultural autonomy if Yugoslavia was constituted as a confederation.

As stated by DAP leaders, their party supports the demands of Serbs in Croatia.

At the Novi Pazar rally, the leaders expressed respect for the "freedom-loving Serbian people" and opposition to the "individuals calling for a crusade against the Muslims." They reminded those "individuals" that there are about five million Muslims in Yugoslavia.

The DAP said it did not want any break-up of Yugoslavia. However, it was not in favour of Yugoslavia as it was now, but only one that would be free and democratic, regardless of whether it was a federation or a confederation.

Slovene Leader Peterle Visits Italy

LD3007124490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1114 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Rome, July 30 (TANJUG)—"Yugoslavia cannot survive as it is now," prime minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia and leader of the Slovene Christian-Democrats Lojze Peterle has stated in an interview published in the Milan daily CORRIERE DELLA SERA today.

The Slovene prime minister arrived in Rome last night on a one-day visit to Italy, at the invitation of Italian prime minister and Christian-Democratic leader Giulio Andreotti.

During the visit to Rome, Peterle will be received in a private audience by Pope John Paul II.

Underscoring the need for Yugoslavia to be made into a confederation, after being a kingdom and a federation, Peterle said that Slovenia was for a community of sovereign nations, a community which would have a common economy, a customs union, a common currency, a common defence strategy and foreign policy.

Meets With Pope, Andreotti

LD3007173690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1345 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Rome, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—Lojze Peterle, president of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, who is also the leader of Slovenia's Christian Democrats, had separate meetings in Rome today with Pope John Paul II and with Giulio Andreotti, Italian prime minister and one of the leaders of the Christian Democratic Party.

Lojze Peterle and members of the Slovene delegation attended a morning mass with Pope John Paul II today at the pope's summer residence in Castel Gandolfo near Rome. Following the mass the head of the Catholic Church received the Slovene delegation for a brief talk. In a statement to Yugoslav journalists in Rome, the Slovene prime minister said that today he informed the pope about developments in Yugoslavia. He remarked that the pope is "well informed." During the talk with the pope, the delegation of Slovene Christian Democrats reiterated a call for setting up an independent bishops conference of Slovenia (it is now part of the bishops conference of Yugoslavia). Their argument is that according to the Catholic Church practice, each sovereign state has its own independent bishops conference. The pope expressed a wish for the Slovene Church to present documents again to support their call.

Lojze Peterle invited Pope John Paul II to visit Slovenia. According to the Slovene prime minister, the pope said that he "will pray for the visit to take place as soon as possible."

Lojze Peterle then met with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and informed him of political relations in Yugoslavia and Slovenia. Dusan Strbac, SFRY ambassador in Rome, also participated in the official part of these talks. He said that on this occasion the great importance of good-neighborly relations between Italy and Yugoslavia in the context of the current changes in Europe was stressed.

The Slovene delegation opened the question of the status of the Slovene national minority in Italy and that of the Italian minority in our country. Andreotti said that the status of the Italian minority in Yugoslavia is improving. He promised that the Italian Government will take into consideration the critical observations set out by the Slovenes of the government's draft law on the protection of the Slovene minority, which has been submitted to parliament. Andreotti, according to Peterle, promised Italian support for the inclusion of Slovenia in European institutions. The Slovene Christian Democrats invited Andreotti, as one of the Christian Democratic leaders of Italy, to visit Slovenia, which was accepted with pleasure by the Italian prime minister. The date of the visit will be fixed later. According to Lojze Peterle, president of the Executive council of the Republic of Slovenia, in talks with Yugoslav journalists, Giulio Andreotti expressed the view that the aspirations of the nations in Yugoslavia and Europe for sovereignty is normal and that they should be supported, but he also said that ways should be found for the peaceful resolution of relations in Yugoslavia.

Lojze Peterle said that the visit and talks in Rome are of very great importance and, he said, are not just symbolic confirmation of Slovene statehood.

The Slovene prime minister also informed journalists about the meeting which the Slovene delegation had this morning in Rome with the delegations of the Slovak Government and the Slovak parliament led by their vice-chairmen, the Carnogursky brothers. An agreement was reached on cooperation between Slovakia and Slovenia at governmental and parliamentary level. Talks will be resumed when Peterle visits Bratislava in the middle of September this year.

Lojze Peterle, president of the Executive council of the Republic of Slovenia, and Dr Andrej Capuder, the [Slovene] culture minister, left Rome in the afternoon for Treviso, where they will have talks with Carlo Bernini, Italian minister of transport, on the construction of the Gorica-Razdrto and Fernetici-Razdrto roads, which are envisaged in the Ossimo Accords.

Summarizes Visit

AU3107151290 Ljubljana Domestic Service in Slovene 1330 GMT 31 Jul 90

[Report on interview with Slovene President Lojze Peterle by Drago Flis in the Slovene Assembly building; date not given]

[Text] Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene government, returned from his visit to Italy and his meeting with Pope John Paul II this morning. In the Slovene Assembly building, our reporter Drago Flis asked him about the most significant aspects of his talks in Rome and in the Vatican.

[Begin recording] [Flis] Mr. Peterle, how does the Italian prime minister and head of the Christian Democrats regard the processes in Yugoslavia, and within this framework, the Slovene strivings for independence?

[Peterle] He regards very favorably those processes in Yugoslavia that mean the peoples becoming independent in a democratic way, but, of course, he does not favor that manner of solving problem that mean repression in Yugoslavia or nonpeaceful solutions to these matters.

[Flis] What conclusions did you reach in Rome about the position of the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian minority in Slovenia?

[Peterle] I expressed to Mr. Andreotti some of our critical views concerning the Maccanico [Italian minister of regional affairs] bill on the protection of the Slovene national community in Italy. He noted this and he said that he is prepared to consider our critical views. I expect that Maccanico's bill will actually be amended.

[Flis] When do you think Maccanico's bill on the overall protection of the Slovene minority in Italy will be adopted?

[Peterle] We did not discuss the deadlines. You know that the affair has been dragging on a long time. If I can rely on what the prime minister said, I suppose that there will be a move by the fall.

[Flis] You were also in a meeting with Pope John Paul II, which was mainly religious in nature. Do you think that the Pope will fulfill our wish to specially visit Slovenia ?

[Peterle] Well, it is interesting that he said that he prays that he will be able to do this as soon as possible, see. One prays when everything is not all right, see. It seems that all the obstacles have not yet been removed so that this may happen. I understood him to mean that he was very much willing for this to happen.

Allow me to tell a joke which he told at the end of meeting with a Slovak delegation, which expressed an equal wish. He said: You know, gentlemen, I will first go to Slovenia and I will visit you afterwards. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Reacts to Bulgarian Statement

LD3007204590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 30 Jul 90

[Text] Belgrade, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—TANJUG has been informed that the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, in its initial reaction to a statement by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, stresses that a report on today's meeting between Stefan Staykov, Bulgaria's deputy foreign minister, and Yugoslav Ambassador Milenko Stefanovic, was received with concern.

This high-ranking Bulgarian official's reaction to yesterday's decision by responsible Yugoslav organs preventing a provocative attempt to lay a wreath at the tomb of Macedonian revolutionary Goce Delcev represents an aspect of Bulgaria's official policy that contains overt greater-Bulgarian aspirations.

Understandably, the Yugoslav ambassador resolutely rejected the Bulgarian side's interpretation and pointed to the damage such an attitude does to Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and to positive cooperation processes in the Balkans.

Serbian Republic, Russian Federation Hold Talks

LD2707230990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1716 GMT 27 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, July 27 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and the Russian Federation will [word indistinct] establish relations, said Serbian Premier Stanko Radmilovic.

Radmilovic explained the new stage in the relations as a result of the role the Russian Federation has following the proclamation of sovereignty.

The Serbian delegation, headed by Radmilovic, today left Moscow after a brief working visit to the Russian Federation.

The talks between the Serbian government delegation and the government of the Russian Federation primarily focused on economic cooperation and scopes for its promotion. Also discussed was the possibility for Serbia to export 600,000 tonnes of wheat in a barter arrangement, [as] well as the construction of a gas pipeline through Serbia.